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 Abstract  
Recent issuances of sukuk were confronted with wide criticism from, both by Islamic 
scholars and investors. The part of the problems arise due to the agency relations in sukuk 
structures that have a distinctive nature with great complexity and various features. Due to 
the higher complexity of the responsibilities undertaken by the agent, greater exposure to 
agency costs results. This research aims to examine sukuk associated risks, agency costs and 
Sharia issues. Specifically, it analyses asset-backed sukuk structures from financial and 
Sharia viewpoints. This is achieved by adopting a case study strategy and inductive approach 
to examine the legal and financial issues arising in three different types of asset linked sukuk 
structures. The data is collected using content analyses of sukuk prospectuses, AAOIFI 
Sharia standards and publications issued by international agencies with the aim of enabling 
the study to achieve insights into the market. Furthermore, information is gathered from 
Sharia scholars using semi structured interviews to generate some specific information on 
the issues involved.   
The objectives of this study are to analyse three key issues: based on theoretical 
discussions identify the risks arising in securities in general and sukuk in particular; to carry 
out a comparative analysis of the principle/agent conflicts which arise in different cases of 
sukuk investment; and to determine the extent of adherence to Sharia rules. The dissertation 
discusses in depth the agency costs that arise in asset-backed sukuk structures. It determines 
how these costs are minimized and conflicts managed in the applications. Among the 
strategies and tools used to reduce agency costs is to apply the concept of co-ownership. 
Under this type of agreement between the originator and investors, the sukuk structure 
becomes more competitive and shows a better allocation of the risks.   
Although the issuance of sukuk are reviewed and approved by eminent scholars, they 
show different levels of contradictions with AAOIFI Sharia standards. The study identifies 
the status of different stipulations of different contracts in terms of Sharia requirements. The 
research then shows the extent to which the compatibility of the sukuk cases differ with key 
Sharia principles. The analysis found that the key requirements are mostly related to the 
guarantee, ownership, principle, return and maintenance costs. It found out that SEC sukuk 
are far away from the spirit of Sharia as most of the essential requirements are not fulfilled. 
 Sadara sukuk show better harmonious with AAOIFI requirements because of their 
unprecedented feature involved in their structure, which highlighted some of the distinctive 
nature of sukuk. Zamzam sukuk achieved the best harmonious with Sharia among the three 
applications. This positive result is attributed to the real ownership to the investment, 
meaning that there is no guarantee for the principle or the return.   
The results show that there is a higher exposure to risks related to liquidity legality 
in sukuk cases than in conventional bonds. More importantly is that the credit risk in sukuk 
cases are higher than in bond investments. The three cases were more exposed to the credit 
risks since any loss in the assets has to influence both the distribution amounts and the 
purchase undertaking. The critical point found is that despite SEC and Sadara sukuk cases 
involve higher exposure to credit risk as required in Islamic finance, they do not provide in 
turn a recourse to the assets according to the concept of sukuk.  The cases also show that the 
purchase undertaking solves the agency conflicts, caused by the originator being the servicer. 
The undertaking device has reduced the incentive asymmetries from different perspectives.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Background  
Starting in the 1970s, Islamic finance has grown rapidly and has now become a global 
phenomenon. While the bulk of the growth in Islamic finance in the earlier period was in the 
banking sector, Islamic capital markets have also been expanding recently. The expansion 
of Islamic capital markets has led to a resurgence of Sharia-compliant financial securities 
called sukuk. The global sukuk market has, since its recovery after the 2008 crisis, grown 
with issuances reaching more than $116 billion in 2014. Therefore, this market is deemed as 
an important source of funds and wealth for many sovereigns, companies and institutions in 
the North Africa, Southeast Asia and Middle East regions (Latham & Watkins, 2015). While 
sukuk1 are sometimes termed Islamic bonds, they differ from them significantly since instead of 
supplying interest to investors, the originator provides profit or rent to them.   
Sukuk have recently been considered to be one of the fastest growing products in the 
international financial landscape, as well as the most successful instrument in the Islamic 
financial landscape. The global volume of sukuk in 2011 was $76 billion, which was five 
times more than in 2005 (Nagano, 2013). During the first half of 2014, the sukuk volume in 
the secondary market reached $286.41 billion with growth of 16.8% year on year and 5% 
quarter-on-quarter (Rasameel, 2014). Statistically, a study named ‘Sukuk Perceptions and 
Forecast’ indicated that sukuk are expected to grow to $907 billion by 2020 while the 
outstanding sukuk issuance in 2014 was only about $175 billion2. Furthermore, in 2014, 19 
jurisdictions tapped the sukuk market, which is regarded as the highest number yet in the 
sukuk market. Thus, sukuk products have received an estimable position in the financial 
market due to their high volume and demand (Ahmed, et al., 2015). This study develops 
                                                   
1 This research applies the word ‘sukuk’ to refer to Islamic bonds and this is plural term. The singular form of 
sukuk is ‘sak’.   
2 The study was conducted by Thomson Reuters at the 21st Annual World Islamic Banking Conference in 
Bahrain 2014. It is based on 44 sukuk lead arrangers, 106 investors and other key market players such as 
regulators, legal advisors, and rating agencies predominantly based in Islamic markets in the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia.  
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from the rapid expansion of sukuk as an alternative tool of financing3 and more importantly 
as a better structure in resisting financial crisis. (Wicaksono, 2015) confirms that the market 
of sukuk shows better resistance to the 2008 crisis in comparison to their counterparts in 
conventional finance. This status gives the sukuk market a competitive position in the 
financial sector.   
In the market, there exist differences of opinion pertaining to the Sharia compliance 
of sukuk. This means that different Sharia rules are applied in the sukuk sector by different 
financial institutions, which has caused chaos in the market. In this regard, an international 
autonomous non-for-profit corporate body Accounting and Auditing Organisation for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), was established in 1990 to promote and maintain 
Sharia standards for Islamic financial organisations, participants, institutions and the entire 
industry of Islamic finance as well as to play a key role in harmonizing Sharia standards 
related to finance in the market (Lahsasna, 2008). The AAOIFI consists of a number of 
scholars that represent several Muslim countries and it is thus deemed as an industry-level 
representative body of Sharia jurists (Latham & Watkins, 2015). It identifies 14 types of 
sukuk that can be classified based on debt, assets, services and equity. The asset-backed 
sukuk are issued with an entire reliance on the existence of tangible assets in order to generate 
returns for investors (IFSB, 2009).  
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem  
Sukuk are securities that must comply with the principles of Sharia. Thus, adherence 
to the rules of Islamic financial jurisprudence is a cornerstone of these instruments. Despite 
the global acceptance of AAOIFI standards, the structure of sukuk does, in fact, reflect the 
interpretation and decision of the Sharia boards embedded in different financial institutions. 
In the absence of any regulatory oversight, Sharia boards for Islamic financial institutions 
are able to issue fatwa (religious edict) which contradict AAOIFI standards. These edicts 
would be incompatible with Sharia-sensitive investors’ demands and do not have 
transparency with regards to the basis in Sharia. Although the size of the Islamic finance 
                                                   
3 In the contemporary applications of finance, Islamic finance has emerged as an alternative source of finance.   
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industry has reached $1.7 trillion, its development has exposed a critical flaw in terms of the 
lack of a clear consensus on the acceptability of the issuances of Sharia pronouncements 
(Zawya, 2014). This problem becomes serious when investors with high sensitivity to 
Sharia-compliance drift away from the market due to the lack of transparency on 
compatibility.  
Most financial institutions attempt to confer legitimacy upon their specific issuance 
of sukuk in the market in order to achieve more acceptances among investors, especially 
Sharia-sensitive investors. They commonly provide a section in the prospectus that confirms 
the product’s compatibility with Sharia. However, a number of reliable scholars in this field 
confirm the illegality of most of the asset-based sukuk applications. For instance, Usmani, a 
renowned scholar, asserted that 85% of partnership-based sukuk in the market are illegal 
according to Sharia (Usmani, 2008). These opposing attitudes regarding sukuk applications 
indicate the gap which exists between Islamic financial rules and the current market. Thus, 
this research attempts to investigate sukuk practices by screening, analysing and examining 
the content and structure of sukuk to determine the extent of their adherence to Sharia rules.   
From a financial perspective, sukuk, as with any contractual relationship, are potentially 
subject to the agency problem. In fact, principal/agent relations in sukuk have a distinctive 
nature with greater complexity and various features. In agency relations, the higher complexity 
of the responsibilities undertaken by the agent lead to a higher discretion for the agent, resulting 
in greater possibilities of agency costs. In addition, due to the unique nature of sukuk risks, the 
concerns raised are indicated by Ahmed et al. (2015) as that ‘the problem for financial 
institutions is that they pursue to convey the belief of investors to regard the sukuk as similar 
to conventional assets rather than being distinctive from a financial viewpoint, as this is 
simply risk valuation. Investors are more comfortable when a security has a common 
structure than being unknown’. In fact, the novelty of sukuk involves a higher exposure to 
risks that have been systematically altered in the market, as the risk exposure for investors 
is minimized to a level that contradicts Sharia rules. Thus, as a result, a gap exists between 
the financial risks of sukuk in theory as compared to current operations. Hence, this study 
focuses on investigating sukuk cases from different perspectives.  
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1.3 Research Aims and Objectives  
This dissertation aims to explore the financial and Sharia perspectives concerning sukuk 
by firstly describing the theoretical viewpoint and then assessing practice by examining three 
sukuk case studies. Theoretically, sukuk are discussed from two perspectives: the financial 
framework and the Sharia background. The research then analyses and evaluates the cases 
based on the standards derived from the theoretical framework. Given the above, the 
dissertation has two broad objectives that have been further classified into the following sub-
objectives.   
The first objective is to explore the financial features of asset-backed sukuk, which 
involves the following sub-objectives:  
i. To compare the risk/return allocation of bonds with asset-backed sukuk to 
determine the financial position of risk allocation in sukuk investment.   
ii. To discuss the problems of agency involved in the structure of asset-backed 
sukuk by identifying the principle/agent relations, conflicts and problems.  
    The second objective is to examine the Sharia basis of asset-backed sukuk, and it includes 
the following sub-objectives:   
i. To assess three sukuk cases issued in Saudi Arabia according to the AAOIFI 
standards in order to provide a precise measurement with respect to their 
compliance and to raise the transparency of their permissibility.   
ii. To identify critical issues faced in the applications in order to investigate the 
points of view of experts, experience and some solutions.  
1.4 Research Questions 
This study focuses on asset-backed sukuk and asks the following three main   
questions.  
i. What are the differences between risk allocation in bonds and in asset-
backed sukuk? To what extent do sukuk cases differ from the theoretical 
framework of sukuk risks?  
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ii. What are the agency problems embedded in asset-backed sukuk investment? 
What are the principle/agent conflicts that appear in different cases of sukuk 
investment?  
iii. To what extent do the three practices of sukuk comply with Sharia rules? 
What are the critical Sharia issues that face asset-backed sukuk? How would 
they be dealt with practically?   
1.6 Research Methodology  
The research methodology will help to respond to the research aims, objectives and 
questions: 
Table 1-1 the Research Aims, Objectives and Questions 
Aims Objectives Questions 
T
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To compare the risk/return allocation of 
bonds with asset-backed sukuk to 
determine the financial position of risk 
allocation in sukuk investment.  
What are the differences between risk 
allocation in bonds and in asset-
backed sukuk? To what extent do 
sukuk cases differ from the theoretical 
framework of sukuk risks? 
To discuss the problems of agency 
involved in the structure of asset-backed 
sukuk by identifying the principle/agent 
relations, conflicts and problems. 
What are the agency problems 
embedded in asset-backed sukuk 
investment? What are the 
principle/agent conflicts that appear in 
different cases of sukuk investment? 
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To assess three sukuk cases issued in 
Saudi Arabia according to the AAOIFI 
standards in order to provide a precise 
measurement with respect to their 
compliance and to raise the 
transparency of their permissibility.  
 
To what extent do the three practices 
of sukuk comply with Sharia rules?  
To identify critical issues faced in the 
applications in order to investigate the 
points of view of experts, experience 
and some solutions. 
What are the critical Sharia issues that 
face asset-backed sukuk? How would 
they be dealt with practically? 
To fulfill the requirements of these aims, objectives and questions, the research uses 
qualitative method since it is based on understanding asset-backed sukuk in depth and 
observing the process of specific applications in order to assess the research in exploring the 
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financial and Sharia features. The dissertation adopts a case study strategy using an inductive 
approach to examine cases in terms of legal and financial issues. This provides the research 
with an opportunity to gather evidence from different sources and to support the analysis in 
ways that cannot be achieved using other strategies (Bryman, 2012, p. 66). In fact, this 
strategy allows for a systematic method and links the data to be collected and the conclusions 
to be drawn with better coherence. 
The data are primarily based on library-collected information, such as textbooks and 
journal articles, and are also based on regulations issued by the internationally recognized 
Islamic financial authorities and institutions such as the AAOIFI. The majority of these 
resources can be accessed via libraries and online material which includes the most relevant 
books, articles and other materials that are relevant to Islamic finance and provide the 
background to the Saudi market. Data is collected using content analyses of sukuk 
prospectuses, AAOIFI Sharia standards and publications issued by international agencies 
with the aim of enabling the study to achieve insights into the market rather than depending 
just on the literature. Furthermore, information is gathered from Sharia scholars using semi-
structured interviews to generate some specific information on the issues involved. These 
various sources and methods of treatment help in investigating the discrepancies that arise 
from contradictions between the existing literature and operation in the real world.   
1.7 Research Motivation and Scope of the Research   
The initial significance of this research is derived from dealing with sukuk as a source 
of finance that is a relatively new phenomenon. In the sukuk market, there is a split between 
Sharia-sensitive investors and others with less sensitivity. Sukuk that adhere to Sharia 
principles will receive a better access to the former investors who tend to be more focused, 
disciplined, and sensitive to the risk of breaking Sharia law. Thus, if one issuance 
contravenes some of the AAOIFI standards, their reliability becomes tenuous. The issuance 
might be called into question by an individual judge, even if it is compliant with other 
standards that have been passed with a narrow majority, regarding who can invest and 
subscribe with stronger majority standards (Majid, et al., 2011). Meanwhile, actual 
adherence to Sharia rules can attract even more of non-sensitive investors, if the structure is 
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financially well-formulated. Thus, satisfying Sharia-sensitive investors does not mean losing 
other investors.   
For these reasons, the present study will put a number of applications on a more 
transparent level related to their Sharia compliance based on AAOIFI standards4. Being more 
transparent will attract new investors who have avoided the sukuk market due to losing 
confidence on product permissibility. This method helps in deciding to what extent each 
issuance complies with Sharia rules. Furthermore, the research discusses the legal issues 
found in the cases with some eminent scholars in an attempt to bring to light other views and 
options which can reduce both the time and costs of due diligence in each issuance.  
In addition to high Sharia compatibility, adverse risks affect the competitiveness of 
the sukuk market. This is because the novelty of sukuk inherently involves a higher exposure 
to certain agency and financial risks. In this respect, Abdul-Rauf and Ibrahim (2014, p. 66) 
have recently confirmed the importance of this sort of study: ‘identifying the risks related 
with sukuk is largely considered as vital for the future development of that particular market. 
It is also most important for managing such markets in a better way’. However, sukuk risks 
vary according to the specific structure applied. Muhamed and Radzi (2014) emphasize that 
sukuk risks differ depending on the structure of the sukuk. Unlike traditional bonds, sukuk 
applications cannot be judged or assessed according to their cover or contract type. For 
example, ijara sukuk can be asset-based or asset-backed, yielding entirely different profiles 
of risks and returns in the event of liquidation and default. This is in addition to the agency 
risks, where each case has distinctive agency relationships yielding considerable differences 
in agency costs. Thus, more attention to the development of sukuk is required in order to 
ensure that their applications are financially attractive. This research comparatively discusses 
their embedded risks, as there is still a requirement to understand and explain to the 
complicated sukuk, as much as the crucial need to interpret their current applications to 
identify the challenges and risks. This dissertation aims to provide a clear and in-depth 
summary of the complexities of the current situation with sukuk. This study will provide a 
                                                   
4 The AAOIFI continuously attempts to standardize sukuk and establishes standard-setting bodies in order to 
address the standardization issues impeding the development of the sukuk market.  
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useful test to show to what extent the relevant theories and Sharia principles have been 
utilized in the cases. Equally important, this will shed light on and make recommendations 
concerning the financial issues in the asset-backed sukuk market.   
The originality of this study is identified in three areas. This research establishes a 
theoretical basis based on AAOIFI standards and agency theory that helps the analytical 
study to achieve meaningful conclusions. The discussion of agency lends additional 
originality to the thesis because it seems that no previous study has analysed the agency 
relationships in asset-backed sukuk structures5. Also, the critical legal and financial issues 
that may face AAOIFI6 applications have not yet been discussed, at least to the extent that 
this research covers7. The analysis looks at the SEC sukuk, the first Saudi International sukuk, 
and a basic plain structure of ijara sukuk. Then, the study examines Sadara sukuk the 
complex structure titled with forwarded ijara sukuk and then at first application for intifa’ 
sukuk (Zamzam sukuk). While intifa’ sukuk seem to be in practice the type most compatible 
with Sharia, there is a shortage found on discussing them, especially in relation to their 
financial risks which the present research attempts to cover. The study aims to fill some gaps 
by providing legal and financial discussions of asset backed sukuk according to well-built 
theories.    
The analytical discussion in this dissertation has two main boundaries. The first is 
the assessment process using mainly the AAOIFI standards. This is because these standards 
have been formulated in consultation with leading Sharia scholars and have introduced a 
great harmonization of Islamic finance practices across the world. The choice a well-
developed standard enables the analysis to focus on assessment rather than on deeper 
juridical discussion. This focus in the assessment helps the study to draw some important 
                                                   
5 Research Samadzadeh & Melander (2012) discusses the implications of agency theory on mudarabah and 
musharakah agreements. However, this current study is different as it looks at the implications of agency theory 
on asset-backed sukuk.    
6  The importance is derived from the standards that have been used. AAOIFI has gained support for 
implementing its clarified standards.  It has a board of 20 members of Sharia scholars that are additionally 
members of other Sharia boards in most of the largest financial organisations and institutions in the world. The 
AAOIFI is also supported by 200 other institutional members, coming from 40 different countries, who belong 
to Islamic financial organisations, central banks and the international Islamic financial and banking industry, 
globally (AAOIFI, 2006).   
7 More explanation is provided in the methodology chapter.   
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conclusions in the financial field. Secondly, the chosen applications are limited to cases 
linked to assets and applied in Saudi Arabia, whether in the domestic or international 
markets. The Saudi market was chosen because it is still nascent that requires more attention 
and effort. Also, this market is a relatively conservative market compared to other sukuk 
markets, meaning that it is more likely for such a market to be interact with AAOIFI 
standards.   
1.8 The Research Contributions and Key Findings 
This research has examined financial and Sharia issues identified in the applications. 
It attempted to contribute to the existing literature by first, exploring how the Basel types of 
risks interact with Sharia-based sukuk (SBS). It also attempted to compare the risks of SBS 
with those of conventional bonds in order to highlight why SBS are considered as alternative 
investment tools. The research then examined how SBS risks qualitatively differ in the 
applications and emphasize the extent of these differences. Second, the study analysed the 
agency relations in SBS structures that haven’t formerly discussed in such a way that 
identifies hidden actions, incentives and information asymmetries. The discussion indicated 
the agency problems that arise in SBS structures, how these problems are minimized and 
how the conflicts are managed in the applications. Finally, the study has evaluated Sharia 
issues in the applications by adopting the AAOIFI standards as a benchmark. It tested the 
cases and showed some evidence of harmoniousness and contradiction with Sharia 
according to those standards in order to improve the transparency of the applications with 
Sharia rules.   
 The key Results found are related to risks allocation, agency problems and Sharia 
compliance issue. This research analysed the differences between SBS and conventional 
bonds and found a number of fundamental differences, proving that these two types of 
securities provide different solutions in the market. In the applications of SEC and Sadara 
sukuk, they do not offer a guaranteed return. The research found in their prospectus that if 
the originator fails to generate rental payments, investors will face a loss without any type 
of guarantee for the distribution. This is a key difference between these applications and 
bonds were the distributions are guaranteed in any cases. Thus, sukuk investors have higher 
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exposure to the credit risk; however, they do not receive an actual relationship to the assets. 
Investors are supposed to have the advantage of the recourse to their assets, while the cases 
only offer beneficial ownership without any actual relationship. This research asserted that 
sukuk-holders should not be treated equally as bondholders without taking into account 
the variation in their risk profiles.  
          Each structure is embedded with a variety of different agency relationships 
depending on the positions taken by the originator, such as being as a manager, a lessee, 
an issuer, a servicer, and a contractor, leading to different levels of exposure to agency 
problems. In fact, the higher level of the responsibility undertaken by the originator, the 
greater the possibility of agency costs. The research shows some hedging procedures that 
have been used in the cases to reduce the adverse selection and the moral hazard. For 
instance, the cases precisely determine the incomes as a rental payment and hence the cash 
flow generated from the assets becomes more specified. Another instance is that SEC and 
Sadara sukuk managed the agency conflicts by the purchase undertaking. The repurchase 
agreement shows a dimension of sharing between the originator and investors, resulting in 
a better managing for the agency problems. The study also found that Sadara sukuk use a 
further device to manage these conflicts by applying the concept of co-ownership. The 
originator and the investors become co-owners of the assets. This particular device 
increases the investors’ confidence that the originator, as co-owner, will maintain a high 
quality of performance.  
Although the three cases considered have been reviewed and approved by renowned 
scholars, the issuances show a different level of contradictions with AAOIFI standards. 
The aggregate percentage compliance of SEC sukuk was only 11.5%, Sadara sukuk 
reached 81.7% and Zamzam sukuk achieved 90%. The prospectus of the cases shows their 
approving fatwa without any evidence or explanation. However, the best financial practice 
requires greater transparency in order to protect the reputation of the issuance and also to 
maintain the investors' confidence. 
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1.9 Structure of the Dissertation  
To answer the research questions of the present study, this dissertation is divided into 
11 chapters. It begins with a brief introduction and then presents a literature review 
explaining the concepts, structures, principles and risks of securitization, conventional bonds 
and asset-backed sukuk. Then, the methodology and rationale for conducting this study are 
explained. Critical analyses and discussions of sukuk cases are treated in the subsequent 
chapters before describing the interviews conducted and drawing conclusions.  
Chapter 1 provides the background of the study. It introduces the research problems 
and objectives with the aim of analytically and critically dealing with the theoretical and 
practical components that make this study important.   
Chapter 2 discusses the characteristic features of securitization and the background 
of the research work. This chapter aims to give a foundation to the study where different 
types of financial structures are presented before examining the risks associated with bond 
investment.  
Chapter 3 deals primarily with the jurisprudence of asset-backed sukuk. Sukuk are 
discussed from the Sharia perspective and based on AAOIFI standards. Sharia issues which 
are the subject of arguments among scholars are examined according to the concepts 
presented in this study. A framework is established to evaluate the applications.   
In chapter 4 an analytical study of sukuk is presented as an Islamic product in the 
financial sector. The chapter mainly considers the specific risks of sukuk in order to 
distinguish this investment from conventional bonds before moving to the agency theory.  
Chapter 5 discusses the financial sector in Saudi Arabia and its capital market. More 
specifically, the research attempts to identify the important issues facing the Saudi sukuk 
market in particular. The rationale for this chapter is to clarify Saudi financial regulations 
related to the sukuk market.   
Chapter 6 explains the methodology employed and the analysis used in the study. 
The chapter introduces the research methodology and methods applied in this research and 
how it has guided data collection and analysis.   
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Chapter 7 examines ijara sukuk that has been applied to the Saudi Electricity 
company sukuk. This case is evaluated in order to highlight the financial issues, challenges 
and also risks involved. The chapter also assesses the level of Sharia compliance in applying 
these sukuk in order to draw conclusions as to what extent they adhere to Sharia standards.    
Chapter 8 presents insights in the case of forward ijara that have been applied in 
Sadara sukuk. This chapter uses the same framework as in the previous chapter to conclude 
with financial and Sharia assessments.   
Chapter 9 analyses Zamzam sukuk as a case study for intifia’ sukuk. The discussion 
is based on financial and Sharia perspectives and uses the same framework that has been 
used in the two previous chapters.  
Chapter 10 provides the results from an interview-based survey on the critical issues 
found in the cases.     
Chapter 11 provides the conclusions and recommendations for the thesis. It presents 
a summary of the analysis and concluding remarks.  
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Chapter 2: Securities as Financing Instruments: 
Risks and Agency Conflicts 
 
2.1 Introduction   
Securitization represents an established and substantial part of US and global capital 
markets; however, the process of asset securitization has evolved over the last few decades 
for funding and risk management purposes (Skarabot, 2001). The conventional view prior to 
the financial crisis tended to highlight the positive role of securitization in increasing the 
resilience of the financial system (Alper, et al., 2015). It was characterized as ‘one of the 
most important financing vehicles in the United States’ (Shenker & Colletta, 1991). Some 
researchers have even referred to asset securitization as ‘alchemy’, since it purportedly 
generates value where none existed earlier (Schwarcz, 1994). Now, securitization is often 
characterized as one of the main contributing causes to the 20072009 global financial crises 
(Alper, et al., 2015). The increasing dependence on asset securitization, particularly by 
financial organisations, has been singled out as a major catalyst to the financial crisis. While 
shifting the credit risk off of bank balance sheets is not a recent phenomenon, the 
securitization wave differs from earlier ones due to the widespread use of sophisticated 
mechanisms enabling banks to shift the credit risk of more opaque assets to different market 
participants. Information related to structured securities is considerably more ambiguous 
than that for traditional securities (Guoa & Wub, 2014).  
This chapter aims to provide background information on securitization as a mode of 
finance, to explain securitization and to gain a broader understanding of the fundamentals of 
securitization process. It begins with an overview of the securitization, and then defines 
different types of structures in order to offer a basis for the analysis. The chapter then moves 
on to discuss the major risks which investors are exposed to. It outlines the major risks and 
shows their negative impact on securitization investment. This discussion paves the way for 
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an analysis the agency conflict which arises in investment, highlighting the influence of 
shifting the risks.   
2.2 An Overview of Securitization  
No uniform definition of securitization exists. Nevertheless, a number of 
commentators have endeavoured to provide a working definition. Mwoungang and Grosen 
(2003, p. 35) have broadly described asset securitization as ‘the matching up of borrowers 
and savers wholly and partly by way of the financial market’. This broad definition covers 
all issuance of securities such as bonds, commercial papers8, sales of mortgage backed and 
other asset-backed securities as they depend on financial intermediation to create loans 
through financial markets. Securitization links the sellers and buyers of capital more 
effectively than traditional methods of funding, including issuing shares of stock or bank 
lending (Lipson, 2012). On the other hand, Kothari (2006, p. 9) provides a more precise 
definition of securitization as ‘the process by which homogeneous, but illiquid, assets are 
pooled and repackaged, with security interests representing claims to the pool sold as 
security to third-party investors’.  This definition is limited to asset-backed securities; 
however, the more appropriate definition for securitization that is commonly cited is: ‘(1) a 
contract, transaction, or; (2) scheme whereby a person invests his or her money in a common 
enterprise with the expectation of profits; (3) solely from the efforts of the promoter’s or any 
third party’ (Deacon & Prendergast, 1979, p. 215). This definition includes any stock, note, 
security future, treasury stock, security based swap, debenture, bond, evidence of 
indebtedness, collateral-trust certificate, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement or generally any interest or instrument that is commonly considered to be 
a ‘security’ (Girasa, 2013, pp. 139-140).  
Over the last decades, the development of securitization markets has had several 
beneficial effects on capital markets. Securitization allows more participants, such as 
corporate and others, to be involved as a result of introducing a further class of debt 
instruments. This has deepened the market. In addition, securitization permits originators to 
                                                   
8 Commercial paper is a short term unsecured promissory note that is issued via a high credit quality institution 
(Melicher & Norton, 2014, p. 33).  
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dispose of assets efficiently with a more beneficial funding profile and better financing 
terms. Securitization also allows investors to invest in assets that they otherwise would not 
have access to. Thus, securitization has contributed to the accessibility of highly rated 
securities to investors and has become a major effective tool for diversification for both 
originators and investors alike (IFC, 2004).  
The market for new securitizations in 2015 decreased by 6% from 2014, to only $436 
billion from $462 billion (Business Standard, 2016). In January 2016, US securitizations 
issuance also decreased by $2 billion from December 2015 (S&P, 2016). Figure 2-1 below 
demonstrates the experience of the main classes of assets in securitization from 2001 until 
the first half of 2015. Issuance of all these securitized assets increased dramatically between 
2005 and 2007, decreased during the housing crisis, and then has recovered. Both high-yield 
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and automobile securities reached to a level higher 
than in 2001. Figure 2-1 shows how all classes of assets fell sharply after 2007. From 2001 
to 2014, automobile securitizations rose by 14%, high-yield CLOs by 156%, CMBS by 58%, 
and for credit cards and student loans decreased by 23% and 5% respectively (Goodman, 
2015).  
Figure 2-1 Securitization of Non-mortgage Asset Classes, 2001-15 (billions of dollars) 
 
Source: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and Urban Institute.   
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2.2.1 Bonds  
Over the past 40 years, the Saudi government's issuance of debt instruments has been 
intermittent. For the first time, the government issued its own borrowing instrument 
(Government Development Bonds) in 1988. In 1991, the government started to issue 
Treasury bills in order to finance its fiscal deficit. However, the issuance of these debt 
securities was paused when the fiscal situation improved (Alhumaidah, et al., 2016). 
Recently, the two-year decrease in oil prices has left the country with huge budget deficits: 
$98 billion in 2015 and round $87 billion in 2016. Saudi Arabia has raised $17.5 billion 
through issuing global bonds in order to repair the damage caused by the collapse in the oil 
price since 2014 (Elaine & Kerr, 2016 ).   
Bonds' issuers have a number of different types of collateral and structuring, which 
can be either unsecured, subordinated (junior) and senior securities. In secured senior bonds, 
bonds are backed by a legal claim on an identified property that belongs to the obligor in a 
default case (Reilly & Brown, 2006, p. 651). For instance, mortgage bonds are secured by 
tangible assets, and in the case of financial distress, the assets can be sold to fulfil the 
bondholders’ obligations (Sundaresan, 2009, p. 8). However, junior debentures have a claim 
on the securitized assets and their cash flow is subordinated to other debentures (Reilly & 
Brown, 2006, p. 650). These bonds can be described as convertible bonds which mean that 
they can be converted into a more junior grade of securities in certain circumstances 
(Hirschey & Nofsinger, 2010, p. 483). Additionally, one of the most popular bond types is 
called zero coupon bonds, which are a discount bond that does not make any regular payment 
of interest (Bomfim, 2005, p. 305). The investors in a zero coupon bond realize interest by 
purchasing the bond considerably below its principal value. The interest will be paid at the 
date of maturity with the exact amount being the difference between the paid price and the 
principal value of the bonds (Fabozzi, 2004, p. 4). Therefore, instead of receiving periodic 
payments of interest, the bondholder obtains a single payment at maturity that equals the 
entire interest gained along with the principal amount (Hirschey & Nofsinger, 2010, pp. 465-
466).   
Debenture bonds, which are unsecured obligations, secure only the obligor’s credit 
since they rely on the corporation’s credit strength (Reilly & Brown, 2006, p. 651). As a 
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result of relying on a high credit company, these bonds are offered at a low rate of interest 
along with no particular pledge for the property involved (Melicher & Norton, 2014, p. 239). 
On the other hand, if these bonds are issued by companies that are not financially strong, this 
will be compensated for by higher interest rates (Qais, 2006). Although, fixed rate bonds are 
common, in some situations bond market participants prefer adjustable interest rates on a 
daily, monthly or annual basis. This allows the interest rate payment on a given bond to 
carefully track the interest rates in the market. The floating rates of bonds are changed 
periodically according to changes in an underlying interest rate standard (Hirschey & 
Nofsinger, 2010, p. 465).   
Moreover, public bonds are a typically fixed obligation with a long-term debt 
securities package in affordable and convenient denominations for sale to financial 
institutions and individuals. They differ from other debt, such as privately placed debt 
obligations and individual mortgages, as they are sold to the public instead of channeled 
directly to a particular lender. The public debt market is mainly divided into three time 
segments depending on the issue’s original maturity. The first segment is short-term, which 
is known as the money market, the intermediate segment is commonly known as (notes), and 
finally long-term obligations with maturities exceeding 10 years are called bonds (Reilly & 
Brown, 2006, p. 650).  
In the bond market, there is a wide range of debt that can meet borrowers’ desires in 
terms of the duration of issuance. Although it is common for bond securities to be mature 
over one year, a maturity of less than a year is considered to be a money market debt 
(Choudhry, 2001, p. 3). In general, bonds with a maturity of between one and five years are 
viewed as short-term bonds, while bonds with a maturity between 5 to 10 years are 
intermediate-term bonds, and long-term bonds have a maturity of more than 10 years 
(Hirschey & Nofsinger, 2010, p. 469). The importance of the period to maturity is because 
the yield on bonds is influenced by the duration of the issuance. Also, the volatility of a 
bond’s price relies on its maturity, since a longer maturity results in a greater risk of price 
volatility which causes changes in market yields (Fabozzi, 2004, p. 4). However, involving 
a call feature in the structure can influence the bond’s maturity (Sundaresan, 2009, p. 9). An 
embedded feature of a call option permits the obligor to modify the maturity of a bond, as it 
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serves the obligors to replace the current issue with a lower-interest cost issue in cases where 
the interest rates in the market decline. Due to this advantage, most loans are embedded with 
the right to call an obligation (Fabozzi, 2004, p. 5). Therefore, it can be seen that there are 
different approaches to bonds depending on the type of call. One extreme call option is a 
freely callable provision which allows the bonds to be retired by the obligor at any period, 
with the typical notification time being between 30 and 60 days. The other extreme is non-
callable provision where bonds cannot be retired by the obligor before their maturity. An 
intermediate call option is the deferred call provision, when the obligor cannot call the bond 
for a specific time after the issue date, such as 5 to 10 years (Reilly & Brown, 2006, p. 651).  
2.2.2 Asset‐backed Securities (ABS)  
There is no uniform definition of an ABS; however, different definitions are found 
in the literature (Klee & Butler, 2002). Shenker and Colletta (1991, p. 1374) defined asset 
securitization narrowly as ‘the sale of equity or debt instruments, representing ownership 
interests in, or secured by, a segregated, income-producing asset or pool of assets, in a 
transaction structured to reduce or reallocate certain risks inherent in owning or lending 
against underlying assets and to ensure that such interests are more readily marketable and, 
thus, more liquid than ownership interests in and loans against the underlying assets’. 
Meanwhile the broader view describes them as ‘securities that are backed by a discrete pool 
of self-liquidating financial assets. Asset-backed securitization is a financing technique in 
which financial assets, in many cases themselves less liquid, are pooled and converted into 
instruments that may be offered and sold in the capital markets’ (SEC, 1999). According to 
this broad definition, ABSs have different asset classes which are attributed to collateralized 
debt obligations (CDO), mortgage backed securities (MBSs) and asset backed securities in 
its narrower sense (Vink & Thibeault, 2008). These asset classes have been sub-divided into 
further sub-asset classes which are CLOs, collateralized loan obligations (CBOs), 
commercial MBSs (CMBSs), residential MBSs (RMBSs), and other sorts of ABSs that are 
backed by a variety of different assets as shown below (Breidenbach, 2003). The universe 
of asset classes can be additionally expanded resulting from the innovation of new types of 
asset securitization in the market.  
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2.2.2.1 ABSs: Different Terminologies  
For the purpose of more precise understanding, the differences between ABSs and 
other similar terminologies will be clarified. Firstly, the principal difference between ABSs 
and bonds relates to risk exposure. Investors in bonds are exposed to all risks related to the 
obligors’ business, while in the case of ABSs, investors bear only risks related to the assets 
in the pool, not to the obligor’s business. This is a beneficial feature for investing in ABSs 
since investors will be unaffected if the obligor becomes insolvent, which is not the situation 
with bonds. The only influence on the entire ABS process will be through the servicing 
agency if the obligor is the servicer, but this can be simply resolved by appointing another 
company to perform this role. In any situation, the cash will remain to flow to the ABS 
holders (Lapanan & Anchev, 2011, p. 16). What is important to highlight is that ABS holders 
are only exposed to the risks of the securitized assets, which include defaults on loans, 
prepayments, delays and some legal risks. This exposure to the assets’ risks means that the 
ABS is to be claimed only on the securitized assets, but not on the entire originating company 
(Fabozzi & Kothari, 2008, p. 93).  
Secured lending is asset-based lending (traditional asset lending), which means that 
the borrower specifies an asset as collateral for the lending arrangement. The specified asset 
can be long-term such as equipment or short-term such as receivable accounts (Fabozzi & 
Kothari, 2008, p. 25). The key difference is that asset securitization is sold or assigned to a 
third party that is a special-purpose company and can also be a trust (Giddy, 2000). Another 
distinguishing factor is that securitization has a lower borrowing cost than in secured lending. 
The lower cost in securitization is attributed to the transfer of the assets, resulting in a better 
quality of credit for the receivables than the originator’s creditworthiness. Secured lending, 
by contrast, is based on the originator’s own creditworthiness (Slaughter & May, 2010). In 
other words, the liabilities and asset can be separated from the originator’s balance sheet 
through true sale in assets securities; whereas, in a secured financing, the originator 
maintains the assets on its own balance sheet plus the extra liability in an amount equal to 
the secured funding (Klee & Butler, 2002). Therefore, the securitization will incur a higher 
credit quality than in secured lending.   
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CDOs, MBSs and ABSs are classes of ABS in its general sense. Each one of the 
classes has a distinct structure in the capital market. The class of security is determined by 
what the securities are backed. For example, securitizations backed by debt obligations, 
pools of bonds or loans are called CDOs; whereas securitizations backed by consumer-
backed assets are called ABSs. Finally, MBSs are securities backed by mortgages (Vink & 
Thibeault, 2008). It can be seen that the key dividing line between CDOs and MBSs is that 
the former are securitizations of unsecured loans whereas the latter are securitizations of 
secured loans. Unsecured loans function as security for the investors, while in secured loans 
there is additional collateral security for investors such as a mortgage (Breidenbach, 2003).  
Although the majority of securitizations are designed for MBSs, there has been an 
increase in the number of real estate securitization (RES) transactions. Commonly, the RES 
concept is confused with mortgage-backed securitization. MBSs are securities originated by 
a bank which are backed by either residential or commercial mortgage loans. These securities 
involve payment claims against an SPV which are backed by secured loans that involve cash 
flows from real estate loans such as mortgages. Basically, MBSs are securities that represent 
derivative real estate cash flows (Breidenbach, 2003). RES refer to the securities that involve 
claims against the SPV which holds the real estate assets. This means that the cash flows 
from actual real estate are being securitized and not the cash flows from the real estate loans. 
Another distinguishing point, depending on the originator’s type and the assets involved, is 
that MBSs are backed by real estate loans that are originated by banks, whereas RES 
represents securities that are originated by corporates or governments and that are backed by 
real estate cash flows or real property (Breidenbach, 2003). To summarize the differences, it 
can be seen that there are two categories of assets: receivable and non-receivable assets. 
CDOs and ABSs represent receivable or loan securitizations, and MBSs and RESs stand for 
real estate assets which are non-receivable.  
2.3 The Structure of Asset Securitization 
The structures of ABSs depend on the establishment of special purpose vehicle (SPVs). 
Establishing an SPV is done mainly for three purposes, firstly for converting non-
standardized, illiquid and unique assets into marketable, liquid and standardized financial 
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assets. The second purpose is to lower the cost, as despite the fact that transferring assets to 
the SPV includes some expenditure such as taxes, the net income will be low as the investors 
will accept lower returns. Another purpose is to protect the originator from the claims of 
investors in the case of insolvency and to reduce the investors risk from originator’s 
bankruptcy (Frankel, 1999). The basic process of cash flow in asset securities is as follows. 
The originator sells a portfolio of loans to the SPV. In order to purchase the portfolio of 
loans, the SPV raises funds by means of selling securitizations to investors. The borrowers 
are often unaware that their loans have been securitized because the originator continues to 
service the loans such as by collecting loan repayments and enforcing delinquent loans. The 
cash flow from the loan repayments is passed from the originator to the SPV. Then, the SPV 
utilizes the liquidity to pay ongoing costs such as trustee and management fees as well as 
meeting the debt-servicing obligations on the securities (principal and interest repayments) 
(Bailey, et al., 2004). To conclude, when all principals are paid and the securities have 
matured, the SPV will be extinguished and all remaining assets and income will be returned 
to the originator by extracting them from the SPV.   
In structuring ABSs, there is an ultimate flexibility of priorities, maturities, and rates of 
return that can be conferred on the investors. For instance, asset securitizations are traded in 
different classes. Each class has a different priority on the cash flow from the assets such as 
in senior and subordinate tranches (Klee & Butler, 2002). Also, there may be single or 
multiple originators, such as multi-SPVs, and differences in the nature of the sale, the 
existence of the assets, tranche types and other structured features that affect the 
securitization and allow it to move to more sophisticated levels. These different structures 
are discussed and compared sections in the following.    
2.3.1 One‐off Securitization vs. Multi‐seller Securitization 
These two opposite structures rely on two different types of SPV. In one-off 
securities, the SPV is especially invented for a specific originator and more precisely for 
only a specific transaction, which is also known as a stand alone transaction (IFC, 2004). In 
this structure, significant flexibility is required to customize the securitization in order meet 
the investors’ desires and needs. However, the cost of the transaction will be relatively higher 
as a minimum of stated capital is needed, commonly one to three per cent of the amount of 
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the security issued, in order to prevent the SPV from being the alter ego of the originator 
(Arnold, et al., 1992). One-off securitization is commonly structured for assets that are 
residential mortgages and the individual SPV is financed by issuing the security (Bailey, et 
al., 2004). Also, in most cases, one-off securitization is utilized in private placements when 
the investors are institutional, in order to design an SPV that suits their conditions and 
requirements (Wang, 2004, p. 20). Depending on the creativity of the experts involved, there 
is an abundance of ways to structure the one-off securitization as each structure of the 
security represents a specific transaction (Schwarcz, 1994).  
Moving to the opposite structure, multi-seller securitization is also known as a 
conduit transaction (IFC, 2004). Multi-seller securitization is when more than one originator 
is utilizing a specific SPV. As a result, the conduit SPV holds a broader range of assets that 
includes both asset-backed and non-asset-backed securities as well as individual loans 
(Bailey, et al., 2004). Most pre-existing SPVs are administered and sponsored by main 
investment banks or commercial banks and the seller commonly is a client of such a bank 
(Dorris & Panayotou, 2004). Allowing multiple originators to employ a pre-existing SPV 
will minimize the cost of the transaction as only a nominal amount of capital is required 
because the multitude of originators reduces the risk of the SPV being an alter ego of any 
single originator (Schwarcz, 1994). However, the exposure to bankruptcy claims is higher 
when a single originator is bankrupted (Gurulkan, 2010). The prospective risk caused by the 
originator’s insolvency can often be mitigated by accommodating only investment-grade 
originators as they are less likely to become bankrupted (Wang, 2004, p. 20). The distinction 
discussed above between one-off securitization and multi-seller securitization cannot be 
decisive in all cases; however, case by case analysis of cost arbitrage, incentives and 
motivations can provide conclusions as to whether one-off securitization and multi-seller 
securitization is a more adequate description of particular originator (Schwarcz, 1994).  
2.3.2 Multi‐seller Securitization vs. Multi‐tier Securitization 
Having more than one originator in asset securities is called multi-seller 
securitization, as previously discussed. A multi-tier securitization is when the asset securities 
have more than one SPV, which is considered to be a means of reducing the role associated 
with bankruptcy risk (Telpner, 2003). In a multi-tier securitization, the originator transfers 
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the pool of assets to the first-tier SPV through a true sale. Then, the first-tier SPV sells the 
assets to the second-tier SPV who will then issue the securities or debt instruments. Although 
both means of transfer can proceed by means of a true sale in order to avoid the risk of the 
originator’s bankruptcy, it is not essential for the second transfer to be a true sale. The 
bankruptcy remoteness is fulfilled by the first transfer; however, the second transfer can be 
for accounting reasons. Also, the second transfer allows the first-tier SPV to offer internal 
credit enhancement to investors at the second tier SPV level (Klee & Butler, 2002).  
2.3.3 True Sale Securitization vs. Synthetic  Securitization 
A true sale securitization has a variety of meninges that depends on each applicable 
legal area, such as bankruptcy, accounting and tax. It basically means that the transfer of 
assets from an obligor to an SPV proceeds through a sale according to each applicable law 
(Wang, 2004, p. 21). Essentially, there are two requirements for a true sale. Firstly, the SPV 
has to be a qualified SPV, and secondly, the sponsor is obliged to surrender control of the 
assets. This means that the sponsor cannot maintain efficient control over the transferred 
receivables through the power to unilaterally cause the SPV to return certain assets, and there 
is a demonstrable separation between the asset and the transferor (Gorton & Souleles, 2007). 
The true insulation between pooled assets and the originator enables both parties to achieve 
the main benefits of securitization. One of the benefits of true sale securitization is that the 
assets and liabilities, as discussed, will be removed from the originator’s balance sheets (Klee 
& Butler, 2002). The true sale permits the originator to be financed through better terms than 
would be the case with an on-balance sheet loan. It helps originators to securitize assets that 
cannot meet their credit qualities. Thus, originators who do not have their own capital market 
rating can be financed through true sale securitization (IFC, 2004).  
Synthetic securitization is comparable to true sale securitization in most structural 
features. The major difference is that the originator, in synthetic structures does not transfer 
the pool of assets entirely to the SPV. Instead it sells only the credit risk associated with the 
assets without substituting the legal title. In other words, the originator will engage in a credit 
default swap with the SPV relating to the pool of assets (Franke, et al., 2012). Through this 
engagement, the SPV will be obligated to the originator to pay an amount equivalent to any 
credit losses related to the assets. Therefore, the originator’s exposure to the assets is moved 
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to the SPV. In turn, the originator will pay a fixed amount to the SPV whereas the SPV will 
issue securities to the investors. The SPV’s revenue will be the amounts paid by the 
originator through the credit default swap as well as the interest received on the collateral 
(IFC, 2004). The benefit of synthetic securitization is that the SPV can exploit price 
differences between the price of the acquired assets and the price that investors desire to pay 
for them (Jobst, et al., 2008). In addition, synthetic securities function generally as an 
effective means to hedge credit risks (Wang, 2004, p. 24). Also, a synthetic sale 
securitization is an on balance sheet financing instrument, whereas a true sale securitization 
is an off-balance sheet financing tool, and in addition the SPV is necessary in the true sale 
securitization while it is not necessary in the synthetic sale securities. In fact, the more access 
that the originator has to the underlying assets, the less likely it is that the structure will be a 
true sale (Schwarcz, 1994). In this case, if a structure of asset securities is based on a cash 
flow that does not include a true sale, then it is secured lending and the holders of these 
securities issued through the SPV would have only a security interest without ownership 
(Iacobucci & Winter, 2005).  
2.3.4 Future Flow Securitization vs. Existing Assets Securitization  
According to the collateral of assets, structures can fall into two categories: existing 
assets and future assets. Instances of existing assets are commercial mortgage loans, 
residential mortgage loans, automobile car loans, student loans and corporate loans. By 
contrast, securities of future assets can be exemplified by tax revenue receivables, oil and 
gas royalties and airline receivables (Fabozzi & Kothari, 2008, p. 8). The differences 
between these structures are mainly attributed to the availability of the assets. In addition, 
there is an existing claim to the value in an existing asset securitization, whereas there is 
no existing claim or contractual right to a cash flow in future flow securitization since 
contractual rights will be generated in the future. Moreover, while the off-balance sheet 
feature is common in the existing asset securitizations, usually there is no off-balance sheet 
transaction in the case of future flow. This is reasonable, because there are no on-balance 
sheet assets that would go off. Finally, from a taxation and legal viewpoint, future flows 
are considered to be closer to debt than the selling of an asset and this has a relatively 
higher risk ranking (Fabozzi & Kothari, 2008, p. 150).  
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2.3.5 Pass‐through vs. Pay‐through  
Securitizations are certificates that can be divided into pay-through certificates and 
pass-through certificates depending on the type of payments (Wang, 2004, p. 19). The key 
distinction between these two certificates refers to the nature of the claim that the certificate 
holders have on the cash flows from the asset pools. A pass-through certificate, which is also 
called a beneficial interest certificate, is utilized when investors have a direct claim on the 
entire cash flow as well as having a proportionate share of the collateral’s cash flow. 
Conversely, securities will use pay-through certificates if there are some rules that are stated 
to distribute the collateral’s cash flow between varying bond classes (Fabozzi & Kothari, 
2008, p. 30). Strictly speaking, a pass-through certificate refers to the ownership of interest 
in the underlying assets and therefore in the subsequent cash flow. This means that the 
principal and the interest are passed through to the investors while the seller is mainly a 
servicer. However, in pay-through security, the assets are retained via an SPV which issues 
securities that are collateralized by assets. Also, in pay-through, similarly to pass-through, 
the cash flow meets the debt service which is paid through to the certificate holders out of 
the pledged collateral. The certificate holders are not the collateral owner of the pooled 
assets, as they have basically invested in a security that is backed by various assets (IFC, 
2004). Overall, when there is only one class of investors with the same level of credit priority, 
the structure is called a pass-through, and subsequently the pay-through structure is when 
there is more than one class of investors at given levels of credit priority (Fabozzi & Kothari, 
2008, p. 255).  
The above discussion confirms that the flexibility, cost and also benefits can vary 
depending on the structure of a certificate (Schwarcz, 1994). In securitization, each issuance 
has its own distinct features as there are various forms of assets transfer, SPV, credit 
enhancement, cash flow allocation, and cash flow transformation. To decide which structure 
is more suitable for issuing a particular securitization, a number of features can be used to 
guide one towards the proper decision. The right market existence, investor preference, asset 
availability, obligor’s design and amount of cash flow have roles in building a security. 
However, the main influence is the flexibility of the legal framework that the security will 
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be originated through. This has to be considered in structuring securities, since obligors and 
investors’ choices are often constrained by regulations (Giddy, 2000).   
2.4 Major Risks in Securitization  
Securitization is typically designed to shift risks from the banking sector to outsider 
investors (Acharya, et al., 2013). In securitization, there is a lower risk in comparison with 
shared investment, and hence regularly a lower payment over a longer term. Generally, some 
securitizations are safer than others; for instance, the government bonds are considered to be 
guaranteed investments since the final repayment is virtually definite (Choudhry, 2001, p. 
4). However, these securities are not free from risks since, at times, mortgage-backed 
securities suffer from sharp drops in value in the United States. This has occurred because 
of interest rate movements that result in large postponements and accelerations of payments 
(Giddy, 2000). Therefore, one of the main challenges is to carefully identify risks and then 
reallocate them to those who are the most able to efficiently bear them.  
Basel II report, which analysed a bottom-up assessment the risks of financial 
organisations, stressed holding capital for three principal risks: credit risk, market risk, and 
operational risk. Although, the liquidity risk was acknowledged, there was no explicit 
dealing in ‘Pillar1’ of the Basel II framework, and also received less attention in other parts 
of the framework (Rosengren, 2009). Recently, the Basel Committee has revised and 
expanded its examination of sound practices for managing liquidity risk by both banking 
institutions and their supervisors (BCBS, 2015). The following section discusses the 
principal risks that have been emphasized by the Basel Committee9.  
2.4.1 Credit Risk  
Basel I simply defined the credit risk as ‘the potential that a borrower or counterparty 
will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms (BCBS, 2002). Credit risk 
is found in all activities where success depends upon the performance of a counterparty, 
                                                   
9 ‘The Basel 2 and Basel 2.5 proposals have been implemented in many developed countries (with some 
variations in detail), while the proposals of Basel 3 are still being debated and refined)’ (McNeil, et al., 2015, p. 
20).  
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issuer, or borrower as there is uncertainty in any counterparty’s capability to fulfill all of its 
obligations. From the investor’s perspective, the credit risk is the possibility of the issuer 
defaulting on fulfilling the terms related to the timely payment of interest plus the payment 
of the amount borrowed (Hirschey & Nofsinger, 2010, p. 108). As the credit rating is the 
current assessment of the credit risk of securities, market participants measure this risk by 
looking at their credit rating assigned by a rating agency10 (Reilly & Brown, 2006, p. 656). 
These agencies examine and study the quality of the securitized assets, as the SPV is 
typically designed to only hold the securitized assets. They also examine the cash flow from 
these assets because it is important to consider any default by the borrowers such as the car 
owners in the case of automobile securitization (Giddy, 2000). From the obligors’ 
perspective, the principal benefit of securitization is its advantage in managing credit risk 
exposure. The securitization process minimizes their exposure to the credit of the securitized 
assets by shifting the unexpected portions of the default risk to investors and credit 
enhancers.   
Raising the credit rating of the issuance through credit enhancement minimizes the 
credit risk for investors. SPVs have to maintain sufficient cash flows to pay due obligations 
even without receiving the predicted revenues (Slaughter & May, 2010). In this regard, the 
obligor often functions as a credit enhancement provider and thus retains exposure to the 
credit risk. As the first loss exposure is incurred by the credit enhancer, this can mitigate 
possible adverse selection and the incentives can be managed to ensure the adequate 
performance of the pooled assets (FDIC, 2007, p. 83). Also, originators are exposed to the 
credit risk from the securitized asset pools caused by their reputation. For example, poor 
credit performance and quality can limit the obligor’s future access to the asset securitization 
market, impacting the pricing of subsequent issues or affecting funding costs from other 
sources. Hence, adding to the credit risk available in on-book residual interests, the obligor 
also maintains a further degree of credit risk referred to as moral recourse. Obligors are 
compelled to absorb more of the loss or offer more credit enhancements than is contractually 
obligatory according to the securitization documents in order to maintain their reputation in 
                                                   
10 Bond ratings assess both the collateral underlying the bonds along with the issuer’s ability to produce timely 
payments of principal and interest (Melicher & Norton, 2014, p. 237).  
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the markets and, therefore, access to market funds. Managing this risk is critical because it 
influences the issue’s ability to access and maintain the source of funds. Poor performance 
and quality of the underlying receivables can, as mentioned, limit the source of funding and, 
in a worst case scenario, can result in an early amortization incident and possibly a liquidity 
crisis that can threaten the obligor’s viability (FDIC, 2007, p. 83). Therefore, originators 
should now have a high awareness of the requirement to identify, control, measure and 
monitor credit risk as well as to decide that they hold sufficient capital against these risks 
and that they are sufficiently rewarded for any risks incurred.  
The Basel Committee encourages banking supervisors internationally to improve 
sound practices for managing credit risk. However, although the Committee’s principles are 
most appropriate for the lending business, they should be useful to all exercises where credit 
risk exists (Glantz, 2002).  The sound practices specifically address the following areas: (i) 
establishing a suitable credit risk environment; (ii) practicing under a sound credit-granting 
method; (iii) maintaining suitable credit administration, monitoring and measurement 
mechanisms; and (iv) ensuring appropriate controls over credit risk (BCBS, 2000). Thus, as 
obligors effectively absorb a considerable amount of losses in most securitized pools, the 
credit risk becomes shared between investors and originators. However, this risk over time 
can become less transparent due to the fact that delinquency risk rises and economic 
circumstances change which leads to more retention of the credit risk by the originator 
(Calomiris & Mason, 2003).  
2.4.2 Market Risk  
Market risk refers to fluctuations in the value of securities as a result of adverse 
movements in market prices (Madura, 2008, p. 355). In the securitization market, risk mainly 
stems from the negative effects of exchange rates and movements of interest rates on the 
investor’s cash flow. The interest rate risk is defined by Basel as the exposure to adverse 
movements in interest rates which affects the value of bonds more directly than stocks 
(BCBS, 2015). The bond’s price will change in an opposite direction from the change in 
interest rates. This means that if interest rates increase, the price of a bond will fall and vice 
versa (Hirt, et al., 2003, p. 72). Also, in the case that an investor has to sell a bond before the 
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maturity date, a raise in interest rates means the realization of capital loss such as by selling 
the bond below the buying price (Fabozzi, 2004, p. 9). Maturity can also influence the 
interest rate risk, as the longer the securities take to mature, the greater the risk that their 
value can be affected by changes in interest rates prior to maturity. Thus, to compensate 
investors in long-term bonds for higher exposure to interest rate risk, issuances typically 
offer higher coupon rates than with short-term securities of equal credit quality (SEC, 2008).  
A decrease in interest rates usually causes a prepayment risk11 for the certificates. If 
the borrowers pre-pay because they can re-finance at inferior cost, this basically leads to 
forcing investors to re-invest at a lower rate. For this reason, prepayment risk commonly 
involves interest rate risk. From the investor’s viewpoint, there are three drawbacks to this 
situation. The first is the uncertainty of a callable bond’s cash flow pattern. Secondly, since 
the obligor calls the bonds once the interest rates have declined, the investor will have to re-
invest the income at a relatively inferior interest rate if the bond is called. Finally, the capital 
appreciation of a bond will drop, since the callable bond’s price may not increase much 
above the price at which the obligor will call the bond. Due to this relationship, it is 
principally important to consider the interest rate risk if bonds are purchased in a low-interest 
rate environment (Fabozzi, 2004, p. 9). Also, it is well known from the theory of the term 
structure of interest rates that the exposure to this risk by an individual is minimized to zero 
when the maturity structure of their assets has met the time structure of his payment 
requirements. In this situation, there is no need for either premature liquidations or 
reinvestments, and thus neither valuation risks nor reinvestment risks play a role. However, 
such a maturity matching supposes that the time structure of payment requirements is 
identified initially (Hellwig, 1994).  
In addition, asset securitization can be used as a means to considerably minimize any 
interest rate risk associated with an asset/liability gap on the part of the originator (Federal 
Reserve System, 1990). The risk of the interest rate is by far the major risk to all bondholders, 
even if the bonds are insured or government guaranteed. However, no concern seems to be 
given to the possibility of transferring interest rate risk to investors through securitization. 
                                                   
11 Prepayment risk refers to the possibility of the issuer redeeming a callable bond prior to maturity (Fabozzi, 
2004, p. 9).  
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This is more significant, because shifting interest rate risk to the investors would represent 
the only option for transferring this risk without at the same time generating a possible credit 
risk associated with the interest rate risk (Hellwig, 1994).  
Market risk also includes currency risk, which is also known as an exchange risk. 
Recently, the swings in global currencies have highlighted the risk associated with exchange 
rates (Goedhart, et al., 2015). This arises when the currency of denomination of the security 
is different from the investor’s local currency. If securities are denominated in foreign 
currencies, the possibility of the currency to depreciate might have an adverse effect on the 
investments and also on the related return (Fabozzi & Kothari, 2008, p. 82). Thus, it becomes 
important to measure the compensation that investors can expect from bearing such risk. 
However, a number of academic researchers in currency risk advocate that investors bearing 
currency risk are not rewarded with higher returns which means that it is principally an 
unnecessary risk to bear and that investors can reduce currency risk by using hedges and other 
techniques designed to offset any currency-related gains or losses (Investopedia, 2008).  
2.4.3 Liquidity Risk  
Securitization includes bundling illiquid asset assets in an attempt to generate a more 
liquid asset that can be traded in the market. Liquidity refers to the degree to which the assets 
can be sold without affecting their price; hence, the risk of liquidity is related to potential 
price distortions caused by the lack of liquidity (Madura, 2008). This may arise from the 
obligor’s failures to manage unplanned situations in funding sources that may threaten its 
viability, or in fulfilling its obligations without suffering major loses (FDIC, 2007). 
Consequently, and from the obligor perspective, the securitization process increases the 
originator’s liquidity position by minimizing its position in illiquid assets and improves its 
position in more liquid assets (Investopedia, 2008). Liquidity risk is an economically 
essential determinant of expected securitization returns. Low interest in a specific issuance 
can result in significant price volatility and have an adverse impact on the investor’s total 
return (upon sale). In their empirical study, Lin, et al. (2011) found a positive and significant 
link between liquidity risk and expected securities returns even after controlling for the 
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influence of default and term betas, market risk factors, stock, the level of liquidity, ratings 
and bond characteristics.   
For liquidity risk, sufficient risk management considers the future cash flow 
requirements in both stressed and normal situations. This represents a challenge even in 
relatively positive market situations since it needs the ability to analyse information from 
several operations of the bank and evaluate the influence of external incidents on the 
availability of funding liquidity. This challenge is more acute; however, in stressed situations 
as the assumptions underlying liquidity risk can change markedly during changes in market 
conditions and counterparty behaviour that influence the liquidity of financial tools and the 
availability of funding. These factors result in a significant and different set of challenges 
for institutions in evaluating their liquidity risk and for supervisors in the assessment of risk 
control and management (BCBS, 2008). For liquidity, the Basel Committee offered two new 
universal quantitative measures to manage the liquidity risk in December 2009: a (stressed) 
1-month liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and a structural (> 1year) net stable funding ratio. 
The first ratio is to protect banks against short-term liquidity shocks (liquidity reserve). The 
second minimizes the re-financing risk and the maturity transformation in funding. The risk 
associated liquidity can be segmented into two categories: funding liquidity risk and market 
liquidity risk. The funding risk is the principal concern of the obligor to maintain a sufficient 
cash flow to meet all liabilities. A typical indicator of this liquidity risk is the current ratio 
(current liabilities/current assets) (Neu & Vogt, 2010).  
2.4.4 Operational Risk  
Although the definitions of credit risk and market risk are relatively concise, the 
definition of operational risk, has developed rapidly over the past few years. Initially, it was 
defined as every type of unquantifiable risk confronted by the obligor (Lopez, 2002). 
However, further changes have refined the definition significantly, and then finally the Basel 
Committee and industry representatives have approved a standardized definition that is ‘the 
risk of monetary losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and 
systems or from external events’ (BCBS, 2001). In general, losses from external incidents, 
such as a natural disaster that harms the company’s physical assets or telecommunications, 
or electrical failures that interrupt business, are relatively simple to define compared to losses 
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from internal events such as product flaws and employee fraud. Thus, originators should be 
more firm with internal risks than external incidents because risks from internal issues will 
be closely associated with an obligor’s business lines and specific products (King, 2010).  
The Basel definition12 depends on the categorization of operational risks based on underlying 
causes. It can also be categorized, based on the standard definition, into two fundamental 
types: (i) the risk of a loss because of the firm’s operating system/technology, including 
failure in transactions and internal processes, either because of an error in the production (or 
back office) process or because of the legal concerns; and (ii) the risk of a loss because of 
agency costs, including mismanagement and fraud due to the segregation between the 
ownership and management. These two categories rely on two different economic 
considerations, as one depends on the production, process, trading, system generating 
revenues, and the other is based on managerial incentives (Jobst, 2005). In general, the 
operational risk is intrinsic to financial firms, and hence should be a significant component 
of their risk management systems. Although operational risk is harder to demonstrate and 
quantify than credit and market risks, improvements over the recent few years in computing 
technology and management information systems have unlocked the way for an improved 
operational risk management and measurement. Over the next few years, financial firms and 
their regulators will develop methods for managing operational risk and capital budgeting 
(Lopez, 2002).  
Legal risk, as previously mentioned, is involved in the standardized framework of 
operational risk according to the Basel committee’s point of view. In securitization, it is 
challenging to develop a watertight legal security structure. The challenge becomes more 
serious in developing countries where the legal structure is still evolving. Different countries 
have adopted different securitization laws. These laws and their content differ, since each 
has been specially formed to overcome legal obstacles that had formerly prevented us of the 
securitization in the relevant jurisdictions (IFC, 2004). For example, most countries have 
unique bankruptcy laws and, particularly in Europe, it is difficult to design securities that 
satisfy all of their bankruptcy laws. These particular bankruptcy laws make it difficult for 
                                                   
12 Their definition involves legal risk and excludes reputational and strategic risk.  
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institutions to achieve off-balance sheet treatment. These transactions become very difficult, 
especially for the originator who desires to conduct an off-balance sheet transaction but does 
not want to sacrifice the advantages of the portfolio as well (Breidenbach, 2003).  
2.5 Securitization and Agency issues  
Securitization accentuates agency problems due to the separation of ownership and 
management. Discussing the agency conflicts in the process of securitization will help to fill 
a gap found in the literature related to the agency conflicts in sukuk structures.  It arises when 
the obligor and investors have different interests with asymmetrical information that is in 
favour of the obligor. The obligor, as an agent, is usually motivated to act in their particular 
interests rather than in the interests of the investors. Also, agency conflict arises when these 
two parties have different attitudes towards risks due to the differences in risk tolerance. 
Consequently, investors cannot ensure that the originator will always act in their best 
interests. Adding to this, the securitization market is seen as an opaque and also a 
conservative market. It does not disclose substantial amounts of information to the public 
(Lapanan & Anchev, 2011, p. 5). This is because most financial loan files consist of a 
considerable amount of non-public and confidential information (Dugan, 1997, p. 42). 
Furthermore, the asymmetry does not only exist between the managers and outsider or 
insider investors; it also exists between different classes of outsider investors. Moreover, the 
asymmetry is not only concerned with the returns and revenues on the general assets of the 
institution, but it also exists in the securitized assets (Iacobucci & Winter, 2001, p. 42). These 
different dimensions of informational asymmetry are the main causes of this problem in the 
securitization market. Although banks desire to honour the conservative nature of the 
markets, they are also obligated to reveal all the substantial information that a potential 
investor has to know (Dugan, 1997, p. 42).    
Thus, the major impediment for transferring the risk of default is the asymmetric 
information which exists in the securitization process (Franke, et al., 2012, p. 1125). 
Originators typically have better information about the assets or loans that are being utilized 
as collateral for the securities issued compared to investors both ex-post and exante. They 
receive more information, they are often superior at analysing it and they are better at dealing 
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with defaults. Taking into account that banks, as originators, are far superior at bearing and 
assessing risks, it makes no economic sense to shift or transfer those possible risks to other 
parties using ABSs or other instruments. As this is the case, bankers, who directly transfer 
and pass on their loans to other parties, are no longer motivated to properly investigate the 
original borrowers (Bui, et al., 2010, p. 316). The existence of asymmetric information gives 
the originator the incentive to transfer lower quality loans and to preserve the best, thus 
resulting in an adverse selection. However, others have claimed that originators have 
incentives to securitize high-quality assets and keep low-quality assets. For instance, Haensel 
and Krahnen (2007) argue that, if the securitized assets are replaced with less highly 
correlated assets, then the originator’s equity beta is assumed to decrease. Meanwhile, if 
securitized assets are replaced with a highly diversified asset portfolio, the association with 
the market portfolio is assumed to increase and the equity betas will approach market betas. 
Similarly, Lemmon et al. (2010) argue that if institutions securitize their high-quality assets 
and retain low-quality assets, the total institutional risk should rise, therefore increasing the 
cost of capital.  
Despite these arguments, evidence has been found by Carey (1998) that the default 
rates on the loans retained by the originator are noticeably lower than the default rates on the 
loans transferred to outsider investors. More importantly, studies by Mian and Sufi (2009), 
Dell'Ariccia, et al. (2009) and Keys, et al. (2010) have found that, during the last few years, 
American banks securitized their lowest quality mortgage loans. Also, prior to the financial 
crisis, more than half of the securities rated by Moody’s received a rating of AAA, which is 
the maximum possible rating and thus are considered to be extremely low risk. During the 
crisis, the creditworthiness of the asset securitization depreciated dramatically. Around 
40,000 of Moody’s-rated tranches were reduced, and nearly one-third of the reduced tranches 
had been rated with AAA (Agarwal, et al., 2010). The ensuing confusion on the actual value 
and risk of securitization and the level of the institutions’ exposure fuelled extra market 
uncertainty and additionally minimized the availability of credit. If this adverse is selection 
combined with an inefficient allocation of risk, it is difficult to understand the reasoning of 
purchasing ABSs at a price that satisfies the originator. This can be attributed to the rating 
agencies’ justification for the quality of the assets. The agency rating remained as an 
attractive feature of the issuance, despite all suspicion (Bui, et al., 2010, p. 324).  
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Now, this raises the question of conflicts of interest between the originator and the 
rating agencies. Most of these agencies are financed by the originators of the instruments 
they rate and hence the agencies are financially dependent on the originator. This conflict of 
interest between the rating agencies and the obligor is known as ‘rating shopping’, since the 
obligor is seeking the best rating even though these agencies may not offer a fair rating on 
the securities. During the financial crises, the delayed reaction from the rating agencies, 
despite great numbers of investors withdrawing from the market, confirmed their unrealistic 
ratings (Makrevska, 2013). However, investors typically cannot perform precise due 
diligence because of the limited information available, and thus investors would blindly rely 
on the ratings provided by these agencies without any attempt to confirm if the price of these 
securities is fair (Akseli, 2011, p. 12). Investors ignored the fact that these agencies are 
financed by the originators and also that the agencies have a bias in favour of a rating that is 
better than the actual risk level (Deventer, 2008, p. 4).  
The originator’s effort level, before and after the issuing date, is not an incentive 
compatible with investors’ interests. As discussed, after shifting the credit risk, the originator 
will no longer be motivated to ensure that borrowers will fulfill their loans, which results in 
an ex-post moral hazard. Also, issuers usually commit additional moral hazard by adding 
lower quality to the underlying portfolio than the credit quality of the overall underlying 
portfolio, resulting in ex-ante moral hazard. Hence, sensible investors are misled by the 
obligors regarding the true value of the credit quality since obligors are at an informational 
advantage when and after assessing such securities (Jobst, 2002). In addition, a further moral 
hazard of securitization highlighted by Alles (2001) is that the originators have no motivation 
to monitor the securitized loans. Originators offer loans to investors and one of their primary 
obligations is to effectively monitor the performance of those securitized loans. This is 
because monitoring the borrowers and the loans, after the loan is approved, minimizes the 
problem of moral hazard, where borrowers might take excessive risks with the borrowed 
amount. Securitization has reduced the incentive to monitor the loans because monitoring is 
expensive and the cash flows from the securitized loans go to the investors and not the 
originator (Lapanan & Anchev, 2011, p. 24). Thus, ABSs can be described as products that 
offer perverse motivation to banks, minimize the value of loans, and transfer risks to parties 
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that cannot assess, evaluate and deal safely and competently with them as banks do. 
Therefore, Bui, et al. (2010, p. 323) make the obligors of securitization comparable to a used-
car dealer. Since the dealer knows the car’s problems, but almost never informs the potential 
customers of them, thus, potential used car buyers often become suspicious; whereas, the 
customers in securitization usually do not have this reaction and mostly feel satisfied without 
any suspicion of wrong-doing.  
In this situation of conflicts when selling high quality assets, if the market cannot 
efficiently separate the low-quality assets from the others, the obligor will bear an adverse 
selection premium since investors will demand a discount on the price of ABS in return for 
the ambiguity about the true value of the securitized asset (Akerlof, 1970). Thus, rational 
investors will form negative beliefs on the true quality of the securitized assets, and assumed 
the adverse selection of the securitized debt turn the investment comparable to the lemons 
market problem. The expected value of private information about the true value of 
securitized assets places a lemons premium on the originator. Because investors will suppose 
that most securitization includes poor quality assets, they ask for a reservation utility in the 
form of an inferior selling price or a higher rate of return as a compensation for the expected 
investment risk of adverse selection (Jobst, 2005). Wolfe (2000) also illustrates how asset 
securitization can minimize information asymmetry and reduce Akerlof’s ‘lemon’ problem. 
He argues that originators have an informational advantage over security holders regarding 
the creditworthiness of the borrowers which may result in investors’ lack of interest. Because 
of this, originators have to offer credit enhancements or other forms of guarantee to the 
investors in order to obtain a fair price for the securitized assets; otherwise the dominant 
price would be the one of a ‘lemon’.  
Given the significant agency problem arising from both the moral hazard and adverse 
selection, originators install credit enhancement mechanisms which allow the incentive to 
be more compatible with the interest of investors and to mitigate risks arising from 
asymmetric information. The detrimental effects of agency conflicts are typically mitigated 
by a subordinate structure. Originators will securitize a considerable amount of senior 
tranches to outside investors, while they retain the junior tranche in order to indicate the 
quality of the asset and to bear the expected loss. According to conventional wisdom, the 
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obligor should preserve the first loss position13 (FLP), since it is the most information-
sensitive tranche, and distribute the information-insensitive senior tranches to the investors 
(Franke, et al., 2012). The design involves risk-sharing by loss-cascading and the loss 
coverage is termed FLP, which principally guards against agency conflict. Originators 
should maintain the FLP since it is the most information-sensitive tranche and offer the 
information-insensitive senior tranches. Essentially, FLP is a credit enhancement that 
represents a mechanism against ex-ante moral hazard in order to restore incentive 
compatibility between investors and originators. This credit enhancement is the most 
important mechanism to mitigate conflicts due to information asymmetry and to obtain better 
incentives for the issuance (Franke, et al., 2012). As investors only bear default losses 
beyond the FLP, a higher FLP means greater protection provided to investors against default 
losses and, hence, against issues of information asymmetries. In turn, the obligor need not 
maintain the FLP, but might sell some or all of it to third parties (Franke, et al., 2007).  
Adding to the FLP mechanism, obligors may also commit some other external and 
internal resources to their securities as a costly signal to prove the quality of the asset. Credit 
enhancement mechanisms can be broadly classified as internal and external mechanisms. An 
instance of internal credit enhancement is overcollateralization, whereby the value of the 
assets transferred to the SPV is greater than the amount of securities that are issued by the 
SPV (Choudhry & Fabozzi, 2003). Overcollateralization differs from cash collateral as the 
latter results in collateral in cash whereas overcollateralization results in collateral in kind 
(Fabozzi & Kothari, 2008, p. 89). Another common form of internal credit enhancement is 
excess spread, when the cash flow is above the amount required for the discharge ofthe 
securities’ payment obligations (Choudhry, 2001, p. 472). In the case of not utilizing the 
excess spread method, the surplus income will be either released to the originator or placed 
in a reserve account (Dugan 1997, p.27). Overall, this method is mainly the first defense 
against losses because the excess spread is the most natural method of credit support as well 
as being the least burdensome to the originator (Fabozzi & Kothari, 2008, p. 86). Commonly, 
the reserve account used to support the credit as a segregated bank account, for the SPV’s 
benefit, and is also known as a cash collateral account. The originator can place a specific 
                                                   
13 This means a security's position that will suffer the first economic loss and carries a higher risk.   
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amount of cash in this reserve account in order to absorb credit losses (Choudhry, 2001, p. 
472).  
 External credit enhancement mechanisms involve credit insurance, surety bonds, and letters 
of credit from financial organisations. Bond insurance used to be the main form of external 
credit enhancement and refers to the buying of a guarantee from a special financial guarantee 
corporation (Giddy, 2000). However, in recent times, and particularly after the crisis, this is 
rarely involved in securities. This is because mono-line insurers have been strictly influenced 
by the financial crisis along with other insurers of other sources that are not eligible 
(Slaughter & May, 2010). Another form of external support is the letter of credit, which is a 
payment method where the buyer, who is the obligor relating to the receivables, along with 
the seller makes an agreement with a financial institution. In the agreement, the institution 
pledges to pay the purchased price to the seller, and thereafter the institution withdraws the 
amount paid from the buyer in order to ensure receiving the payment by the originator 
(seller) (Slaughter & May, 2010). In recent years, this method of credit has proven to be less 
popular, especially after a number of issuances which were downgraded resulting in a 
downgrading of assets that they had afforded letters of credit against (Choudhry, 2001, p. 
472). Moreover, the letter of credit has become a more costly method since it is obtained 
from top-rated banks, although the number of such banks has decreased (Fabozzi & Kothari, 
2008, p. 93) It is vital to note that the third party credit enhancement, which includes bond 
insurance, letter of credit and guarantees to related parties such as the originator, is exposed 
to third party credit risk and also has the highest costs among other credit enhancements 
(Fabozzi & Kothari, 2008, p. 91). Hence, when the rating of the third party guarantor 
declines, the security’s rating will be declined even if the collateral is functioning as planned 
(Fabozzi, 2004, p. 233).   
Securitization with credit enhancements may be a means of avoiding a ‘lemons 
market’ problem. Securitization typically involves various methods of credit enhancement 
to protect investors against two main forms of risks; the risk of adverse selection and the risk 
of moral hazard. Therefore, it is expected that securitization with adequate credit 
enhancement will implicitly show a risk sharing agreement between obligors and investors. 
The implicit risk sharing mechanism of these support methods is of critical importance in 
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showing how obligors signal their ability to absorb default risk through the trenching and 
loss allocation of the transaction without affecting the repayment promised to investors 
(Jobst, 2005).  
2.6 Summary  
The chapter has highlighted that there is no uniform definition for securitization or 
ABS. However, several definitions have been provided which allow a clearer and/or broader 
understanding of the terms. In practice, securitization is the process of taking illiquid assets 
and transforming them into a liquid security. This process has advantages for both the 
originator and investors. It allows more investors to participate by offering further classes of 
debt and more flexible financial instruments. Also, it allows originators to dispose of their 
illiquid assets and to allow some small firms to offer asset securitization. Thus, securitization 
has broadened the value of both originators and investors. Despite this, securitization is 
considered to be one of the most significant financing products, and the value of these 
instruments, as a means of finance has changed particularly after the financial crisis. Issuance 
of all classes of assets increased dramatically between 2003 and 2007, followed by a shape 
drop, leaving the market having learned some hard financial lessons.   
In this regard, the chapter has addressed the downside of securitization related to major 
risks and agency problems. Securitization is naturally designed to shift risks rather than to 
share them. The major risks that have been transferred to the investors, according to Basel, 
are credit risk, market risk, operational risk and liquidity risk. The only possible way for 
investors to measure risks incurred in securitization investment is by the credit rating. In 
spite of all suspicions raised on these mechanisms after the financial crisis, this method is 
still the optimal way to understand the risks related to particular issuances. Securitization, 
on the other hand, has benefitted the obligors by reducing their exposure to credit risk, raising 
liquidity, shifting market risks to other parties and minimizing the operational risks related 
to the securitized assets. Thus, from the originators’ perspective, the principal advantage of 
securitization is its means to shift a bundle of major risks. Nevertheless, the securitization 
developed obliges the obligors to retain some degree of these major risks by sharing them 
through FLP. One positive aspect of FLP for investors is that originators also retain their 
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monitoring incentives and information asymmetries are minimized. Through FLP, 
originators must continue to monitor and control the performance of the assets in the pool at 
the same level as prior to the issuance. This chapter also examines agency issues and 
concludes that the agency costs inherited in the structure of securitization due to the 
separation between ownership and management result in a number of types of adverse 
selection and moral hazards. Credit enhancements can significantly reduce the investors’ 
exposure to agency risks. The greater mechanisms used of credit enhancements, the lower 
the exposure to these conflicts. Therefore, asset securitization brings some feature of risk 
sharing and allows funding for a less risky product through the capital market.   
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Chapter 3: The Basis in Islamic Jurisprudence of 
Asset‐backed Sukuk  
  
 3.1 Introduction  
Saudi Arabia is the second largest Islamic finance market with assets valued at $338 
billion. Saudi Arabia has the biggest penetration of Islamic finance against conventional 
finance globally, with 53% of its population having exposure to Islamic funding. The Saudi 
government strongly considers that the role of Islamic finance is inevitable in offering the 
essential resources for multilateral banks to achieve the objectives of sustainable growth and 
development (Jeddah Chamber, 2015). In fact, the key principles of Islamic finance are 
universal and simple. The detailed implementation of these principles requires knowledge 
of Islamic jurisprudence.  
Sukuk as Islamic securities mean conducting a structure in consonance with Islamic 
jurisprudence. Sukuk are securities that comply with Islamic commercial jurisprudence and 
its investment principles. They need to be Sharia compliant and pronounced by eminent 
Sharia scholars. In this respect, the chapter provides a jurisprudential examination of asset-
backed sukuk. It starts with a discussion defining and analysing their main structures in order 
to extract their particular rules and parameters. It highlights the basic principles on which 
asset-backed sukuk are based and describes their detailed principles. Key issues related to 
asset-backed sukuk are discussed to facilitate understanding of this structure as a preliminary 
step to its operation in the Islamic finance market. The chapter also provides some discussion 
of prohibited transactions in order to build up a jurisprudential foundation to enable the 
applications to be investigated.  
3.2 Overview of Asset‐backed Sukuk  
The AAOIFI has defined sukuk as ‘certificates of equal value to represent undivided 
shares in the ownership of tangible assets, services or usufruct’ (AAOIFI, 2008, p. 307). This 
definition is, in general, well-accepted and represents sukuk from a Sharia perspective, not 
sukuk that are dominant in the market. This definition describes SBSs where all Sharia 
requirements are fulfilled, but not the SCS where only some of the requirements are 
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followed. However, Haneef (2009) defined sukuk as ‘transferable certificates representing a 
share in the ownership of assets or business ventures that entitle the sukuk-holders to receive 
periodic fixed returns and full redemption on maturity of the sukuk’ (Haneef, 2009, p. 130). 
In Haneef’s definition, there are some critical points from the Sharia perspective. Firstly, 
sukuk-holders are not entitled to full redemption on maturity since sukuk-holders share the 
profit and loss of the business. Secondly, receiving periodic fixed returns is not the case with 
all SBSs as sukuk have to offer a genuine return generated from the securitized asset which 
may float depending on the asset’s condition. Haneef’s definition can be accepted when 
considering the dominant practice of sukuk and not the SBS structure. Accordingly, sukuk 
definitions provided in the literature can be categorized into definitions based on Sharia 
principles and definitions based on the dominant practice in the industry.  
Asset-backed sukuk include the structure of ijara sukuk. The term ijara, in the sense 
of renting the usufruct, has an analogous meaning to the English term ‘leasing’14 (Usmani, 
2003). According to the common practice of ijara sukuk, the SPV purchases the asset from 
the originator that will be leased back to him for a period corresponding to the duration of 
the sukuk, and the rental payments received from the originator correspond to the distribution 
payment amount. Lastly, according to a binding promise, the originator at the maturity date 
will purchase, from the SPV, the invested asset at an agreed price that covers the principal 
repayment to the investors (Al-Amine, 2008). However, if the assets are unavailable, then 
the structure becomes a forward ijara sukuk. Forward ijara sukuk have been newly 
introduced as a mode of finance into the Islamic financial market based on the unanimous 
agreement on the legality of the forward ijara contract15. Godlewski (2014) highlighted that 
ijara structures were constrained by the requirement for existing assets which can be relaxed 
if looking to finance new assets through the structure of forward ijara sukuk where assets do 
not yet exist. The structure enables both the issuer and investors to benefit from ijara sukuk 
where the assets are either not available or still under construction. Recently, forward ijara 
                                                   
14 Although, the general meanings are compatible, in practice there are essential differences which will be 
discussed below.    
15 However, there is some confusion over its legality since a number of contemporary scholars refer to an earlier 
disagreement between the early Muslim scholars and its prohibition by the Hanafi School. In fact, the traditional 
texts of the Hanafi School and other schools include many citations that emphasize the agreement of the Hanafi 
standpoint as well (Monawer, 2012).  
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sukuk have been used for the advance finance of major industrial projects, real estate 
development or large items of equipment (Alvi, et al., 2010).    
In forward ijara sukuk, the originator makes, initially, an istisna’ arrangement 
(requesting to construct) with the SPV and undertakes to provide the assets at a future 
specific date. The SPV pays the price, which is equal to the principal amount, to the 
originator for the delivery of the assets at a specified date. The SPV undertakes to lease the 
assets to the originator under the contract of forward ijara for an overall period that reflects 
the life of the sukuk. Then, the originator, as a lessee, undertakes the payments of two 
agreements; the advance rentals when the assets are not delivered, and the actual rentals 
when the assets are delivered in certain amounts that are equal to the periodic distribution 
amount. Typically, these amounts are usually calculated in reference to either a fixed rate or 
variable rate such as the LIBOR (Tariq, 2004). In fact, the structure of forward ijara sukuk 
is the same as that of ijara sukuk except that in the former, the assets are yet to be provided 
or produced when the contract is conducted.  
Intifa’ sukuk are a further form of sukuk that are backed by assets. In the financial sector, 
intifa’ is linked with the word sukuk to describe time sharing bonds that are in line with 
Sharia principles. Intifa’ sukuk represent the ownership of usufruct during a specified time 
and in a specified unit in a residential complex for a specified amount of years. The contract 
of time-sharing is open to be combined with a wakala contract16. It is permissible to appoint 
an agency to take responsibility for partitions that can provide some flexibility and maintain 
better service for the investors (Kahf, 1997, p.80). In fact, intifa’ sukuk and ijara sukuk 
involved a contract of ijara; however, their basis is different. From the perspective of 
investors, intifa’ sukuk are based on operation and use; whereas ijara sukuk are based on 
rental payments. Intifa’ sukuk are relatively less often practiced in comparison to the two 
previous structures. The concept of the Islamic time share has not been widely used for the 
purpose of marketing projects in the region; however, Munsha’t Real Estate Project 
Company, in cooperation with the Al-Baz Company, were successfully involved in 
                                                   
16 This is a contract that gives the power to someone to nominate another one in order to act on his behalf based 
on the agreed conditions and terms such an agency contract.   
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implementing intifa’ sukuk for the Zamzam Tower in Holy Makkah (Merrill Lynch 
International, 2008).   
3.3 The Ijara Sukuk Industry 
Islamic finance, and particularly the market in sukuk, is an important source of wealth 
that is growing rapidly. The global sukuk market grew with issuances that reached more than 
$116 billion in 2014 (Latham & Watkins, 2015). Ijara sukuk were the dominant type of sukuk 
until 2005 when the first musharaka sukuk17 were issued through the DMCC Gold Sukuk. 
Although participatory structures such as mudaraba, musharaka sukuk and others picked up 
pace rapidly and outperformed ijara sukuk in 2006 and 2007, ijara sukuk returned to favour 
in the market due to the fatwa issued by the AAOIFI in February 200818. In addition, 
Godlewski, et al. (2014) found that ijara sukuk encountered positive reactions from the stock 
market. They attributed this to both the lower Sharia risk of ijara sukuk in comparison with 
other structures and to the lower risk of adverse selection than with other types of sukuk. 
This is because ijara sukuk have more stable prices and returns than other structures since 
the return can be predicted more accurately during the life of the sukuk19 (Al-Jawria, 2009, 
p. 134). Thus, ijara sukuk are associated with relatively lower risk and show a more accurate 
credit analysis compared to other structures (Abubaker, 2009). To prove this, during the 
crisis from 2007 until 2008, musharaka sukuk issuances dropped by more than 80% and 
mudaraba and murabaha sukuk decreased by 68% and 60% respectively. However, the 
issuance of ijara sukuk during the crisis decreased by only 8% (Hijazi, 2009, p. 7). To 
demonstrate the dominance of ijara sukuk, Figure 3-1 shows the volume of sukuk issuances 
according to their structure from 2001 until March 2015:   
                                                   
17 AAOIFI identified fourteen possible structures for sukuk. Sukuk structures vary from salam (pre-payment of 
an asset for future delivery), murabaha (cost-plus sales), istisna’ (build-to-own property), ijara (rental/ lease 
agreement), mudaraba and musharaka (partnerships) (AAOIFI, 2008).   
18 The Fatwa includes that the purchase undertaking in all participatory sukuk structures are unacceptable except 
under leasing contracts (AAOIFI, 2008).  
19 However, the estimated return on some forms of ijara sukuk cannot be entirely determined and fixed at the 
first stage of the contract because the insurance and maintenance costs cannot be accurately determined in 
advance (Rohmatunnisa, 2008).  
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Figure 3-1 Structural Break-up of the Global Sukuk Issuance, 2001-15 
 
Source: International Islamic Financial Market  
In Saudi Arabia, the introduction of sukuk instrument has been relatively late 
compared to other Muslim countries. The first Sharia compliant instruments were issued in 
the late 1990s-early 2000s, and later, the short-term murabaha sukuk in 2002. While, long-
term murabaha sukuk were issued for the first time in January 2016 (Jeddah Chamber, 2015).  
3.4 Critical Issues of Asset‐backed Sukuk 
The AAOFI has issued a number of guidelines and standards to improve 
transparency, disclosure and governance. It states particular standards for sukuk; however, 
Jobst, et al. (2008) claimed that sukuk lack a well-accepted standardization. In the sukuk 
market, there are a number of well-known institutions for standardization in the Islamic 
finance industry. To give an example, the International Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB) is a well-known organisation in the Islamic market including the sukuk market. The 
formation of the IFSB based in Kuala Lumpur was inaugurated officially on 3rd November 
2002 (IFSB, 2002). A further step related to Islamic financial standardizations has been taken 
by the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) that is headquartered in Bahrain and 
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has been operating since 2002. This establishment is a true example of the developing 
standardization of Islamic capital and money market products and practices, including the 
sukuk industry (IIFM, 2002).   
The earliest and most dominant organisation in this field is the Accounting and 
Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), which was established 
on 26th of February 1990 in Algiers (AAOIFI, 2006). These organisations were recently 
established in line with conventional market organisations such as the regional structure of 
the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) which was created in 1974 (ICMA, 
n.d.). This is a natural result of the Islamic market being in its infancy level compared to the 
international market. These Islamic institutions have made efforts to standardize the Islamic 
financial market. For example, in recent years, the AAOIFI has introduced more than 20 
Standards related to the Islamic financial market.  
Despite all of these current organisations, the point made by Jobst, et al. (2008) is 
that these standardizations are not well-accepted. In practice, the major issue is not the 
shortage of standardization organisations, but that Islamic standardizations are not binding. 
Islamic guidelines are not mandatory for the issuing of sukuk in all Muslim countries. Hence 
the positive effects of the published standards, with the subject of sukuk in particular, will 
remain not to be seen. Based on the main example of sukuk standardizations that was the 
subject of a resolution by AAOIFI in 2008, questions can be asked about how these standards 
help to develop the practice of sukuk in the market. Are there any differences between the 
practices relating to sukuk before and after the AAOIFI declaration? Naim, et al (2013) 
attempted to answer these questions by reviewing some examples of sukuk preceding and 
after the pronouncement of the AAOIFI standard. In their review, sukuk samples were 
analysed by focusing particularly on controversial areas such as the guarantee feature, 
pricing and ownership transfer. The disappointing finding was that there were only 
negligible changes in the principal terms and also in the conditions of the sukuk after the 
AAOIFI standards. Thus, by declaring more authentic decisions and principles in their 
standards, the AAOIFI has not had a noticeable effect in altering the behaviour of industry 
players. Thus, it is undoubtedly true that the Islamic standardizations are not influential 
enough and there is a considerable gap between the standardization organisations and players 
in the Islamic finance industry.  
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To achieve a higher level of Sharia-compliant sukuk is only possible when one of  
the three parties involved (investor, issuer or Sharia advisor) becomes more conscious about 
the sukuk being compatible with Sharia. However, this is mainly a question of investors’ 
decisions, since a higher demand for Sharia-based products can lead to equilibrium where it 
becomes optimal for the issuer to offer Sharia-based instruments. When those investors 
prefer to pay more or accept lower returns for products with higher levels of Sharia 
compatibility, the institution’s incentives to cheat will also be reduced. This, furthermore, 
will provide the institutions with the ability to recoup the higher cost of Sharia-compliant 
products as well as to receive an incentive to improve their Sharia quality. This is a 
challenging period which requires a larger basis of Sharia-conscious investor. The numbers 
of more Sharia-conscious investors can possibly be improved by enhancing the education of 
investors to raise their awareness. At the same time, the presence of Sharia-consciousness 
among both Sharia advisors and issuers is essential to ensure the success of SBS (Azmat, et 
al., 2014). Otherwise, the enforcement of the standards by the authorities in each country 
may be a solution in the current situation. This enforcement could help to enhance the 
issuances of SBSs in the market more swiftly than the earlier process (Nazar, 2011).  
It is important to point out that the current situation of the non-binding market for 
sukuk related to Sharia principles has resulted in conflict resolution and fatwa shopping. 
Sukuk issuance undergoes a strict screening procedure by religious advisors in order to 
confirm their Sharia compatibility. Their resolutions are of primary significance to investors 
who have to ensure that the issue which is compliant with Sharia prior to purchasing. Thus, 
the examination of the quality of Sharia compliance can affect the investor’s reaction towards 
the issuance, with a higher quality audit sending a positive indication on the ability to trade 
the issuance in later periods. This fatwa provided by Sharia scholars represents a prominent 
difference between conventional and Islamic finance. Furthermore, the stock market’s 
reaction towards sukuk can be affected by the reputation of the Sharia advisor endorsing the 
issuance. If doubts exist in respect of the Sharia compliance surrounding a particular issue, 
the signalling effect of a fatwa can play a key role in determining investor reactions 
(Godlewski, et al., 2014).   
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Although the Sharia advisory board has been considered as a further step to achieving 
the compliance of sukuk, some practices show the opposite situation where the Sharia 
advisory boards are not strict enough with Sharia principles. This high level of tolerance has 
led to inverting the core of sukuk, and this has changed the essential features of this 
instrument (Abdo, 2014). The practice that allows the issuer to seek fatwa on specific 
issuance from jurists, who they assume will accept their product as an investment compatible 
with Sharia is termed as fatwa shopping (Safari, et al., 2014). Searching for a friendly 
scholarly view on an issuance is basically a means of being granted a fatwa that satisfies the 
issuer’s desires and not the principles of Sharia. For instance, one preference of traditional 
investors is the guarantee of return, which is not permissible in Islamic finance. However, 
fatwa shopping by the institution may find an Islamic scholar who can sidestep this difficulty 
and set his imprimatur on the issuance in order to make it more attractive. Such a practice is 
a critical threat to the Islamic finance industry as a whole, since the processes of Islamic 
finance will then work against the harmonization of fatwa.   
The problem becomes more complex in the presence of a considerable number of 
Sharia advisors, and thus the possibility of fatwa shopping may become more affordable. 
The number of Sharia advisors is mainly at present about 250–300 plus between 15 and 20 
members who are highly sought by sukuk issuers (Azmat, et al., 2014). The situation where 
a fee is received from the issuer, who has the right to look for different views, mainly 
encourages fatwa shopping. The advisor, who is mainly concerned about losing fees, may 
approve a less-compliant or even non-compliant sukuk structure in order to receive the 
business (Azmat, et al., 2014). Recent research shows that about twenty Islamic scholars 
hold more than half of the sukuk market, and the top 3 of these scholars receive annually 
around $4.5 million in fees (Zaheer & Wijnbergen, 2013). It is apparent that the sukuk market 
is negatively affected by the same type of incentive conflicts that appear in the case of the 
rating agencies in conventional finance. The current situation of the sukuk market has 
resulted in a strong incentive to be excessively lenient in certification with Sharia-
compliance matters (Zaheer & Wijnbergen, 2013). Thus, a number of studies such as by 
Majid, et al. (2011) assert that for any fatwa that contravenes AAOIFI standards on sukuk, 
its reliability tends to be tenuous, even when it may be compatible with other standards and 
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has been approved by a narrow majority. Such an issuance might be called into question by 
an individual judge, who might subscribe to a strong point of view.  
3.5 Sharia Framework of Asset‐backed Sukuk  
In asset-backed sukuk, the main contract is ijara, meaning that all ijara conditions 
and rules have to be fulfilled. This is coupled with the issued standards for a valid sukuk. 
This section provides a Sharia framework based on AAOIFI standards, and discusses the 
critical rules related to both ijara and sukuk standards followed by a discussion of prohibited 
transactions. The section aims to identify the Sharia framework related to asset-backed sukuk 
that will form a benchmark for the rating. This section will guide the empirical chapters to 
fill a gap related to determining to what extent do the cases comply with Sharia rules?  
3.5.1 Critical Rules of Leasing  
For a valid ijara, the key requirements are mostly related to the asset, liabilities and 
maintenance.  For rules related to the asset, the principle condition in ijara is to own the asset 
or the usufruct prior to the contract. The AAOIFI supports this principle by the hadith that 
the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) prohibits one from selling what he does not own and ijara 
is a sale of usufruct (Abo-Dawod, 2009, p. 3:283). Therefore, true ownership of the 
securitized assets is essentially required when structuring asset-backed sukuk. Also, the 
securitized assets have to be identified as permissible according to Sharia law and liable to 
valuation in terms of the cash received. If the asset is not identified or not valued or not 
permissible this means the investors, as a lessor, will lose their access to the asset. However, 
in a case of default, the originator as a lessee will not be charged any penalty; however, other 
steps can be taken in order to recover the rent such as vacating the property from the current 
lessee (Haider & Azhar, 2010). Further to the asset’s conditions, the leased asset should be 
utilized only for the purpose stated in the contract, otherwise the lessor’s consent is 
mandatory.  
For the rules related to the liabilities associated with leased assets, there is a general 
agreement among early jurists on the liabilities and rights in the ijara contract. The AAOIFI 
clearly elaborates on these liabilities and rights between the lessee and the lessor under the 
ijara basis. To illustrate their view, the rights and liabilities arising from the ownership of 
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the leased asset shall be with the lessor; whereas the rights and liabilities arising from the 
use of the leased assets shall be with the lessee (Merah, 2008, p. 203). This means that 
investors are in charge of all of the liabilities associated with the leased asset apart from the 
liabilities resulting from the assets’ usage of it. Thus, investors would be responsible for 
paying property tax and insurance for the guarantee programme along with incurring all risks 
associated with the leased asset during the leasing period.   
On the other hand, the originator is not responsible for the assets’ damages except 
those that results from misuse and negligence. The lessee will not compensate the lessor 
once the asset value has been impaired, unless such impairment occurred because of the 
misconduct or negligence of the lessee. This is because the AAOIFI consider the leased asset 
in the lessee’s possession as amanah (a form of trust). Thus, if the usufruct of the leased 
asset is impaired partially or wholly with no negligence on the part of the lessee, the lessor 
shall be responsible for repairing the usufruct and he has to bear such costs (AAOIFI, 2008). 
In practice, some prospectuses include a statement that the lessee shall bear the cost of asset 
impairment and costs such as taxes that relate to the ownership of the property. The point 
behind including such a statement is that the parties consider the property’s ownership as it 
will be devolved to the lessee whereas Sharia principles will not accept releasing the lessor 
from their liabilities. Thus, such statements are not accepted and may turn the investment 
null and void (Usmani, 2003, p. 5).  
In addition, the AAOIFI emphasizes that the responsibility for maintenance and 
insurance fall under the lessor’s liabilities as the owner of the asset (AAOIFI, 2008). All 
expenses are incurred by the lessor since the ownership risk is vested with in the individual. 
However, the impairment of the leased asset due to non-maintenance of such assets may 
render the contract voidable. It is acceptable in Islamic law that the lessor delegates the major 
maintenance of the rented asset to the lessee but that all expenses incurred for such 
maintenance have to be reimbursed by the lessor. The only cases where the lessee is 
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committed to bearing the maintenance are periodical maintenance and operating 
maintenance20.   
Finally, with regards to rental payment rules, the rental has to be determined at the 
time of agreement and thereafter cannot be changed without the agreement of all parties’. 
Rental payment is charged from the actual delivery date of the leased asset and not from the 
date of the price paid or of purchase by the lessor (Usmani, 1998).  
In fact, these standards relating to liabilities are not subordinate rules, as claimed by 
some scholars. They are agreed by all early jurists, thus contradicting these standards turning 
ijara contract to be invalid (Merah, 2008, p. 214). These standards are major rules, since 
they reflect the real meaning of the ijara contract, specifying the identity of the ijara contract 
and deciding whether it is proper or not. For instance, the real goal of the ijara contract will 
be negated if the lessee bears the liabilities for the maintenance arising from the ownership 
of the leased asset.   
3.5.2 Standards for a Valid Issuance of Sukuk  
The AAOIFI in 2008 set specific standards for sukuk investment. The key standards 
were related to the assets’ ownership, investment guarantees, and the Sharia advisory and 
approval process to be observed in any prospectus of issuance. The following sections 
present the essential requirements in this field: ‘5/1/8/1 the prospectus must include 
contractual conditions, adequate statements about the participants in the issue, their legal 
position and rights as well as obligations; 5/1/8/2 the prospectus of sukuk must include the 
identification of the contract on the basis of which the certificates are to be issued, such as 
sale of tangible leased assets, ijara etc.; 5/1/8/3 the contract that forms the basis of the issue 
must be complete with respect to its elements and conditions, not including conditions that 
conflict with its objectives and rules; 5/1/8/4 the prospectus must explicitly mention the 
obligation to abide by the rules and principles of the Islamic Sharia and that there is a Sharia 
board that approves the procedures of the issues and monitors the implementation of the 
                                                   
20 Operating maintenance is required for the smooth utility of the leased asset continuously, such as oil for 
machinery and equipment. Periodical maintenance is essential for sustaining the capability of the asset to provide 
usufruct and is delegated with all its expenses to the lessee (Merah, 2008, p. 209).  
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project throughout its duration; 5/1/8/5 the prospectus must state that the investment of the 
realized funds and the assets into which the funds are converted will be undertaken through 
Sharia-compliant modes of investment; 5/1/8/6 the prospectus must state that each owner of 
a certificate participates in the profit and bears a loss in proportion to the financial value 
represented by his certificates; 5/1/8/7 the prospectus must not include any statement to the 
effect that the issuer of the certificate accepts the liability to compensate the owner of the 
certificate up to the nominal value of the certificate in situations other than torts and 
negligence nor that the individual guarantees a fixed percentage of profit’ (AAOIFI, 2008, 
pp. 242-243).  
Accordingly, investors have to be the legal owners of the pooled assets, instead of 
being nominal holders of the certificates. Ownership has to include all of the obligations and 
rights that accompany actual ownership, which means transforming sukuk from being asset-
based into asset-backed securities. Also, managers or issuers of sukuk cannot guarantee the 
principal investment to sukuk-holders. The originator cannot guarantee the principal to buy 
the pooled assets for the nominal value at the time of maturity or even in the event of default 
irrespective of potential losses or profits, but rather the assets can be obtained for their fair 
market value or net value. However, the AAOIFI has added a further statement that excludes 
ijara sukuk ‘it is permissible for a lessee in a sukuk ijara to undertake to purchase the leased 
assets when the sukuk are extinguished for its nominal value, provided the individual is not 
also a partner, mudharib, or investment agent’ (AAOIFI, 2008). This means that ijara sukuk-
holders can receive their capital through purchase undertakings. In addition, the managers 
and originators are not allowed to offer loans to the certificates holders when actual profits 
from the pooled assets fall short of expected profits. Instead, a reserve account can be created 
for the purpose of covering such a shortfall. Moreover, a Sharia supervisory board is a 
requirement in order to review all documentation and transactions related to structuring 
sukuk and to verify that the manner of implementation is in accordance with Sharia rules and 
principles.  
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3.5.3 Prohibited Transactions  
In Sharia law, any transaction must avoid riba (usury) since this is the main 
prohibited behaviour in terms of commercial dealings. In this field, the most emphasis has 
been given to riba, and the emphasis has been shown in different verses of the Quran, ‘That 
they took riba, though they were forbidden and that they devoured men’s substance 
wrongfully. We have prepared for, those among men who reject faith a grievous punishment’ 
(Qur’an 4:161). In another verse, another such argument is found, ‘O ye who believe! Be 
afraid of Allah and give up what remains (due to you) from riba (from now onwards) if you 
are (really) believers’ (Qur’an: 2:278). As these texts are unequivocal and explicit texts 
concerning this prohibition, riba cannot be tolerated to any extent. Also, if riba is involved 
in any transaction, this will render the contract null and void (Alsulaiman, 2011, p. 42).  
Riba of a loan is the main type that occurs in every loan that attracts a benefit. In 
lending, the repayment has to be for the same amount as the amount of the loan. Any increase 
in the amount of money returned by a borrower is riba, which is either imposed by the lender 
in the contract or even promised in the contract by the borrower; however, if the borrower 
pays more than the amount borrowed without any previous explicit or implicit stipulation, 
this is allowed since the lending has been conducted with no commercial exploitation 
(Rahman, 2006). In fact, charging interest on loans is riba and considered unjust, since a 
loan in Islam is strictly considered a brotherly act and not a business transaction (Tariq, 2004, 
p. 10).   
Sharia law excludes lending from financial and business dealings in order to avoid 
commercial exploitation. Considering riba as exploitative is because it only operates in 
favour of the wealthy and only needy people will pay extra money for a mere postponement. 
Consequently, Quran sets a strict distinction between profit from trade and profit from riba. 
Profit from trade is beneficial to society and helps to develop the welfare of individuals 
whereas profit from riba contributes to scarcity, illiquidity and nonproductive outcomes 
(Elgamal, 2000, p. 5). Thus, the time value of money is prohibited; whereas the time value 
of money is widely recognized in conventional business transactions. In a situation where 
the borrower postpones repayment after the time that was originally agreed, the lender is not 
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permitted to receive compensation for the delayed payment. Charging the debtor additional 
money for failure to pay when due is an explicit riba, although this delay is considered to be 
a sin and might also be punished.   
Similarly to riba of a loan, there is a contract that has a compatible essence known 
as the inah sale. To illustrate is an inah sale is a contract that involves sale and immediate 
repurchase. A seller will sell merchandise to a buyer on a cash basis and thereafter he will 
immediately repurchase the item sold on a deferred basis at a higher price than the cash price. 
Riba in this contract will be the difference between the two prices (Rosly & Sanusi, 1999, p. 
8). To give an example, a person sells an item for $5000 and then buys it back in cash for 
$4000, which means that he basically borrowed $4000 in order to be repaid $5000. In this 
contract, what are the scholars’ views? Do they permit it prima facie or prohibit it due to the 
motive behind the sale? According to the motive behind inah sales, the majority of jurists 
invalidate the sale of inah because it constitutes a legal device to receive a loan with interest 
(Ibn-Rushd, 1985, p. 60). However, Imam Shafi’i allowed it and mentioned that ‘the 
unlawful intention of the parties is immaterial unless expressed in the act’ (Shafi’i, 1990, p. 
63). He treated the inah sale as two separate transactions in which each of them comply with 
all the essential elements and conditions of a sale contract.   
In fact, the inah sale is an apparent stratagem for riba by conducting two transactions 
with an unwanted asset that is only being used for the legalizing of the riba of a loan. In 
addition, the inah sale has been explicitly prohibited by the Prophet (PBUH) as he was 
reported as saying: ‘If people are busy with inah sale…’ Allah will make misfortune befall 
them, and will not remove it from them until they return to their religion’ (Ibn-Qudamah, 
1984, p. 60). Due to this explicit prohibition from the Prophet (PBUH), their cannot bear any 
controversy about this type of sale in terms of ruling. Although Imam Shafi’i legalized this 
concept that was a personal opinion and did not rely on any interpretation of any authentic 
Islamic authority while the majority who prohibit such a sale base their opinions on one of 
the authority of Islamic legal sources in the Sunnah. Also, Imam Shafi’i mentioned in 
different statements to his followers that ‘following the hadith and ignoring my personal 
view is contradictory to it’, as well as ‘If you find in my writings something different to the 
hadith of the Prophet (PBUH), then speak on the basis of the hadith of the Prophet (PBUH), 
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and leave what I have said’ (Nawawi, 1997, p. 63). In another citation, he stated that ‘For 
everything I say, if there is something authentic from the Prophet (PBUH) that is contrary to 
what I have said, then the hadith of the Prophet (PBUH) comes first, so do not follow my 
opinion’ (Alrazi, 2003, p. 93). No doubt these statements of Imam Shafi’i are in favour of 
the majority point of view. Therefore, the reported hadith along with the methodology that 
is adopted by Imam Shafi’i supports the view of the impermissibility of the inah sale. Also, 
it is important to highlight the comments of Ibn-qayyim on the view of Imam Shafi’i, that 
‘The late followers referred to Imam Shafi’i some views that he did not mean it. Who knows 
Imam Shafi’i and how he was in his life, he knows that he never uses hiyal (stratagems) and 
he never permit it to anyone. However, he only validated the contract as a normal two 
separated sales without any deceit. Hence, if the parties agreed to lend 1000 and receive 1200 
in turn, then they add the commodity only to enact the pure riba as it is in inah sale, he 
defiantly will not accept it’ (Ibn-Qayyim, 1973, p. 293).  
Due to the strict attitude of jurists and explicit prohibition on the inah sale, some 
people have invented other similar contracts such as the sale of wafa and istighlal. The 
ultimate goal of such sales, which have the same essence as the inah sale, is to enact pure 
riba. To illustrate these sales, the sale of wafa is selling with the right of redemption. It is a 
contract whereby the possessor of an asset sells it, with a stipulation that the seller will give 
it back when he returns its price to the purchaser (Haydar, 2003). In other words, it is a sale 
contract that includes the condition of abrogation as in the end the seller will return the cash 
and the purchaser will return the asset. Also, an istighlal sale is to sell an asset with an 
attached promissory condition that the seller, who leases out his asset, will receive it back 
once he pays back the loan.  
The literal meaning of the istighlal sale is the exploitation sale, since the purchaser 
exploits the asset that is sold as he benefits from the rental through leasing it to the seller 
(Haydar, 2003). In fact, the sale of istiqlal can be considered as a form of the sale of wafa, 
since the asset is rented to the seller; whereas, the sale of wafa itself is considered as a form 
of inah sale since they are compatible with its main feature that the merchandise eventually 
returns back to the seller.   
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Almasri, a distinguished researcher in Islamic transactions, criticized permission being given 
for such sales, ‘the people of hiyal have artificially made it a controversial contract: Is it 
allowed or is it forbidden? Is it a sale or a rahn (collateral) for those who allowed it? The 
reality is that wafa and istighlal sales do not bear any controversy; they are simply a usurious 
stratagem, i.e. a usurious loan in a form of a sale’ (Almasri, 2006).  In fact, the sale of wafa 
and istighlal are loans with the benefit of the asset involved, to use it or to invest it. Covering 
the loan with a sale to justify riba will not change the ruling that riba will occur in any loan 
that attracts benefit. The Prophet (PBUH) said: ‘There will come a time on people where 
they allow riba contract under sale contract’ (Ibn-Qayyim, 1973, p. 178). Although, these 
two sales have not been prohibited by the Prophet explicitly, such as inah sale has, the 
reported hadith can apparently include them. This is because, regardless of all the invented 
procedures, they are clearly a stratagem in order to get around the prohibition of the inah 
sale. The stratagem is to give the inah sale a different and new name in order to make it 
acceptable to the public; however; in reality it is a mere form of inah sale that is prohibited 
explicitly by the Prophet (PBUH).   
From the previous discussions and pieces of evidence quoted, it can be said that the 
view of prohibition outweighs permissibility. In this respect, Almasri criticized the 
proponents of these sales by stating that ‘I wonder about the mentality that propagates the 
prohibition of riba and yet goes on allowing it at higher rates, under various pretexts and 
stratagems. This is like closing the ‘white’ door and opening tens of black windows, to the 
point where the ijtihad of contemporary jurists, if we can call it ijtihad, focuses on no other 
than the inherited old stratagems. It seems that the whole of fiqh has been reduced to mere 
stratagems’ (Almasri, 2006).   
The reason for prohibiting riba exists in these sales with the extra cost and effort 
through buying and selling a commodity. Sharia does not forbid a lower harm that exists in 
riba and then permits what is more harmful. In this sense, Ibn-Taimiyah mentioned that ‘the 
clear cut riba is more beneficial to them than these stratagems. The legislator is wise and 
merciful. He does not prohibit what is beneficial and allows what is less beneficial. He does 
not prohibit what is harmful and allows what is even more harmful. If He has prohibited such 
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transactions, then His prohibition of these transactions (stratagems) is even stricter.’ (Ibn-
Qayyim, 1973, p. 182).  
3.5.4 Sale and Leaseback  
Sale and leaseback is a controversial type of transaction. In this arrangement, the 
seller will promise to rent the asset from the buyer once the sale is conducted, then all of the 
obligations and conditions of the ijara contract are applied to the seller as a lessee and the 
buyer as a lessor. There are some proponents of sale and leaseback contracts, and one of the 
main contemporary proponents is Nazih Hammad who presented a paper under the title 
‘Renting the Estate to Who Sold It’ to a jurists’ seminar organized in Riyadh. He claimed 
that the permissibility of such a concept is the view of Maliki jurists and IbnTaimiyyah 
(Hammad, 2007). Although, al-Dharir agreed with him, Siddiq based his argument on the 
general principle of the natural permissibility of transactions. Nevertheless, the majority of 
contemporary scholars do not allow sale and leaseback transactions. This is because the 
structure would transform the funds into a loan which means that any stipulated return would 
make it a prohibited riba. In addition, a well-known hadith which prohibits two sales in one 
sale refers to an inah sale that can involve such a transaction21.  
However, the evidence provided by Nazih Hammad to support his view is not 
precise. He claimed that Maliki jurists and Ibn-Taimiyyah allowed such a transaction, but 
the situation that Maliki jurists and Ibn-Taimiyyah allowed is when someone states, ‘I will 
sell you my house for such an amount provided that you sell me your animal for such an 
amount’ (Ibn-Taimiyah, n.d.). In this situation, two different items are involved, while in the 
case of the sale and leaseback one item is returned back to the seller making it akin to the 
prohibited inah sale. Also, their other basis was its general permissibility, which is also not 
accurate because when concerning compound contracts which are made up of more than one 
contract this might lead to impermissibility. If the rule relating to the 'simple single contract' 
is permissible, the rule relating to compound contracts (multiple contracts in one deal) results 
in impermissibility. This point is based on the hadith that forbids two sale contracts in one 
                                                   
21  The hadith is reported by Ahmad, al-Nisa'i and al-Tirmdhi. AI-Tirmidhi authenticated the hadith (see 
NaylalAwtar 5/248).  
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and two transactions in one. Thus, Islamic jurisprudence usually finds that each contract may 
be permitted on its own, but they are not allowed when compounded together in one contract, 
such as in the prohibited inah sale as it is compound contract (Almasri, 2006).  
What is important to shed the light on is the fact that the above discussion concerns 
the compound contract of the sale and leaseback transaction. The promise if not compulsory 
and not joined to a contract means that the contract is not a compound one. On the other 
hand, if it is compulsory, then it becomes a condition, resulting in the compounding and the 
prohibition of the transaction. This is because, in Islamic jurisprudence, it is well known that 
a condition can alter the ruling. For example, a nonconditional riba is permissible while a 
conditional riba is not. If a person lends cash to another without condition and thereafter 
borrows from him, this is permitted; however, if this lending was with the condition that the 
latter lends back, this would not be permissible (Almasri, 2006). Therefore, it is unanimously 
agreed that it is permissible if both purchase and lease contracts are executed separately and 
consecutively, and the lessee may then leaseback the leased asset to the lessor at any rental 
amount agreed on.   
3.6 Summary   
This chapter has discussed sukuk definitions and revealed that their definitions are 
categorized into those compatible with Sharia and definitions compatible with the practice 
in financial markets. The AAOIFI definition reflects the meaning of sukuk with compatible 
Sharia. AAOIFI sukuk include different types of structures; however, ijara sukuk are the 
dominant type and have gained a a positive status in the financial market. This is because 
these sukuk have lower Sharia risk compared to other structures as well as a lower risk of 
adverse selection in comparison with other types of sukuk. This is attributed to the stability 
of their prices and returns compared with other structures, making the return more 
predictable during the life time of the sukuk. Forward ijara sukuk are similar except that the 
assets will be available at a future date. Also, intifa’ sukuk involves the contract of ijara; 
however, its basis is different from that of ijara sukuk. From the investors’ perspective, 
intifa’ sukuk are based on the operation and use of the underlying assets, whereas ijara sukuk 
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are based on the rental payment. Thus, the returns on intifa’ sukuk are less predictable than 
in the previous structures.  
The chapter also deals with Sharia standards related to sukuk structures. The 
discussion highlights the requirements related to ijara contracts, mainly involving the asset 
requirements, liabilities and maintenance conditions. The principal condition related to 
assets in ijara is to own the asset or the usufruct prior to the contract. Secondly, it is important 
that the rights and liabilities arising from the ownership of the leased asset are incurred by 
the lessor, while the rights and liabilities arising from the use of the leased assets are incurred 
by the lessee.   
Moreover, the AAOIFI stresses that the expenses for essential maintenance and 
insurance are linked with the lessor due to his ownership. These discussed standards are 
major rules since they represent the real meaning of the ijara contract under Sharia law since, 
for example, the real sense of the ijara contract will be negated if the lessee incurs the 
liabilities that arise from the ownership of the leased asset.     
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Chapter 4: Asset‐based Sukuk: Structures and 
Assessment  
 
4.1 Introduction   
Sukuk are the fastest growing instruments among the activities of Islamic finance. 
During recent years, and particularly since 2010, the growth of the international sukuk market 
has been highly impressive. Since 2011, the market has observed record sukuk issuances by 
corporates, sovereigns and quasi-sovereigns in a number of jurisdictions worldwide, 
especially in the gulf countries and Asia (IIFM, 2015). This notable growth was spurred not 
merely by the spread of Islamic banking but also by the extensive development of the sukuk 
market and investors’ demands for financial instruments in harmony with their religious 
beliefs (Godlewski, et al., 2014). From the year 2001 until 2014, the evolution of this market 
has shown a remarkable increase in sukuk issuance in 2014 representing 10 times more than 
2001 from $1,172 million to $120, 854 billion (see Figure 4-1) (IIFM, 2015). This upward 
momentum has recently supported the entry of new regions and jurisdictions in to the sukuk 
market. On October 29, 2013, the British Prime Minister announced that the United 
Kingdom will be the first country other than countries in the Islamic world to invest in sukuk. 
This has reaffirmed the growing interest in this particular mode of finance (Di Mauro, et al., 
2013).  
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Figure 4-1 Global Sukuk Issuances, 2001-15 
 
Source: IIFM Sukuk Database.  
           This chapter focuses on asset-backed sukuk, which involve a number of different 
structures. The discussion adopts a theoretical approach related to agency theory focusing 
on risk/return assessment arising in the investment, and also uses AAOIFI Sharia standards 
as the basis for the analysis. Section 4.2 presents a literature review and background related 
to asset-backed sukuk and provides an overview of Sharia principles related to sukuk and 
discussing the AAOIFI standards. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 extend the previous literature through 
an analysis and discussion of the financial risks of assetbacked compared to conventional 
bonds. Section 4.5 explores the agency relationships in an attempt to contribute to the 
literature in terms of the agency costs of asset-backed bonds in order to design mechanisms 
and devices that can be implemented to manage conflicts.  
4.2 Asset‐backed Sukuk as Financial Instruments  
Sukuk market in Saudi Arabia is relatively new, with occasional issuances in the 
initial years. The market was stable between 2008 and 2011, with 3–4 issuances/annum 
totalling about $2 billion. In 2012, the market grew speedily, with 10 sukuk issuances with a 
total value of $6.7 billion. This trend maintained in 2013 and 2014. Saudi Arabia issued 
sukuk totalling close to $15.2 billion in 2013, ranking it the second amongst Muslims 
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countries. Saudi Arabia’s aggregate sukuk outstanding in 2014 stood at around to $50 billion, 
up by 35% from only $36.4 billion in 2013 (Jeddah Chamber, 2015). In Saudi Arabia, out of 
12 domestic commercial banks, four are full-fledged Islamic banks and a fifth, the largest 
conventional bank, is in a move to become Sharia-compliant. The four Islamic banks 
together hold around 25% of the assets. The Islamic banking sector asset base reached about 
SAR 1,151 billion, showing about 21.4% of the global Islamic banking assets, with a growth 
rate of 8% in 2014. The market share of assets in the total banking industry surpassed 50% 
in 2015 (Alhumaidah, et al., 2016). 
Finding suitable assets is a critical issue for both sovereign and corporates entities 
when issuing asset-backed sukuk. Identifying the underlying assets that meet Sharia 
requirements as well as offering attractive earnings to both suppliers and users of finance is 
a major hurdle in sukuk market expansion. The lack of proper assets to work with is because 
eligible assets are restricted and limited to both sovereign and corporate issuers (Jobst, et al., 
2008). Many sovereigns are reluctant to part with public assets, simply because of their 
apprehension that the disposal of public assets to overseas investors could result in negative 
public sentiment. Thus, sovereigns favour the conventional securities route since they do not 
require any disposal of underlying assets. Similarly, the corporations either do not have the 
proper assets, or the assets are not adequate or have been encumbered or they might be 
subject to transmission taxes (Haneef, 2009). Adding to this, after finding a proper asset for 
certain issue, the institution has to wait until the maturity date in order to be able to re-use 
the same underlying asset for another issuance (Al-Amine, 2008). This shortfall of eligible 
assets could impede or slow down the regular issuance of sukuk. However, the sukuk market 
has moved towards issuing asset-based sukuk instead of asset-backed sukuk in order to 
overcome the problem. As in asset-based sukuk, there is no real ownership of the asset, 
sovereigns can share their public assets and companies can provide important assets for 
investors without any concern about losing their possessions. In the global market, around 
98% of sukuk are associated with doubts concerning their representation of ownership (Kanji 
& O'Neill, 2015). The underlying asset might be the shares of companies, which do not 
provide true ownership, but rather merely offer a right to the returns. For instance, the state 
of Bahrain tested ijara sukuk in 2001, and although it was hugely successful, the major 
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problem was ownership. These sukuk are no more than the buying of earnings and returns 
from shares which are not legal from the Sharia perspective (Usmani, 2008).  
Despite the fact that sukuk are theoretically different from conventional securities22, 
it is questionable in practice to what extent sukuk are actually different from their 
conventional counterparts. This is a controversial subject in the sukuk literature as, there is 
an ongoing argument between two groups as to whether sukuk are really different from 
conventional securities. The first group is led by Miller, et al. (2007) who claims that sukuk 
structures are designed to imitate conventional bond features, whereas the second group is 
led by Cakir and Raei (2007). Thet adopted the opposite view that sukuk are unlike bonds 
since sukuk in practice offer diversification benefits that can reduce the risk portfolio. They 
gave evidence to support their view by using a sample of sovereign Eurobonds and sukuk 
through the same issuer. They created two hypothetical portfolios. the first contained only 
Eurobonds and the second contained both sukuk and Eurobonds. Then, they calculated and 
compared the value-at-risk (VaR) for the portfolio which included both instruments to the 
other which included only Eurobonds. Their final results indicated that VaR is reduced for 
the portfolio containing sukuk along with conventional securities, proving that sukuk does 
have some diversification benefits for investors. Thus, based on their results, it can be said 
that sukuk provide a variety of financial tools and choices which could attract a diversified 
investor profile.   
Although Cakir and Raei (2007) used quantitative methods that have been widely 
referred to as far as risk evaluation between conventional bonds and sukuk is concerned, their 
study has been criticized. One of the criticisms is that when measuring the gains of 
diversification from using sukuk in a portfolio, they ought to be evaluated additionally 
against the lower returns along with the inherited liquidity risk because the illiquidity 
imposes on the portfolio a higher level of risk at periods of volatility. Furthermore, the 
authors designed two separated portfolios for a country rather than making a globally 
diversified portfolio, and then excluded conventional bonds from their investigation which 
may make some constraints on interpreting their results (Hassan, 2012). Regardless of the 
                                                   
22 There is an agreed view that sukuk and conventional securities are theoretically different (Jobst, et al., 2008).  
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weight given to criticisms of the Cakir and Raei example, their results are supported by stock 
market participants who react differently towards sukuk and bonds. In practice, stock market 
participants are able to distinguish between the characteristics of conventional bonds and 
sukuk.   
Even though in most cases in practice sukuk are similar to conventional bonds in their 
structure, stock market participants perceive these two instruments as being alternative 
financial tools, and consequently they react differently to their issuance (Alam, et al., 2013). 
More importantly, recent research has found that Islamic and conventional financial 
institutions had different levels of exposure to the financial crises (Ghoddusi & Khoshroo, 
2015). As this is the situation in the market, investing in sukuk can help to reduce the risk of 
portfolios, and the discussion concludes thus in favour of Cakir and Raei’s point of view.   
Imitating bonds is a major issue that faces the development of sukuk. Issuers, by 
endowing sukuk with the same features as conventional bonds, issuers face the negative 
consequences of them being not compatible with Sharia and destroying the distinct features 
of sukuk (Jobst, et al., 2008). The question that may arise is to what extent the problem of 
imitating bonds prevails in the sukuk market. In other words, to what extent does the Islamic 
sukuk market not comply with Sharia principles?  
Dusuki and Mokhtar (2010) found in their research that only 11 out of 560 sukuk 
issuances, that is equivalent to about 2% of the total, are eligible to be asset-backed as a 
result of fulfilling all the Sharia requirements of an actual sale of the asset to the sukuk-
holders. Therefore, it can be said that, while only 2% of sukuk are Sharia-based in not 
imitating conventional bonds and are sharing ownership, the remaining 98% of sukuk are 
not. Apparently, sukuk that imitate bonds have flooded the market and clearly the theoretical 
framework of sukuk has not yet been applied to the market. Undoubtedly, the imitation issue 
has had a negative impact on the Islamic market due to the loss of investor confidence, 
particularly among Sharia-sensitive investors, towards investing in sukuk. More significant 
is the loss of the advantage found by Hasan and Dridi (2010), where the adherence to Sharia 
principles has shielded Islamic institutions from the effect of the crisis as the impact on their 
profitability in 2008 was limited.  
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However, the current situation leads to the question of why issuers do not follow the 
Sharia framework. Why do Islamic banks and other Islamic institutions endeavour to mimic 
the structure of bonds? And what is the motivation for such imitation, despite being 
prohibited and negative in terms of their reputation? Why are Sharia-compliant sukuk (SCS) 
more popular than Sharia-based sukuk (SBS)? What are the advantages of applying SCS? 
This chapter seeks to find answers to these questions.   
In Islamic financial institutions, as in any other institutions, deciding which structure 
of sukuk should be issued is conducted by deciding which structure can maximize the profit 
to and value of the institution. By saying that, Islamic institutions may prefer to imitate bonds 
in order to attract both conventional and Islamic markets. This is because, through the 
imitating of the typical structure of bonds, investors are more familiar with the risks 
involved. Therefore, considering both markets can be seen as one of the motivations for this 
issue since most sukuk issuances are US dollar-denominated and, interestingly, around 60 
per cent of sukuk-holders are Western companies and institutions, while the remaining 40% 
are other buyers including those in the Gulf countries (Salah, 2009). Understanding the link 
between Western investors and sukuk issuances makes it easy to recognize how the sukuk 
market would be motivated. Accordingly, rendering sukuk identical to bonds would satisfy 
their clients in Western markets.   
Satisfying Western clients as a motivation to imitate bonds cannot be ignored, 
particularly in the case of international issuance. However, this justification would not suit 
cases of local issuances where investors mostly seek higher levels of Sharia compliance in 
products and the imitation issue prevails in such situations. For example, a number of sukuk 
have been issued locally in Gulf countries under the concept of SCS that do not strictly 
follow Sharia principles. This gives one indication that what attracts international investors 
is always not the main motivation for such imitation.   
An additional explanation provided by Wilson (2008) is that Islamic institutions 
exercise particular care to render sukuk identical to other bonds and conventional debt 
securities, aiming to simplify investors’ risk assessment and facilitate the understanding of 
these new investments. Unfamiliar investors will then be able to assess the risks of the new 
instrument. On the other hand, others have the opposite attitude that a strict adherence to 
Sharia principles will noticeably simplify the restructuring. This is because the Sharia 
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compliance structure involves an obvious allocation of property rights, and shareholders will 
be provided with full title to the underlying sukuk assets in cases of distress (Zaheer & 
Wijnbergen, 2013). Hence, it might be argued that the decision whether or not to simplify 
the sukuk structure is determined by the issuers. Both bonds and sukuk, in their underlying 
concepts, are simple to understand; a bond is a loan with interest, and sukuk are shares in a 
project. However, when it comes to practice, the concept of sukuk becomes more 
complicated to understand since most of the issuers intend to build a more complex design 
so as to achieve the bonds structure. The issuers have expended a great deal of effort to 
design sukuk identical to bonds. Accordingly, how complicated or simple the structures of 
sukuk are depends on the issuer’s preferences and decisions.   
Kuran (2004) attributed current practice in the Islamic financial market, including 
the sukuk market, to the environment that Islamic financial institutions operate in as Islamic 
banks coexisting with conventional financial institutions in most countries. As a result, 
Islamic institutions are likely to face adverse selection problems if they only offer financing 
instruments that are based on profit-loss sharing (PLS). An apparent omission in this 
argument is that moral hazard arises in conventional finance, too. PLS finance has a moral 
hazard when the net income is underreported in order to share less, and conventional finance 
has a moral hazard when the net income is over-reported in order to maximize debt finance 
and therefore return on their equity (Wahrenburg, 1996). Furthermore, Dar and Presley 
(2000) attempted to answer the questions raised, saying that the motivation for transferring 
sukuk from being equity finance to be merely conventional debt finance is that the former is 
basically not feasible for financing short-term projects due to high levels of risk. The high 
exposure to risks includes the time diversification results of the equity, resulting in 
institutions that rely on the imitative sukuk rather than the genuine sukuk to finance their 
businesses so as to ensure a preferred level of liquidity. However, this might be argued by 
the point that long-term finance also suffers from the imitated sukuk as short-term finance, 
and thus considering short-term finance as a cause of imitated sukuk seems not accurate.   
The discussion would not be complete without understanding the broader macro 
issue that needs to be addressed in order to identify the motivation behind the heightened 
applications of SCS rather than SBS. A regulatory framework for securitization in the 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council has not yet been developed. The fact that 
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bankruptcy law is still underdeveloped in the Middle East has further minimized the risk 
appetite of the originators in structuring SBS design. Insolvency law is vital for facilitating 
true sale contacts in which investors are protected and can receive payments from asset-
backed securities, even in cases of the originator’s bankruptcy (Nazar, 2011). Therefore, 
sukuk structure is greatly affected by conventional bond practices regulated by the Western 
legal framework.  
Adding to this, from the supply perspective, the issuers can receive relatively higher 
ratings in comparison with their Sharia-based counterparts, resulting in a substantial 
minimizing of the cost of funds. For example, the Tamweel's asset-backed sukuk have 
received from Moody's the maximum possible rating in the UAE of Aa2. An asset-based 
sukuk by the same institution was four notches lower at A3 (Howlader, 2009). Nevertheless, 
the asset-backed sukuk, on the demand side, provide a bankruptcy remote investment 
(Ahmed, 2010). For the current situation, Islamic issuers may not be interested in financing 
projects if adequate information is not available, and only if the risk-adjusted rate of return 
is more than the return on risk-free investments. This is because the issuer will act as an 
investment partner, and in the asset-backed structure that requires sufficient information to 
efficiently assess the appropriate profit and the project’s risk (Ahmed, 2002).   
4.3 Analysis of Sukuk Risks  
Sukuk inherently involve a higher exposure to certain financial and market risks. The 
question is commonly asked whether sukuk and conventional bonds are different or similar 
in their risk exposure. To what extent do they differ in their risk/return features? Can the 
solutions applied in securitization be utilized in sukuk? The following discussion aims to 
respond to these questions by identifying various unique aspects of risks faced by sukuk-
holders according to the Basel types of risks. As previously discussed, the major risks 
according to the Basel Committee are credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk and operational 
risk. However, an additional risk of being not compatible with Sharia will also be discussed 
since sukuk investment stems from Sharia principles.  
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4.3.1 Credit Risk  
There are various unique credit risks associated with asset-backed sukuk. Credit risk 
principally involves the return payment risk and the principal payment risk (capital loss risk). 
The inherent credit risk is the possibility that the originator fails to meet any of the 
obligations stated in the agreed terms. For example, in ijara sukuk, a higher possibility to 
default in the rental payments or the final purchase of the assets means a higher exposure to 
credit risk. SBS naturally involve a higher exposure to the return payment risk since there is 
no guarantee of the return when the asset is destroyed. Investors derive their periodical 
distributions from the cash flows generated from the asset, meaning that any loss in the asset 
may affect the amounts distributed. However, the situation is entirely different with bonds 
since there is no exposure to asset risk, or rather to the originator’s creditworthiness, due to 
no ownership being involved. These additional risks related to the underlying asset may not 
suit the appetites of particular investors who are familiar with other types of risk. However, 
in order to manage this problem, there are some recent innovative structures that have been 
implemented when issuing ijara sukuk, where the originator as a lessee has an option to 
substitute the entire or part of the underlying assets with different assets at similar value. 
This allows the originator to minimize the risks related to the assets and to maintain the 
distributional amounts by obtaining other resources. The substituted assets can be used as a 
resource for the next stage of the business (Al-Sayed, 2013).   
As Sharia law did not allow guarantee the principal, this undoubtedly raises the risk 
of capital loss (Zaheer & Wijnbergen, 2013). Capital loss risk is incurred by investors in SBS 
since their originators would buy back the assets at the market price, which may not be 
equivalent to the issuance amount, thus resulting in some loss (Tariq & Dar, 2007). For 
instance, some ijara sukuk indicated that the originator unilaterally undertakes to purchase 
the assets at their market price that would prevail at the date of maturity. Thus, the risk would 
naturally increase if there was any reduction in the value of the invested assets23. Investors 
would be eligible to receive higher rates of return and they could benefit from having direct 
recourse to the assets in the event of default.   
                                                   
23 Asset value risk refers to the market risk.  
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The credit risk becomes higher when they are based on a floating rate, since the rental 
payments will fluctuate and make the amounts distributed to less predictable, which may 
result in more defaults. However, as the originator is commonly the only lessee, the cases of 
default will be limited to cases of the originator’s bankruptcy. This process reduces the 
possibility of credit risk; whereas, larger numbers of lessees may increase the possibility of 
default since the returns of sukuk will be subject to the desires and abilities of a number of 
lessees to pay the rental payment. Furthermore, with the floating rate, maturity plays another 
role in emphasizing the impact of this risk. This means that the credit risk in the longer-term 
of asset-backed sukuk is always higher than in the shorter-term. This is mainly because it is 
predictable and easier to forecast what will occur to the lessee’s credit worthiness over, for 
example, a two-year period than predicting their credit worthiness over 20 years (Tariq, 
2004). A third factor that increases the exposure to credit risk is the unavailability of the 
asset. The additional embedded risk is the exposure to default in delivering the securitized 
assets according to the identified quantity, time, specifications or requirements (Abdullah, et 
al., 2014).  
Regardless of these factors, it can be said that sukuk in general are likely to face more 
credit risk than bonds for a number of reasons. Firstly, most of sukuk prospectuses include 
more sophisticated risk management mechanisms than in these conventional securities since, 
for example, the rescheduling of debt for a higher mark-up rate does not exist under sukuk 
due to the prohibition of debt trading (Tariq, 2004). Secondly, based on the fact that 
conventional bonds represent a debt obligation and asset-backed sukuk are certificates of 
ownership, sukuk investors would have only a limited opportunity to retrieve their initial 
capital in the case of default in comparison with conventional securities which are considered 
to be more liquid (Noor, 2013).  
Strictly speaking, the credit risk for SBS is higher than that for bonds because the 
originator of the SBS, as a manager of the asset, cannot bear any default or loss except if the 
loss happened owing to the manager’s poor performance. However, if the loss occurs due to 
causes beyond the manager’s control, such as a global financial crisis, investors would bear 
the possible risk of losing either the return or the principal (Al-Sayed, 2013). Consequently, 
in conventional bonds, the risk of default has different aspects since there is no actual link 
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between the bonds and the project, whether or not the project is completed as specified or 
not, or whether the project fails or is successful, and the principal and interest will be paid 
to bondholders according to the agreed schedule. Therefore, receiving ratings from the rating 
agencies has to be taken into account prior to any investment in bonds to mitigate the risk of 
default. Meanwhile, SBS credit risk would be measured by the performance of the particular 
assets since the asset risk ultimately becomes the risk of investors. Through proper 
management of the underlying asset performance as well as its profit-generating ability, this 
risk can then be managed. Typical processes for asset and associated cash management have 
to be implemented in order to minimize the credit risks (Haider & Azhar, 2010).  
4.3.2 Market Risk  
The market risk of asset-backed sukuk refers to possible changes in the assets’ prices, 
interest rates and currency exchange rates (Najeeb1, 2013). First is the risk arising from 
changes in the value of the underlying assets due to changes in demand and supply. The 
decrease in the prices of these assets can influence the issuance in such a way that the asset 
may not generate sufficient revenue to meet the obligations, or the price of the final purchase 
may even decrease. Hence, investors in SBS need to keep up with the value of the securitized 
asset due to the actual link between the investors and the underlying assets.  
Moving onto the interest rate risk, SBS issuances might not be benchmarked with 
any of the interest indicators and would rely totally on the revenues from the asset. For 
instance, sukuk intifa’, typically, are not benched with LIBOR, thus there is no direct 
influence of changes in interest rates. However, there may be an indirect exposure to 
fluctuations in interest rates through the widespread benchmarking in the sukuk financing 
process. However, this risk, as with bonds, will be greater for fixed rate sukuk but minimal 
for floating rates ones (Bacha & Mirakhor, 2013).   
In most ijara sukuk, the periodical distributions are linked with interest rates, 
resulting in an adverse correlation between interest rates and sukuk prices. Any sukuk 
benchmarked with LIBOR involves the possibility of later and increased rates so that the 
originator, on the asset side, will not generate as much revenue as future market 
circumstances might dictate. The originators have to respond to changes in LIBOR since any 
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rise in income has to be shared with the sukuk-holders (Kamil, et al., 2009). Thus, originators 
have the incentive to issue sukuk during seasons of low interest whereas investors have to 
predict a decline in the value of the sukuk when changes are made to the interest rate.  
Although higher interest rates can provide the opportunity to invest at new rates, this 
is not applicable to the case of forward ijara non-tradable sukuk due to their illiquidity 
(Abdullah, et al., 2014). Therefore, it can be said that the exposure of sukuk, if they are 
benchmarked, to the interest rate risk is higher than in conventional bonds because of their 
illiquidity, which is attributed to the limited size of the secondary sukuk market (Hassan, 
2012). The illiquidity creates more obstacles to adapt active portfolio management tools 
which have been implemented to protect the portfolio returns from changes in interest rates 
(Hassan, 2012). Furthermore, there is no standardized and recognized Islamic derivative 
instrument in the sukuk market for managing market risks, since most of the instruments 
available to manage this risk that are used in conventional markets are not Sharia-compliant. 
However, the risk can be considerably reduced or even avoided if the sukuk were structured 
according to Sharia rules. This is because the returns from sukuk will be calculated based on 
real profits from the underlying asset (Usmani, 2008). Arsalan and Humayon (2007) argue 
that reducing the interest rate risk is not an actual avoidance, but rather is a substitution by 
an asset value risk. The asset value risk is greater than the interest rate risk, since the price 
of the underlying asset fluctuates more in the market than the interest rate.  
Finally, asset-backed sukuk, under market risk, are exposed to the exchange rate risk. 
This risk is serious since sukuk have become an international financial instrument and attract 
a great number of sophisticated foreign investors. It arises from unfavourable exchange rate 
changes that will have an impact on foreign exchange positions. in the case of divergences 
between the currencies of denomination in which sukuk finances are accumulated (Al-Bashir 
& Al-Amine, 2011, p. 347). Also, it is important to note that maturity plays a significant role 
in emphasizing market risk. The longer life of asset backed sukuk results difficulty in 
forecasting changes in exchange rates, interest rates and asset values.   
Exchange rate fluctuations may result in a loss for either the sukuk-holders or the 
originator of an international sukuk. In fact, exchange rate risks are unavoidable with the 
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rapid growth of the industry and the increase in multi-national investments. The challenge is 
to devise an efficient exchange risk management approach that is compatible with Sharia 
principles (Tariq & Dar, 2007). In general, SBS have the same nature of currency risk as the 
conventional securities, and thus they can be treated according to the traditional currency 
risk management perspective. For instance, in some issues, the originator can minimize the 
risk of exchange rate changes by using a number of currencies in their issuance (Al-Sayed, 
2013).   
4.3.3 Liquidity Risk  
The exposure of sukuk to liquidity risk is higher than with conventional bonds due to 
both endogenous and exogenous causes. Endogenous reasons depend on the nature of the 
sukuk, where there is a restriction on trading in debt sukuk such as forward ijara sukuk and 
salam sukuk. Thus, forward ijara sukuk tend to be kept for a relatively longer time before 
they can be liquid; accordingly, it is a very illiquid asset. Thus, investors are not able to 
employ the asset to take up another superior opportunity for investment (Tariq, 2004). In this 
regard, Tariq (2007) proposes using embedded options as a device for sukuk risk 
management. He explains that, as it prohibits debt trading, Sharia permits its exchange for 
tangible assets, goods and services. Investors, thus, can receive an option to exchange their 
forward ijara sukuk based on istisna’ with real estate after a specified  
period rather than waiting for the maturity of the sukuk.  
Exogenous factors relate to the ability to trade sukuk in the secondary market. Most 
sukuk remain active only in the primary market, while the secondary market is not well-
structured for trading (Haider & Azhar, 2010). The inactive secondary market is due to the 
limited number of issuances along with the lack of alternative instruments in the same asset 
class (Abdullah, et al., 2014). In addition, even after the sukuk become eligible for trading 
and satisfy all Sharia requirements, the exercise of ‘buy-and-hold’ is a further obstacle in 
activating the secondary sukuk market. Almost all sukuk are bought for the purpose of long 
term investment (Kamil, et al., 2010). For instance, in the Gulf region, there is virtually no 
secondary trading in sukuk since most sukuk-holders treat sukuk as ‘buy and hold’ 
investments, resulting in a significantly illiquid market and inhibiting the discovery of actual 
prices (Jobst, et al., 2008). The current situation can be attributed to the fact that that in the 
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sukuk market, supply is far less than demand. As the demand for sukuk considerably exceeds 
supply, investors tend to hold onto their sukuk dearly and no secondary market can become 
active (Majid, et al., 2011).  
Most sukuk in the market do not face endogenous problems but rather the exogenous 
problems. Therefore, the development of sufficient secondary markets is critical for sukuk, 
more so than for conventional securities, because conventional financial firms have a number 
of non-Islamic tools available to manage their liquidity. Also, the activation of primary 
markets to meet the high demand for sukuk is crucial for a better secondary sukuk market. 
Governments have to be more active in issuing sukuk which show different types of risk-
bearing and a variety of maturity periods. A good example was the initiative by the 
government of Bahrain which issued three and six-month maturity sukuk (Al-Sayed, 2013). 
Governments should also provide proper regulatory standards for the secondary market with 
easy access for any possible investor. For example, the Bahrain International Islamic 
Financial Market has created a way to standardize the secondary market and to develop 
products that can be traded. This step provides some solutions to the liquidity risk in the 
market of sukuk (Haider & Azhar, 2010).  
4.3.4 Operational Risks  
Operational risks in asset-backed sukuk mirror those existing in conventional security 
markets. They involve any incident that negatively affects the operation of the securitized 
project. However, SBS involve some additional features related to true associations with 
underlying assets. This will add to any negative incidents concerning the assets which may 
have an impact on SBS investors. For instance, if partial or even full impairment of the 
intangible asset occurs, investors will bear the loss. This exposure is minimal if the ijara 
assets are land parcels, while in the case of cars, machines or equipment, for example, the 
risk of this loss cannot be ignored. However, originators can apply Sharia-compliant 
provisions for insurance in order to minimize the exposure to operational risk. Also, proper 
maintenance and servicing are essential to maintain the structures of the assets and to ensure 
sufficient returns to the investors (Bacha & Mirakhor, 2013).  
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Moving onto legal risk24, the absence of standardized regulations that govern all 
sukuk issuances is a major impediment to the overall development of sukuk market. This 
market is not yet well-regulated to the whole extent and no documented and standardized 
structure has yet been introduced for sukuk issuances (Jobst, et al., 2008). A more specific 
example of this risk is that, in the forward ijara structure, the main aspect of legal risk arises 
when the specific details of time and description are not applied. There is not yet any form 
of consensus in respect with the appropriate procedure when a project that is the subject of 
a forward ijara sukuk is postponed and thus the delivery project does not take place on the 
specified date (Goud, 2011). The lack of regulation of the sukuk market is critical for all 
parties involved, especially investors. As Sharia law is involved in almost no national 
legislation, hence it is not realistic for sukuk to be issued according to such a  
law (Haider & Azhar, 2010). By applying commercial and Sharia law, legal inconsistencies 
can be exposed in insolvency resolution or asset control, since the sukuk structure requires 
the fulfilment of both sets of laws (Jobst, et al., 2008).   
It can be said that the cause of the legal risk in the sukuk market is that in several 
countries the official Sharia standards on sukuk are lax, leaving much to the advisor’s 
discretion. The advisor can use differences in opinions among jurists to the issuer’s 
advantage, while the AAOIFI standard that endeavours to harmonize Sharia standards has 
received only unofficial status in all of its members’ countries. This has resulted in 
difficulties for the regulator in neutralizing issues of Sharia non-compliance and has raised 
confusion about which official laws can be imposed and to what extent they can be imposed 
in issuing sukuk (Azmat, et al., 2014). Some issuances, in their prospectuses, rely on English 
laws long as they do not conflict with Sharia law. This is because English law has been in 
practice considered to be the law available that is in most harmony with Sharia.  
Currently, resorting to English law as the governing law in the sukuk market is 
becoming more common. This is a result of the absence of well-developed local Sharia courts 
processing Islamic financial issues, the supposed weaknesses of local laws about issues 
relating to cross-border legal features, and the desire for higher ratings from the rating 
                                                   
24 Legal risk, as previously discussed, is a component of operational risk under the Basel framework.   
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agencies which favour English law as governing law. Nevertheless, a question that can be 
raised is whether this particular law indeed fulfils all Sharia compliance principles. A number 
of legal practitioners believe that English law is the choice that best maintains Sharia 
compliance along with being in harmony with well-developed legal practices (Al-Amine, 
2008). However, in practice, there is a problem of conflict which appears when applying 
Sharia finance under the jurisdiction of English law. In all incidents of disputes, the common 
law including English always prevails over Sharia law (Nazar, 2011). For example, in the 
case of the Shamil Islamic Bank of Bahrain vs. Pharmaceutical Company, the defendant was 
not able to pay the amount for his financing to the Shamil Bank. The court made its decision 
based on English law rather than Islamic law (Global Law Firm, 2012). This is because the 
judge ruled that governing a contract cannot be based on two different law systems. Thus, 
the English courts in the case of the Shamil Bank, rejected the application of Sharia law to 
the contract when it was questioned. The main reasons were the significant difficulty and 
controversy in applying such a law, and therefore the Court stated that it was ‘improbable in 
the extreme, that the parties were truly asking [the Court] to get into matters of Islamic 
religion …’ (Global Law Firm, 2012, p. 13).   
Although most of the essential contractual clauses in issuing sukuk are mainly based 
on Sharia, using conventional courts to judge Islamic financial tools is not without short 
comings. The conventional courts are unaware of such principles, which definitely influence 
their decisions. For instance, the court would not consider the ijara sukuk as a relationship 
between lessee and lessor but a relationship between a creditor and a borrower according to 
some of the prospectus clauses25 which represent an obvious departure from the spirit of the 
sukuk (Al-Amine, 2008). A permanent solution rests with the systematic harmonization of 
Islamic financial documentation, and the minimizing of differences among Sharia boards as 
well as the codification of the essential principles of Sharia commercial law into formulated 
legislation based on the core of Sharia principles along with the best legal international 
practices. This procedure will not be efficient if only some countries adopt the principles 
developed as a basis for their national legislation. The legal foundation must be strong 
                                                   
25 A clarification of the clauses is shown in later chapters.   
26 By Usmani in 2008 (as previously mentioned).  
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enough to ensure protection for investors. The main area that requires emphasis is the legal 
foundation for sukuk respecting bankruptcy and collateral security laws. The few cases of 
defaulted sukuk have stimulated more emphasis on certifying bankruptcy systems and 
collateral security which are sufficiently backed by credible and sound legislation. Being 
comparatively new phenomena, these default cases are considered a wakeup call to ensure 
protection for investors as well as in adopting smooth bankruptcy procedures (Kusuma & 
Silva, 2014).  
4.3.5 Sharia Risk  
After the recent criticism26 of sukuk as not being compatible with Sharia, Sharia risk 
is becoming more critical. It arises when assets lose their value as a consequence of the 
originators’ breach of fiduciary duties with regard to the Sharia compliance. Each issuance 
has to satisfy the requirements and demands of the Sharia board mandated in order to be 
certified as an Islamic investment (Abdullah, et al., 2014). However, some dissolution 
clauses in the sukuk prospectus may render the issuance null and void from a Sharia 
perspective26. Generally, the outcome of issuing non-compliance the sukuk may damage the 
originator’s reputation and will also result in an extensive effort to restore investor 
confidence (Tariq, 2004). For example, Goldman Sach’s attempts to issue a one year sukuk 
in 2011 were withdrawn among charges that it had failed to uphold the principles of Sharia 
(Platt, 2014). One of the ramifications of the failure to issue the sukuk was the closure of the 
Sharia advisory firm that advised Goldman Sachs on the instrument. This aspect of Sharia 
risk can be best minimized by greater harmonization of commercial Sharia rules.  
In addition, the Sharia compliance risk may arise due to changes in the opinions of 
Sharia scholars on a particular issuance. Any Sharia scholar has the right to change his fatwa 
about the approval of an issuance. To mitigate this aspect of risk, sukuk originators maintain 
that any subsequent changes in scholarly opinions would not have any impact on the validity 
of the statement made concerning any early issuances (Al-Bashir & AlAmine, 2011, p. 346). 
Thus, it is essential that the pronouncement of a particular issue remains in force even after 
the Sharia advisor changes his fatwa. Sharia compliance risk also arises if another Sharia 
                                                   
26 Various examples will be shown in the case study chapters.   
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scholar disapproves of a particular sukuk issuance. This is because there is no guarantee that 
an issuance approved by one Sharia scholar will be approved by other parties in the field. In 
this situation, sukuk liquidity may be negatively influenced since investors may be reluctant 
to engage in a controversial issuance (Thakur, 2007). Hence, sukuk-holders are mainly 
recommended to refer to their personal independent Sharia advisor as to whether certificates 
satisfy their individual standards of compliance. A more important aspect of Sharia risk is 
that there can be no guarantee that sukuk-certificates and transaction documents will be 
enforced by the judicial authority in case of disputes. Although some sukuk have received 
pronouncements to confirm their compatibility with Sharia, such a statement cannot be 
binding on the judicial committee (Al-Bashir & Al-Amine, 2011, p. 347). For instance, there 
are a number of Sharia issues facing the ijara sukuk process that may transform the 
instrument to be similar to a loan with interest which is strictly prohibited in Islam. Thus, the 
possibility of ijara sukuk losing its Sharia value means that it would be judicially treated as 
a loan with interest.  
 4.4 Risk/Return of SBS and Bonds  
This section provides a comparison between bonds and asset-backed sukuk pertaining 
to their financial risks in an attempt to identify the degree of danger in sukuk investment. 
The discussion will describe the results qualitatively in order to provide the literature with 
an understanding to the risks of SBS investment. Table 4-1 summarizes the previously 
identified risks along with their features and factors. Note that each risk is assigned a 
numerical value ranging from 0 implying no exposure to risk, to 1 indicating low exposure 
and 2 representing high exposure. As these rankings are based on subjective judgments, 
they can be considered indicative only.   
Table 4-1 SBS Risks vs. Bond Risks 
Risks  Features  SBS  Bonds  Factors  
 
 
 
 
Sharia risk  
-Not satisfying Sharia 
requirements  
-Changes in Sharia scholar’s 
opinion  
-Another Sharia scholar 
disapproves of the issuance  
1  
Due to the strict 
adherence to Sharia 
principles  
0  
Due to no relation 
to  
Sharia and their 
principles   
 
 
Being approved by only 
one scholar  
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-Judicially treated as a non-
Islamic instrument  
 
 
 
 
Credit risk  
 
- Return payment risk  
- Principal payment risk  
2  
- Because any loss in 
the asset may affect 
the distributions  
- Due to the purchase 
undertaken at market  
price   
1  
Due to no link to 
the asset but  
rather to the  
originator’s 
creditworthiness  
-Being calculated under 
a floating adjusted rate   
-Having a long maturity 
period  
-Being securitized for 
unavailable assets  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market risk  
 
Asset value risk  
2  
Due to the actual link 
to the assets  
0  
Due to no 
connection to the 
assets  
Having a long maturity 
period  
 
 
Interest rate risk  
1  
Typically, an indirect 
influence as the  
distribution amounts 
are calculated based  
on real profits and are 
not benchmarked  
2  
Typically, is 
benchmarked with 
LIBOR  
with adequate  
management  
tools  
-Being calculated 
under a fixed rate  
-Having a long 
maturity period  
-Illiquidity feature  
Currency exchange 
rate risk  
2  
All have the same exposure  
Having a long maturity 
period 
 
Liquidity  
Risk  
 
 
Inactive secondary market  
2  
Due to limited 
issuances and the  
restriction on trading 
debt sukuk  
1  
Due to being 
more active and 
better 
standardized  
  
 Buy-and-hold exercise  
 
Operational 
Risk  
 
The impairment of the 
tangible asset  
2  
Due to the real 
ownership of the  
asset  
0  
Due to no 
connection to the 
assets  
 
 -  
 
Legal risk  
2  
Due to the absence of 
standardized 
regulations  
1  
Due to better 
standardized 
regulations   
 
 -  
Total Risk Exposure  10 points  5 points  -  
Note: 0= no exposure, 1= low exposure, 2= high exposure; factors playing a role in the level of impact of the 
risk.  
Bonds are far safer due to the well-regulated market and well-developed management 
tools. As shown in the above Table, SBS have higher exposure to risks than bonds, which is 
not a surprising result. Being riskier than bonds is a natural result of investors changing from 
being debt providers to investment partners, which means the absence of guarantees. This 
higher exposure is attributed to the physical ownership of the underlying assets, since the 
transfer of ownership entails the transfer of losses, costs and maintenance associated with 
the underlying assets. For instance, investors have to bear all costs and expenses related to 
the basic characteristics of the assets.  
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The returns from SBS should reflect the significant risks according to the positive 
relationship between risk and expected return. In the financial version of ‘no pain, no gain’, 
more risks tolerated results in more profits expected. Usmani (2008) pointed out that sukuk 
– in the SBS structure - are an instrument for the equitable distribution of wealth since sukuk 
allow all holders to benefit from the real revenues and profits originating from the project or 
enterprise in equal shares whereas, in a standard security, the originator is not entailed to any 
return greater than the principal and the specified amount of interest whatever revenues and 
profits may have accrued from the projects established, which exclusively and entirely go to 
the originator. Hence, there is no right for bondholders to seek a share in the profits achieved 
beyond the interest received (Usmani, 2008). It is important to note that the higher level of 
risk inherited in SBS will also vary according to the contract applied. For instance, investors 
in forward ijara sukuk are mainly exposed to all of the risks borne by ijara sukuk investors; 
but also with some additional degree of risk related to the unavailability of the assets. This 
is because forward ijara sukuk include the ijara contract with further features that add to the 
risk. Another example is intifa’ sukuk, treated as a secured sukuk, which has a greater 
exposure to credit risks. Thus, the risk management plan is essentially an integral part of 
financial planning for SBS. Although, the risks involved can be minimized and managed, 
they cannot be entirely avoided.   
4.5 Sukuk and Agency issues   
Agency problems that can occur at each stage of the sukuk process are not discussed 
in a way that identifies the principle/agent relations, conflicts and information asymmetries. 
This discussion will help to fill this gap exists in the literature of sukuk related to agency 
issues. Within the framework of agency costs, this section analyses the incentives for asset-
backed sukuk that flow from informational asymmetries. Such asymmetries are commonly 
referred to as additional costs for the parties in asset-backed sukuk. In these sukuk, agency 
costs can refer to the loss in the value of the sukuk that result from the agents following their 
individual interests rather than the optimal interest for the investors. As indicated, in a typical 
structure of asset-backed sukuk, a number of parties are involved including the originator as 
a manager, a lessee, a servicer, or a contractor, which indicates the existence of potential 
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agency conflicts from different perspectives. These agency relations have not previously 
been discussed in the literature in such a way that allows analysis of the hidden actions, 
incentives and informational asymmetries. The following discussion aims to add to agency 
theory as applied to the structure of sukuk in order to show to what extent agency conflicts 
appear among the parties.  
Although the details of asset-backed sukuk vary widely, the typical transaction 
involves the segregation of a specific set of cash flows from a particular originator’s assets 
in order to issue sukuk based on these cash flows. For example, in ijara-based sukuk, the 
rental payments generated from the underlying assets are allocated to investors. However, 
potential investors face information asymmetries in assessing the assets, services and 
originator prior to the investment. While assessing the assets, there is an agency relationship 
between the originator and investors concerning the type of assets. The nature of the 
asymmetry of information depends on the type of the assets, as it may critically arise when 
the value of the securitized assets falls. Originators are in a position to use risky assets when 
structuring asset-backed sukuk. They have an incentive to exclude risky assets from their 
books and to transfer their excessive risks to another party. By securitizing these risky assets, 
this limits the originator’s exposure to exogenous price risk. Adding to this, monitoring is 
inadequate since it suffers from information asymmetries between the monitor and the assets 
being monitored. However, originators can minimize the effects of asymmetric information 
by using assets that are typically less opaque (Albertazzi, et al., 2015). For instance, sukuk 
ijara typically securitizes physical and tangible assets that tend to be less opaque than 
securitizing loans, which helps to minimize the asymmetric information based on the type 
of assets.  
 According to the hidden-information framework, asset-backed sukuk asymmetric 
information arises from the value of the underlying assets. In these sukuk, there might no 
actual relationship between the cash received by the originator and the value of the assets. 
This means that the sale of these sukuk might not represent the actual value of the assets. 
Investors seek to purchase sukuk with confidence that the prices pai, reflect the value of the 
assets purchased. This is because paying a higher price, in SBS, than the assets’ value 
becomes a critical issue in the insolvency of the originator. If the originator becomes 
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bankrupt, the investors would have recourse in place to cover any losses that occurred, but 
if the principal was far higher than the actual value of the assets this would result in a greater 
loss. Furthermore, if these sukuk will end according to their future actual value, this would 
also result in a loss of principal. Moreover, paying a higher price than the assets’ value may 
affect the proceeds from the assets since the returns depend on the condition of the assets. 
Revenues from securitized assets vary with the exogenous fluctuations in their price and also 
with endogenous causes of changes to the asset’s conditions. This means that investors may 
not receive their returns in a timely manner and, in a worst case situation, they may lose all 
of their returns. This demonstrates the uncertainty in terms of the returns. For example, in 
ijara sukuk, the endogenous condition of the assets during the period of the contract may 
influence the return. To illustrate this, when a partial loss occurs to the securitized assets, 
this leads to a reduction in the rental payment, and when a total loss of the asset occurs, this 
means a total loss of the forthcoming returns. Therefore, it is essential for investors to be 
confident about the value and condition of the invested asset.  
Another source of uncertainty in the value of sukuk is when the assets are unavailable. 
In this case, there is another dimension of agency relationships, which is the agency existing 
between the investors and the originator as a contractor. The assets’ value is influenced by 
the contractor’s effort, inherent talent and other factors that cannot be observed. These 
unobserved factors can have a direct effect on the final value of the asset, resulting in a 
possible moral hazard risk. Adding to this, investors are not capable of monitoring the 
contractor, having no efficient access and authority, and cannot assess the business. In this 
case of asymmetrical information, the contractor has a compelling incentive not to perform 
well, which can lead to the investors being deceived into paying a far higher price for a 
poorly constructed asset. Moreover, when the assets become available, the originator as a 
manager may misuse them, misusing the surplus since the investors/owners do not have 
adequate information about or control of the asset The manager may misuse the surplus or 
spend it on personal expenses rather than meeting any forthcoming obligations such as 
maintenance costs for the assets27. If the assets increase in value, then the SPV will be able 
to pay all its obligations while gaining a surplus. However, the greater the access that the 
                                                   
27 As discussed earlier; the maintenance costs of assets are incurred by the investors.  
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originator has to the earnings from the underlying assets, the more likely to suffer from 
agency costs. However, some structures retain a subordinate tranche for the originator where 
surplus may occur, and this would increase the originator’s access to these earnings. In such 
a case, sukuk can be structured in a way that the originator would not have recourse to the 
surplus by selling the subordinated tranche to a third party. This will protect investors from 
agency conflicts concerning surplus earnings.  
The originator in asset-backed sukuk is typically the servicer of the asset and 
investors face a costly and difficult duty in ascertaining the quality of services. Typically, 
there is no authorized access for investors to evaluate the services provided by the originator 
to determine whether or not his actions were proper and adequate. Low quality services for 
the securitized assets may arise as a result of the informational asymmetries of the type of 
services. Moreover, the quality service of the assets is difficult to evaluate owing to the 
simultaneous production and consumption of services (Holmstrom, 1985). As investors are 
unable to examine the competence of the service provider, the quality of the securitized 
assets, along with the hazards of malpractice, cannot be predicted. Therefore, the price of 
asset-backed sukuk may not reflect the actual value of the underlying assets. Sellers of low-
quality assets can enter the market and distance the providers of high-quality assets by 
reducing price that the latter cannot gain sufficient returns on their investments for 
competency enhancement (Akerlof, 1970). To illustrate this, the behaviour of investors in 
asset-backed sukuk mainly relies on the information that is available before and after 
purchase. Before making the purchase decision, investors seek information about the price 
and the quality of the other alternatives under their consideration. However, the service 
quality of the assets is difficult to evaluate, resulting in assets with high and low quality 
services coexisting in the market for assetbacked sukuk, leading to a greater exposure to the 
lemon problem.   
In asset-backed sukuk, an adverse selection may arise between the originator who 
belongs to a profit-maximizing institution and highly Sharia sensitive investors on the 
question of compatibility with Sharia (Azmat, et al., 2014). Most investors cannot evaluate 
accurately to what extent the issuance is compatible with Sharia. Sharia advisors may be able 
to act as intermediaries to ensure compliance and thus mitigate the informational 
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asymmetries between originator and investors. Nevertheless, as investors are not involved in 
structuring these sukuk, this may enable the originator to overcome some Sharia 
requirements through fatwa shopping. Adding to this, the fatwa usually does not provide any 
classification on their specific basis in Sharia or the details of the standards applied; rather, 
it tends to provide a general statement on compatibility with Sharia. Concerning this issue, 
it can be said that the sukuk approved by a number of scholars can indicate a higher 
credibility in having avoided fatwa shopping compared to sukuk approved by only one Sharia 
advisor. This case would bear a lower risk of being incompatible with Sharia and could 
minimize the risk of adverse selection. However, after the sukuk have been purchased, the 
originator may benefit from the absence of Sharia supervisors since most issuances do not 
include any Sharia supervision after the fatwa is published. This may result in a moral hazard 
from the originator not following all Sharia requirements.   
Given information asymmetry as an inherently problematic and costly problem in 
asset-backed sukuk, there are a number of mechanisms that can be used to limit the agency 
costs. By addressing some collateral to securitized assets, this can make the structure more 
effective in reducing agency risks. Moreover, investors must ensure that the originator of the 
sukuk bears some of the risks associated with the underlying assets. This can reduce the 
degree of moral hazard and adverse selection problems caused by the quality of information 
and amount of asymmetry. For instance, if the originator as a manager/agent undertakes the 
purchase of the underlying assets at their nominal value, the manager’s actions would be in 
favour of the assets, and difference in the incentive between investors and the originator 
would be minimized. Purchase undertaken at nominal value is one of the optimal device used 
to manage incentives, since the repurchase contract shows a dimension of sharing between 
the manager and investors in the securitized asset, resulting in reducing the costs of 
monitoring. However, the implementation of repurchase contracts, according to market 
value, can raise the incentive asymmetry as the market value is the best summary of the value 
of managerial decisions (Iacobucci & Winter, 2005). The managerial decisions made by the 
originator can be used as a means to reduce the price which would be paid to investors. 
However, the limitation of future agency costs through such an undertaking is only half of 
the story, since in order to control the agency costs in asset-backed sukuk there must be a 
commitment that the proceeds from the assets are not misused. In ijara-based sukuk, the 
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return is precisely determined as a rental payment and thus the cash flow for the asset will 
not be wasted. This leads to the better management of the agency costs. Committing the 
future cash intake to investors in this way reduces the agency costs of free cash flow and 
protects future cash flows from mismanagement. Through these two mechanisms, the 
investors would have an incentive to examine how the assets are managed and serviced and 
how the proceeds are spent. Investors will thus not have to spend on monitoring and 
examining the proper usage of the assets in order to that ensure the proceeds are used wisely, 
and as a result the incentives and risks in relationships between the originator and investors 
become less asymmetrical. For example, the asset’s performance in ijara sukuk is not a 
concern for the sukuk-holders, but rather they are only interested in coupon payments. This 
is because the issuer undertakes to buy the underlying asset on the maturity date for an 
amount equal to the face value of the sukuk.  
4.6 Summary   
Asset-backed sukuk involve a high level of exposure to particular financial and 
Sharia risks. This chapter identifies various aspects related to sukuk risks. It is important to 
advise investors to follow their individual Sharia standards according to the guidance of their 
independent Sharia advisor in order to reduce the risk of conflict or changes in fatwas. Most 
aspects of Sharia risk can be reduced by strict adherence to Sharia financial law. In this 
regard, SBS structures show a harmonization with Sharia rules which leads to the better 
management of this risk. Also, the chapter highlights the two main features of credit risk that 
may face asset-backed sukuk. The chapter further identifies a number of factors that increase 
the exposure to credit risk in asset-backed sukuk. The potential of return payment loss and 
the principal payment loss are at the core of credit risk exposure. Linking the return with a 
floating rather than fixed interest rate makes the return less predictable. The long maturity 
period of the issuance also makes default less predictable. If the return is predictable and 
easier to forecast, this improves the management of the distribution amounts so as to avoid 
defaults. Furthermore, the unavailability of the securitized asset adds another dimension of 
credit risk. Possible default in delivering the assets according to time or specifications makes 
the risk exposure higher. Embedding any of these features in the structure of asset-backed 
sukuk increases the possibility of defaults. SBS are exposed more to credit risk than bonds 
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since the return and the principal are not guaranteed by the originator, unless the loss occurs 
due to misuse or negligence, while the structure of the bonds typically provides a guarantee 
to the capital and the return.   
The research also addresses the market risk of asset-backed sukuk, which involves 
three main aspects. Firstly, asset value risk is where changes in the price of the underlying 
asset may influence the value of the sukuk.  This risk is greater with SBS than with bonds. 
This is attributed to the association between the investors and their assets. Secondly, the SBS 
should be less exposed to interest rate risk as their optimal return depends on the actual 
revenues from the asset. However, the direct link between the return and any of the interest 
rate indictors will increase the risk exposure. Finally, currency exchange rates exposes the 
structures of both sukuk and bonds to risk to similar extents. The liquidity risk in sukuk 
investments is higher than in their conventional counterparts. This is due to the inactive 
secondary market in sukuk caused by the exercise of ‘buy-and-hold’. The market requires an 
activation of the primary market to issue more sukuk as well as better regulation. Finally, the 
operational risk that appears is higher in SBS than in bond investments. This is attributed to 
the additional exposure to all negative incidents concerning the asset which are incurred by 
investors as owners. The degree of this exposure depends on the nature of the asset. In 
general, SBS receive higher exposure to all types of risks than bond, which is a predicted 
result due to the nature of sukuk.   
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Chapter 5: An Overview of the Sukuk Market in 
Saudi Arabia  
  
5.1 Introduction  
It is likely that Saudi Arabia will be a major contributor to the growth of sukuk 
issuance. This is because its position has positively changed after an upsurge in Riyal sukuk 
issuance with a faster expansion than for traditional bonds. In 2012, around $7.25 billion 
denominated sukuk were issued, which was up from $3.01 billion in 2011. In the first quarter 
of 2013, $2.74 billion had been issued, showing a rapid growth in the market (Ajlouni, 2013). 
In 2013, sukuk issuance in the country, according to Zawya, increased to the equivalent of 
$15.2 billion through 20 deals, compared to $11.2 billion through 18 deals in 2012. In 2014, 
Saudi Arabia was the second-largest sukuk issuer, with a total of 15 issuances that were worth 
more than $12 billion (Saudi Hollandi Capital, 2013). Moreover, there are a number of 
issuances in the pipeline, according to the Saudi Bank NCB, such as of the Saudi National 
Shipping Company with an announced value of around 4 billion denominated in Saudi Riyal 
over a 10-year tenor (Augustine, 2015).  
These record numbers are motivated, according to Moody (2013), by the strong 
investor demand with a marked preference for Islamic financial instruments within the 
country. This is coupled with the increased funding opportunities to finance the Kingdom's 
large-scale infrastructure developments. The infrastructure sector, constituting utilities, 
construction and transport, was the main contributor to the sukuk market and accounted for 
the majority of the amounts raised in 2013. Sukuk markets in the kingdom have promoted 
factors such as reform initiatives, in increasing government spending and high levels of the 
repatriation of the Kingdom’s funds into the country after the 2008 financial crisis. 
Increasing capital requirements in the infrastructure sector represent strong opportunities for 
sukuk (Alawi & Al-Quati, 2014). The Finance Minister of the Kingdom officially declared 
government plans to issue Islamic sukuk in order to finance the current budget deficit due to 
fluctuations in oil prices (Aljazeera, 2016). On the demand side, the sukuk market is further 
enhanced by the increased participation of institutional investors, as investing in sukuk could 
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facilitate better portfolio diversification. However, the sukuk industry in Saudi Arabia is 
exposed to specific structural issues that need to be addressed. This chapter discusses the key 
challenges for the sukuk market in the country. The issues that primarily face the secondary 
sukuk market are addressed in order to draw conclusions concerning the way forward for the 
Saudi market on the global sukuk map.  
5.2 Primary Sukuk Market  
The Saudi sukuk market is relatively new due to the delays in its first issuance. The 
first issuance was the Caravan sukuk in 2004 by HANCO a car rental company, that was 
based on an ijara contract for three years (Ahmad, 2010). A year earlier, in 2003, the Saudi 
government founded the CMA as an independent regulatory body in order to develop and 
regulate capital market activities (Alesheikh & Tanega, 2011). This shows that the delay was 
a natural result of the lack of a separate body to govern the securities market. Afterwards, 
the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC), Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), Saudi 
Hollandi Bank, and Dar Al-Arkan Real Estate Development Company (DAAR) have all 
issued sukuk to fund their long term projects, operations, or to refund existing debt. However, 
there have been no official sukuk issued by the Saudi government as there has been in 
Malaysia and a number of other Islamic countries.  
During the crisis, international investors became more cautious of lending to any 
Saudi corporation after the high-profile defaults in 2009 of the Saudi Al-Saad Company and 
Al-Gosaibi groups. However, the price of credit default swaps for the region increased again 
in 2011 since, during the ‘Arab Spring’ Saudi Arabia has overcome this negative global 
situation. This is evidenced by the over-subscribed sukuk issued in 2013 via Saudi Aramco 
for its Sadara joint project, as well as the three fold over- subscription to the $4 billion sukuk 
issued by the General Authority of Civil Aviation in 2012. Table 5-1 shows other examples 
of sukuk issuances, representing a sizeable market for such volumes of sukuk (Ramady, 
2014).  
Table 5-1 Saudi Sukuk Issuance, 2009–2013 
Date   Sukuk name  Amount ($)  
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2009  Saudi Hollandi Bank   193 million  
2011   SATORP Aramco  1 billion  
2012   General Authority of Civil Aviation  4.0 billion  
2012   Saudi Electricity Global Sukuk II  2 billion  
2012   Banque Saudi Fransi  1.25 billion  
2012   Islamic Development Bank  1.3 billion  
2013   Sadara Saudi Aramco  2.0 billion  
Source: Saudi Aramco (2013).  
Beyond the market growth in terms of size, sukuk have become more sophisticated 
by moving from plain vanilla structures to more innovative transactions. Plain vanilla sukuk 
are where only one Sharia contract is applied. This becomes more complex when it is then 
applied to a group of at least two Sharia contracts. In this respect, several structural 
innovations have been seen in the riyal sukuk market, including an increase in non-rated 
issuers entering the market (Saleem, 2013). Also, it is important to highlight that the 
differences in the costs of issuing sukuk and conventional bonds in Saudi Arabia is 
insignificant, and in some cases, sukuk issuance cost less than issuing bonds. The returns on 
riyal sukuk are low compared to those in other markets since profit rates are not determined 
by the prevailing money market rates; rather the scarcity of riyal issuances shows a further 
30-40 bps contraction. For instance, the Sadara sukuk, which was a recent issuance with a 
lifespan of 16 years, was priced at 95 basic points above the six-month Saudi interbank 
offered rate, creating a profit rate of just under 2%. By comparison, the Saudi Electricity 
sukuk priced at $1 billion, a 10-year dollar denominated sukuk in the global market in March, 
offered 3.473%, making it a better and more attractive return (Pancholia & French, 2013). 
The current low return in this market can be attributed to the high demand for sukuk in the 
country. Sukuk in the Saudi market are regularly over-subscribed, showing that the demand 
from institutional investors far exceeds supply. Saudi investment insurers and funds, which 
are cash-rich in a booming economy, seek sukuk for their portfolios and would accept low 
returns for investing in them, generating a more financially attractive option for issuers 
(Arabnews, 2013).   
On the other hand, the cost of sukuk in other Asian countries is still higher than that 
of issuing bonds. For instance, in Malaysia, despite being the largest sukuk market, the 
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average yield on sukuk is higher than eight percentage points over that of traditional bonds 
and in Indonesia, a growing market, the yield on sukuk is significantly higher with 86 basis 
points over the issuing of bonds (Reuters, 2014). Despite the lower costs of the Saudi sukuk 
market, a considerable difference in size can be seen between this market and the Malaysian 
market.  
Table 5-2 Comparison between Saudi and Malaysia Sukuk Markets, (Jan 2001 – Dec 2015) 
  Corporate  Sukuk   % of Total Value  
 
 
Issue Size  ($ ml)  516,736  
 
            
          71.38%  
No. of Issue  4700 
 
Issue Size  ($ ml)  59,427  
 
 
 
           8.21%  No.  of  Issue  87 
Source: IIFM Sukuk database, 2016 
Between 2001 until end-2015, Malaysia issued 4700 corporate sukuk that were worth 
$516,736 billion, while only 87 corporate sukuk worth $59,427 billion were issued by Saudi 
corporations, taking into account that there is no comparison in the sizes of the Saudi and 
Malaysian economies. These figures show that Saudi banks and corporations are losing the 
opportunity to gain income which would have been obtained if they had invested 
appropriately in establishing a comprehensive and proactive sukuk infrastructure (Khnifer, 
2011). Moreover, the Saudi government, as the biggest player in the Arab stock market, has 
a plan to spend around $400 billion on its infrastructure and could gain enormously from the 
large appetite for the sukuk market in the Kingdom. This would enhance investment 
opportunities by providing investors with a wider range of financial products and would 
enrich companies’ financing methods by avoiding borrowing from banks in order to prevent 
the inclusion of long-term debts on their balance sheets (Alesheikh & Tanega, 2011). 
Therefore, banks need to react swiftly; otherwise, they will be mere bystanders when the 
corporate sukuk market comes to dominate.  
In this context, it is important to highlight the Malaysian public policy as enabler for 
Islamic finance to progress. Malaysia’s long-established public policy commitment to the 
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development and expansion of Islamic finance has been instrumental in placing the country 
as a key international centre for Islamic finance (ICM, 2016). Malaysia was successful in 
building up Islamic finance because of their pro-active nature of the public policy provides 
the necessary regulative environment and the required incentive mechanism. It allowed non-
Islamic financial organisations to develop Islamic finance instruments, subject to the 
necessary Sharia safeguards (Panglima & Adjunct, 2007). Islamic banking was introduced 
in Malaysia through “windows,” which permitted conventional financial institutions to 
provide Sharia-compliant banking instruments and services. Unlike some other countries, 
where legislation now necessitates Islamic banks to be standalone, maintaining this strategy 
supported the creation of a competitive and dynamic Islamic financial industry. The same 
year, a Sharia-compliant government Investment Act was announced to allow the 
government to provide Sharia-compliant investment certificates in order to facilitate 
managing liquidity risk of Islamic banks. This is in addition to the progressive liberalization, 
which allowed foreign organisations to receive Islamic banking licenses, saw an increase of 
parties in the industry; Malaysia presently has 16 licensed Islamic banks, of which 6 are 
subsidiaries of foreign organisations. Currently, Malaysia's Islamic banking assets valued at 
$65.6 billion and the industry sees a robust average growing rate of about 20 percent annually 
(Ibrahim, 2016) . 
5.3 Secondary Sukuk Market 
In June 2009, the Kingdom established a new secondary trading platform to replace 
the previous process of over-the-counter transactions (Jadwa, 2009). The secondary market 
in sukuk is small compared to those in other countries with comparable economic indicators. 
Sukuk trading in 2014 amounted to only 108.1 million SAR, and by the end of the first quarter 
of 2015, there was only a single deal amounting to 213.5 million SAR. This shows an evident 
weakness in a market that is worth $8.1 billion for its listed issuances (Augustine, 2015). 
Despite the large size of the market, the number of listed issuances on the Tadawul arise 
from only four issuers. The current secondary market worth SAR 28.2 billion is divided 
between six issuances: Sadara owns SAR 7.5 billion issued by the Aramco Company; Saudi 
Electricity 3 owns SAR 7 billion, Saudi Electricity 4 owns SAR 4.5 billion, the Bahri sukuk 
own SAR 3.9 billion, the Satrop sukuk own 3.5 billion riyals issued by the Aramco Company, 
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and finally the Sipchem sukuk own SAR 1.8 billion. The market suffers from being totally 
inactive since the emergence of the market. From mid-2009, only SAR 3.9 billion were 
traded in 220 deals (Alarabiya, 2016). The market is found with no single transaction taking 
place for more than 45 days. The Saudi market in sukuk represents enormous potential wealth 
that has not yet been stimulated. The primary market is in relatively better condition in terms 
of issuance and offering, while the secondary market is counted as one of the least active in 
the region, which means that it is absolutely necessary to animate this market and deliver 
appropriately efficient mechanisms (Al-Buqami, 2013).  
Although, all Saudi sukuk issuances have succeeded and have been oversubscribed, 
the trading in these sukuk is not yet healthy. The current limitations of the Saudi primary 
market and the lack of alternative products in the sukuk asset class have led to a situation 
where demand is higher than supply, therefore incentivizing investors to hold onto sukuk 
until their maturity date. The size of the secondary sukuk market is negatively influenced by 
the presence of buy-and-hold strategies activated by major investors (Alawi, et al., 2010). 
Therefore, the price of any new sukuk issuance in Saudi Arabia can be distorted because 
banks are unable to get the required sukuk prices. In addition, the absence of securitization 
and active market makers which are important in ensuring an effective price discovery 
mechanism are further elements hampering Saudi secondary trading.  
Furthermore, Saudi sukuk are sold with a minimum price that is over the individual 
budgets. Sukuk issued in the market are out of reach for average investors as a natural result 
of their huge costs. For instance, buying one sukuk from the SEC costs SAR 1 million, 
whereas most sovereign and corporation bonds cost $1000 and are sometimes issued at only 
$100 in some sovereign issuances. This also represents as an obstacle in activating the Saudi 
secondary market (Al-Hoymany, 2014). More critical is the current trading commission 
applied in the market, which is considered a major obstacle for growth since commissions 
are not applied properly so as to serve the market and investors.   
A fair trading commission can motivate and activate the market; however, in the 
Saudi market, the maximum commission that is allowed for trading equals is one thousandth 
of the value of the transaction, with a minimum of 500 SAR. Despite the argument that this 
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level of commission is insignificant, the fact is that commission has an adverse influence in 
the market. Firstly, the reason for and purpose of applying a minimum commission for 
trading is unclear, as this may discourage individuals from trading in the market if each 
transaction, no matter how small, will cost a minimum of 500 SAR. However, if an 
individual or an institution wants to buy one sukuk from the fourth edition of the Electricity 
Company for one million SAR, they will have to pay one thousand SAR as a commission. 
But the return from this sukuk would be 16,500 SAR, meaning that 6% of the transaction 
will go towards paying the commission. This can have direct a impact on slowing down 
activities in the market, whereas the commission in the US for some transactions does not 
exceed $10 (Al-Hoymany, 2014).   
5.4 Legal and Regulatory Framework for Sukuk Market 
In Saudi Arabia, there are two official bodies responsible for the regulation and 
supervision of Islamic financial activities, including sukuk issuances. These financial 
authorities are the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), and the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA). The SAMA was established in 1952 to act as the central bank for the 
Saudi government. Then, fifty years later in 2003, the development requirements of the 
industry and its evolution necessitated the founding of a separate regulatory body that 
focuses on the investment and capital markets, and thus the CMA was established.  
The CMA has the sovereignty required to regulate and control the capital market 
(Alesheikh & Tanega, 2011). The CMA’s duties include the development and regulation of 
the issuing of securities, controlling publicly traded companies, ensuring transparency and 
protecting investors from unfair market activities. Thus, no Sharia supervisory 
responsibilities were given to the CMA (CMA, n.d.).  
Saudi Arabia strictly adheres to Sharia laws, and thus as Islamic financial 
instruments, sukuk are not particularly popular in the community. Some of the rules of 
Islamic investment and trading are enforced by law such as the prohibitions against 
consuming alcohol and pork and entering into gambling activities; however, other Islamic 
financial rules, such as the prohibition of contracts contaminated by fixed-interest, are not 
enforced by Saudi law but are generally recognized by investors (Merdad, et al., 2010). 
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Although Saudi Arabia is an Islamic country whose constitution prohibits dealing with riba, 
riba in practice does exist in its financial market. The policy of the Saudi government related 
to the use of interest in the banking sector is exemplified in Article 2 of the Royal decree. 
This established the charter of the SAMA, which represents the central bank and is forbidden 
from participating in any business that is based on interest. This Royal charter shows the 
banning of interest, confirming the Saudi government’s attitude towards Sharia rules. 
Nevertheless, deals with interest can be seen to occur in most commercial banks where 
financing and trading rely on a fixed annual rate, while no objection has been made by either 
the government or SAMA to such practices by commercial banks (Alsulaiman, 2011). This 
implied permission of riba which creates system where conventional and Islamic systems 
coexist. The country allows around fifteen international and national financial institutions to 
operate entirely or partially along conventional lines as well as along Islamic lines.  
Saudi Arabia has the largest Islamic bank in the gulf countries, namely the Alrajhi 
Bank; however, bank and market regulators in Saudi Arabia do not assume any Shariarelated 
duties. Islamic finance and banking operations have been practised in the Kingdom for 
decades without being regulated in a similar way to the conventional sector.  
There is no specific law or policy designed for Islamic financial institutions within the 
context of the official regulation structure in Saudi Arabia. There is no specific framework 
for issuing sukuk, and most of the articles in the Offers of Securities Regulations and the 
Listing Rules indicate financial tools as securities in general or refer to stocks, debt 
instruments or bonds in some cases. In their articles, there is no mention of the word sukuk, 
consequently sukuk issuance is not operationalized under a framework that takes account of 
the nature of sukuk as different from traditional debt instruments. Rather, the CMA monitors 
and regulates sukuk issuances side-by-side with the issuing of bonds under its Listing Rules 
and the Offer of Securities Regulations (Alesheikh & Tanega, 2011). Despite the 
fundamental differences between sukuk and conventional debt instruments, the Offers of 
Securities Regulations and the Listing Rules do not account for the clear differences between 
sukuk and stocks, nor between sukuk and conventional debt instruments. Sukuk are currently 
issued as debt products under the broader meaning of ‘Debt Instruments’ in the Regulations; 
however, it can be argued that sukuk designs would not generate a debt obligation on the 
originator. Alesheikh and Tanega (2011) believe that the present regulations for issuing 
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bonds in Saudi Arabia do not provide an effective mechanism to set up and maintain 
transaction-specific special purpose entities. This generates substantial obstacles, thereby 
hampering investors’ ability to obtain access to capital markets. Also, the absence of such 
specifications may cause confusion between sukuk and bonds and would define sukuk as 
debt instruments even if these sukuk do not generate any debt obligations on originators.  
An additional issue for sukuk is the absence of a central Sharia supervisory board that 
specializes in Islamic finance. The absence of such a significant body may lead to a decrease 
in public trust towards Islamic financial instruments. Nevertheless, several institutions have 
their own Sharia supervisory boards and follow the guidelines and principles that are 
published by regional and international institutions such as the AAOIFI. These institutions 
submit themselves to a Sharia board in order to ensure their activities are compliant with 
Sharia principles. However, a structure or document that is allowed by one Sharia board in 
one institution may be rejected by another Sharia board in a different institution. Thus, the 
absence of a centralized Sharia supervisory board raises the possibility of conflict in fatwas 
among Islamic scholars on Saudi sukuk issuances.  
These different opinions may result in major damage to certain sukuk issuances, in 
addition to a loss of confidence among investors (Alesheikh & Tanega, 2011). The current 
situation could be attributed to a lack of interest on the part of the Saudi financial regulators 
the SAMA and CMA who are less concerned with supporting Islamic finance than fulfilling 
traditional central banking roles (Wilson, 2002). Therefore, each financial institution is free 
to identify its own Sharia criteria, rules, board and acceptable investments (Asaad, 2007).  
5.4.1 Saudi Courts and Sukuk Disputes  
Given the current lack of sukuk regulation, the question that arises concerns how 
Saudi courts deal with sukuk. The strict prohibition of riba has influenced court decisions 
related to disputes involving financial institutions. This is because the policy of the Saudi 
court is to not submit any ruling that might be considered a breach of Sharia law. Thus, these 
courts have rejected any claims against customers who are in debt to any financial 
institutions. This can be shown in the Decision No.291 of the Supreme Judicial Council, 
dated 1980, which provides that all courts are banned from validating the mortgage loans of 
commercial banks. This decision emphasized the refusal of the Saudi Tribunal to examine 
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financial disputes associated with interest, considering them on a jurisprudential footing. 
Banks and other financial institutions still place major pressure on the courts to review 
decisions by referring to the risks and losses generated by this refusal. The first commercial 
Circuit refusal at the Board of Grievances was made in 1996 to adjudicate a situation 
involving bank shares, since the contractual obligations between the plaintiff and the 
defendant involved interest (Aljarbou, 2004). However, with regards to sukuk, there is no 
precedent case yet to define the approach of Saudi courts in dealing with disputes related to 
sukuk. This poses some doubt concerning to what extent the rules regarding sukuk documents 
would be imposed by the pertinent judiciary.  
In addition, sukuk-holders need to show the validity of sukuk according to Sharia, 
since there is no guarantee that the approval of certain sukuk issuances by the originator’s 
Sharia advisor would result in them being validated by the court, because such approval is 
not binding. Rather, the court has the discretion to issue its own determination related to the 
compliance of a particular sukuk issuance with Sharia and Saudi law. This means that there 
is no certainty regarding the jurisdiction of the court and the approach to enforcing it in cases 
of sukuk disputes. The securities regulations in Saudi have a main issue concerning the 
transparency of court processes and decisions, and thereby public confidence. Moreover, in 
certain cases, a court’s legal decisions and judgments are not published, leaving ambiguity 
as to how legislation may be interpreted (Alsulaiman, 2011). In addition, there is a lack of 
well-established insolvency law in Saudi Arabia. The fact is that a separate bankruptcy law 
does not exist in the Saudi legal framework, and bankruptcy law in Saudi is still 
underdeveloped. Also, there are no clear requirements for true sale transactions which have 
further exacerbated the risk to sukuk issuers in structuring true sale sukuk (Dusuki & 
Mokhtar, 2010). Thus, there are difficulties in understanding the risk of the originator’s 
bankruptcy in respect of the sale of assets in true sale the sukuk structure.   
5.4.2 The Intifa’ Sukuk System in Saudi Arabia 
In Saudi Arabia, intifa’ sukuk (time-share sukuk) were first formed in 2005 for tourist 
real estate units, such as guest-houses and hotels. Intifa’ sukuk permit the distribution of the 
expenses for construction, operation, and maintenance management between a number of 
beneficiaries, thus minimizing the expenses for users. The demand for these sukuk has 
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increased during the past years, which has prompted the government to modernize and 
develop regulations governing this activity. The Saudi government introduced a version of 
the system to deal with intifa’ sukuk and the system specifically defines the obligations and 
responsibilities of the involved parties with some penalties to be imposed upon violators of 
the regulation. The aim is to protect all parties involved from intentional or unintentional 
abuse (Saudi Embassy, 2015).  
Thereafter, in 2014 the Saudi government withdrew dealing of sukuk intifa’ with 
non-Saudis in the two holy cities (Medina and Makkah). The operation of the intensive hotel 
services and facilities in these two cities cannot now involve non-Saudis (Saudi Embassy, 
2014). The reason for this is attributed to the intensive infrastructure construction undertaken 
by the Saudi government. This entails the construction of a number of new hotels to facilitate 
pilgrimage in the two holy cities. The prohibition of non-Saudis from dealing in intifa’ sukuk 
has excluded the inheritance situation. The official statement instituted this resolution with 
immediate effect.  
5.5 Saudi sukuk market and low oil income 
The Saudi Arabian economy is heavily dependent on the oil industry. In recent times 
the price of crude oil has dropped more than 50%. The impact of low oil income has an 
influence in reducing the liquidity and causing fiscal deficit on the growth of sukuk market. 
Consequently, Saudi Arabia has witnessed a downgrading in its credit rating by both Fitch 
and Moody’s in the last few months, with both ratings agencies quoting a drop in oil prices 
as the reason for the drop of Saudi Arabia’s credit profile (Pettinger, 2015). Moreover, S&P 
rating agency also lowered its unsolicited short and long term, local and foreign currency 
sovereign credit ratings on Saudi Arabia to 'A+/A-1' from 'AA-/A-1+' with its outlook 
maintaining negative (CIMB, 2016).  
Contrary to the market expectations that drop in oil prices will support the expansion 
of sukuk issuances, sukuk market witnessed a significant drop in their total issuance. 
Despite of the significant fall in oil prices since mid-2014, total sukuk issuance did not 
pick up in 2015 or even in the first half of 2016, as was expected by a number of market 
commentators. In fact, issuances decreased in the first half of 2016 by 12.5 percent from 
a year ago. While other commentators supposed low oil prices would encourage the 
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government to tap the sukuk market for funding to maintain the capital spending 
(Augustine, 2016). 
One of the principal reasons explaining the lack of linkages between oil prices and 
sukuk market in Saudi is attributed to the large stocks of fiscal assets that Saudi Arabia 
have built up during many years of fiscal and current account surpluses. It has built up 
substantial foreign currency reserves; thus it can afford temporary drops (Pettinger, 2015). 
This is along with conventional debt issuances that Saudi government tend to use them as 
a source of public-sector deficit financing. This is because sukuk issuances are mainly 
supported by real assets. Isolating sufficient assets to support the issuances can add to the 
funding timeline and influence the overall financing cost while conventional bond 
maintains its attraction for the government (Reuters, 2016).  
5.6 Recent Developments and the Way Forward 
To develop a functional capital market, a structural and economic changes and 
legislative amendments are needed. In 2008, the CMA made a major decision to permit 
foreign investors to directly invest in the Saudi stock market after decades of highly 
conservative regulations on foreign investment. In fact, the Saudi secondary market does not 
need liquidity from foreign investors but only requires greater regulation and transparency 
(Alesheikh & Tanega, 2011). Due to its large size, the Saudi financial market does not need 
additional liquidity but rather the market needs to be developed by increasing transparency 
and reforming the regulations. In spite of government initiatives to develop the Saudi capital 
market, a number of hurdles still exist preventing the country from achieving its full 
potential, such as the lack of transparency and unclear economic policies. These are still 
major challenges (Ajlouni, 2013).  
For the Saudi sukuk market to achieve their microeconomic and macroeconomic 
benefits, it is would be significant for sukuk to be issued and traded afterward on a large 
scale. In this respect, the Saudi primary market is active; however, the market cannot satisfy 
the demand. The Saudi government has to engage in the market along with corporations in 
order to achieve a better balance between demand and supply. In the next few years, the 
corporate sukuk market is predicted to rapidly increase, even with the current absence of a 
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developed regulatory and legal framework for the market. Saudi corporates are expected to 
issue more sukuk than bonds due to the wider range of investors who are restricted to Sharia-
compliant borrowing according to their individual rules as well as other international 
investors who are becoming increasingly satisfied with sukuk investments. This expectation 
can be supported by the huge market appetite for sukuk as a fixed income product that has 
motivated private and public companies to focus on sukuk rather than on conventional 
lending instruments. Consequently, there has been a total absence of Saudi corporate bond 
issuances since 2013, while in 2014 sukuk issues reached a value of $7.8 billion (Augustine, 
2015).  
Moreover, there is a persistent need for a more robust secondary sukuk market to be 
built that would boost its appeal, particularly among active institutional investors. The lack 
of liquidity appearing in the secondary market is one of the critical risks associated with 
investing in the Saudi sukuk market. This illiquidity has discouraged a number of retail 
investors to consider participating in this market. In this respect, investors tend to claim a 
premium for participating in illiquid investments; however, the yields offered by the listed 
Saudi sukuk do not compensate for this illiquidity risk (Kawach, 2009). Currently, a key 
component of the further success of the sukuk market in Saudi Arabia would be to develop 
a more liquid secondary market rather than to compensate with higher returns. To encourage 
trading, it is vital for the Saudi capital market to adjust some of the current costs and 
commissions in such a way as to reduce the total costs of trading in order to encourage the 
involvement more players (Al-Hoymany, 2014).  In addition, Saudi Arabia has to encourage 
the issuance of sukuk with varied credit qualities, risk profiles, maturities and currencies. 
This would offer investors a range of options in the market and promote retail participation. 
For example, the Malaysian sukuk framework permits the issuance of both ringgit and non-
ringgit sukuk. Also, market makers and brokers should accept a greater role in the secondary 
sukuk market. Intermediaries are investment bankers, fund managers, and brokers who can 
facilitate secondary trading by underwriting and counselling on complex sukuk issuances 
(Mohammed, 2014).  
It is also essential for Saudi Arabia to establish a uniform and adequate regulatory 
framework in order to keep pace with the rapid development of the sukuk market during 
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recent years (Alawi, et al., 2010). The major solution to the absence of a legislative structure 
for sukuk issuance would be to extend current regulations to cover a wider range of financial 
products, including sukuk, by issuing new regulations. Before issuing new regulations 
relating to sukuk, there are some vital points that have to be considered by the board of the 
Capital Market Authority. Firstly, any regulatory and legislative framework for issuing sukuk 
has to be compatible with the principles and provisions of Sharia. This is because the Basic 
Law of Governance in Saudi adopts these principles, as it stipulates that the constitution of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the Holy Quran and the Sunnah (Council of Ministers, n.d.).  
Thus, any new regulations for sukuk have to consider Sharia law based on the Holy Quran 
and the Sunnah in order to prevent any conflict with the Basic Law of Governance. In 
addition, the new regulations for sukuk should be approved by a Sharia Committee whose 
members are appointed by the Saudi Sharia Advisory Council (SSAC). This step can ensure 
that the new regulations and legislation concerning sukuk are compatible with Sharia rules 
(Alesheikh & Tanega, 2011). Also, it is important to establish an independent central Sharia 
board to supervise and standardize Islamic banking activities, including issuing sukuk, and 
to institute a Sharia Committee comparable to the Sharia Advisory Council (SAC) in 
Malaysia. However, the Sharia committee or adviser can be appointed by the CMA until an 
independent body such as a Saudi Sharia Advisory Council (SSAC) is established. A general 
Sharia compliance board is for the banking and finance sector can ensure the uniformity of 
lending decisions in meeting Sharia law (Sidawi & Meeran, 2011). The establishment of this 
board is necessary with some level of authority in order to enforce its statements and to 
generate general rules and guidelines that should be taken into account by entities issuing 
sukuk in the Saudi market.   
Also, the CMA should adopt guidelines and standards that are related to sukuk and 
published by regional and international institutions such as the International Islamic 
Financial Market (IIFM), the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), and the AAOIFI. For 
instance, in 2008 the AAOIFI has issued six recommendations about how to structure sukuk, 
which dealt with issues of repurchasing, ownership and compliance (Al-Shamrani, 2014, p. 
110). Undoubtedly, having a separate and robust regulatory framework for the issuance of 
sukuk would ensure high standardization and reduce the risk of difference of opinion between 
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Sharia scholars. For this, coordinated efforts have combined the achieves of key regulatory 
bodies such as the Finance Ministry, CMA and SAMA to improve the current situation. 
However, there is a recent applied factor that can spur the issuance of sukuk in Saudi Arabia 
in the medium-term, which that the CAM plans to modify the corporate debt market in order 
to make the regulatory approval of debt instruments easier. As declared, the plan includes 
making the procedure for structuring bonds that comply with Islam’s ban on riba more 
straightforward, since most Saudi companies find it significantly easier to raise bank loans 
than issue sukuk in the public market (Augustine, 2015).   
5.7 Summary  
In Saudi Arabia, there is a large demand in the primary sukuk market which has some 
notable effects. For instance, the regular over-subscription of issuances has reduced the 
returns the Saudi issuances. The returns on SAR sukuk are much lower compared to those in 
other sukuk markets. This has reduced the total cost of issuing sukuk in Saudi Arabia, making 
the sukuk market more attractive for issuers. The total cost of issuing sukuk becomes, in some 
cases, lower than that of issuing bonds. Despite all of these key factors that can boost market 
growth, the Saudi market is still failing to adequately activate its sukuk market. The shortage 
in the primary market results in the prevailing presence of buying and holding strategies. 
Investors are motivated by the current situation to hold sukuk until their maturity. 
Consequently, the secondary market suffers from being illiquid and has become one of the 
least active markets in the region.  
Despite regular sukuk issuances and a huge demand from the Islamic mutual funds 
in the country, there is no single piece of legislation specifically regulating the 
implementation of Islamic sukuk. This is a result of the lack of interest from in Saudi 
financial authorities in supporting Islamic finance. Therefore, in cases of sukuk disputes, 
there is no certainty about the jurisdiction of the court or the approach to be enforced. The 
current weakness of Saudi sukuk requires a well-structured and well-regulated market. The 
major solution to the absence of a legislative structure for issuing sukuk would be to extend 
current regulations to cover a wider range of financial products and to include sukuk by 
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issuing new regulations. Greater transparency is also required and along with the reform of 
regulations to establish an adequate regulatory framework.   
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Chapter 6: Research Design and Methodology  
 
6.1 Introduction  
The aim of this research is to analytically discuss sukuk based on assets and to 
critically examine the Sharia and economic aspects of some of the cases in Saudi Arabia. 
The previous chapters have served as the foundation for the research and provided the basis 
for the empirical chapters. Exploring in depth the concept of sukuk based on assets, the 
relationships with their counterparts in traditional markets were illustrated. Furthermore, the 
requirements for validity according to Sharia as well as their financial significance were also 
analysed in order to deliver an understanding of the risks and returns involved. During the 
discussion, emphasis was placed on the AAOIFI standards in respect of compatibility with 
Sharia, and the agency relevant relationship were considered in respect of risk allocation.   
The main aim of this chapter is to describe the methodology of the current research. 
The following points are addresses: the research design, approaches used, and methods of 
data collections and analysis. These choices are determined in the light of the research 
problem and questions in order to achieve the aims and objectives of the research. Then 
finally, the chapter concludes by explaining the criteria for high quality research followed 
by a summary of the main decisions made as described throughout the chapter.  
6.2 Research Philosophy 
The research philosophy depends on the researcher's way of thought. It 
significantly influences the results of the research and thus needs to be considered 
carefully. The adopted research philosophy can be thought of as assumptions about the 
way in which the researcher views the world. These assumptions will support the strategy 
and the methods are chosen for the study in order to construct a robust research 
methodology (Saunders & Thornhill, 2003). There are two categories of research 
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philosophies; they include positivism philosophy and interpretisvism philosophy 
(Atherton & Elsmore, 2007). 
Positivism is a philosophical theory that also knows as scientific philosophy. It is 
based on the concept that logical and mathematical treatments are the best sources for 
gathering any data. It considers that information collected from these sources is acceptable 
and authentic by all (McBurney & White, 2009). This is useful when the size of the 
sample is huge; however, in the present research this philosophy cannot be used since the 
sample size applied is not large. On the other hand, the interpretivism is the opposite theory 
of the positivism (Rowlay, 2012). The meaning of the Interpretivism according to Collis 
& Hussey is that "a paradigm that emerged in response to criticisms of positivism. It rests 
on the assumption that social reality is in our minds, and is subjective and multiple. 
Therefore, social reality is affected by the act of investigating it. The research involves an 
inductive process with a view to providing interpretive understanding of social phenomena 
within a particular context" (Collis & Hussey, 2012, p. 57). This philosophy relates to the 
study that is conducted by being present in the society rather than by gathering data from 
analysing the presence of mere objects. In fact, it is in favour of primary data collection or 
qualitative research method (Holden & Lynch, 2004). Therefore, inductive and deductive 
approaches are linked to opposite research philosophies, the inductive approach to 
interpretivism while the deductive approach to positivism (Saunders & Thornhill, 2003).  
This research chooses the interpretive philosophy as it the best philosophy for the 
current study. This philosophy fits perfectly to the study since it deals and interprets the 
details of the current market of sukuk and evaluates how the cases are structured from 
Sharia and financial perspectives. It is applied as the sample size is small in the case, the 
data collected is not mathematical treated while it takes into consideration the information 
derived from sukuk prospectus which will provide ease to the research in the collection of 
the data. 
6.3 Research Design  
This research has an explorative nature as it is mainly related with matters that 
have not been clearly identified (Sekaran, 2000). This implies that the considering issues 
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are new at least in a particular context or case. According to Kotler et al (2006), 
exploratory researches are able to collect preliminary information to identify problems 
and suggest hypothesis. In fact, the adaptability and flexibility to change constitute a 
significant feature of exploratory researches and thus these researches can easily change 
the line of thought as result of new results that appear. However, Adams and 
Schvaneveldt (1991) indicted that the adaptability associated with exploratory research 
should not mean the loss of way to the inquiry rather it should be a mean to a narrower 
focus as the research progresses data are collected. In this research, the exploratory nature 
of the study helps to ask open questions to discover the situations and to gain insights 
about the current market of sukuk.  
This research employs a case study design since every project requires an overall 
design, and a research study is no excluded and it also requires appropriately planned and 
designed activity (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 42). Bryman (2012, p. 66) considers the case 
study one of the main types of research design. He points out that some of the best-known 
studies in sociology are based on case study designs. Case study research provides the 
opportunity for the researcher to bring evidence together from many varied sources to 
support the issues at hand in ways that cannot be achieved in different forms of research 
(Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 216).  
Case study research examines and investigates in-depth a specific unit or a number 
of units that can be organisations, individuals, events, or communities. This design can draw 
upon a range of methods, such as interviews, observations, focus groups, and types of 
analysis, with a range of sampling techniques and purposes (Hmel, et al., 1993, p. 4). Case 
studies are distinguished from experimental research in that they are not conducted in 
controlled conditions and are not specially conducted for the purpose of comparisons. Also, 
case studies are distinguished from surveys in that they are principally conducted to study 
and investigate particular cases (David & Sutton, 2004, p.111).   
Table 6-1 Case Study vs. Experiment and Survey 
  Case Study  Experiment  Survey  
Cases investigated  One case or a small 
number of cases  
Relatively large 
number of cases  
Relatively large number of  
cases  
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Variables analysed  Large number of features  
of each case  
Small number of 
features of each case  
Small number of features  
of each case  
Object of study  Naturally occurring cases 
where the aim is not to 
control variables  
Cases where the aim is 
to control the 
important variables  
Naturally occurring cases 
selected to maximize the 
sample’s representativeness 
of a wider population  
Quantification of 
data  
Not a priority  A priority  A priority  
Methods used  Many methods and 
sources  
One method  One method  
Aims  To look at relationships 
and processes  
To look at causation  To look for generalization  
Source: (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 10)  
A case study is not a method in itself; rather, it is a design that can draw on a variety 
of methods such as quantitative or qualitative methods. In fact, there is a tendency to 
associate the case study design with qualitative methods due to the nature of this design. It 
is undoubtedly true that proponents of this design often favour qualitative research methods, 
since these are beneficial in generating a detailed intensive study of the case considered. 
Conversely, if the examination extensively relies on a quantitative method, it might appear 
to be more of a cross-sectional design than case study research (Bryman, 2012, p. 67). Yen 
(2003, p. 6) suggests that case study research is best formulated for the study of 
contemporary events or situations using methods that operate naturalistically, such as to 
collect data in natural settings or through relatively open-ended questions in interviews. 
Also, it encourages the use of documents and the life histories related to the case in order to 
allow the case study researcher to conduct a qualitative exploration. Accordingly, this 
research attempts to critically examine some of the contemporary Saudi sukuk applications 
that are based on assets. Case study design assists this research in using qualitative methods 
since the data concerning these applications are collected from particular documents related 
to them. The research explores how sukuk are applied in Saudi Arabia in an attempt to find 
the critical issues in the applications and then to conduct interviews based on the issues 
identified. In fact, this design allows for a systematic method and links the data  to  be  
collected  and  the conclusions to be drawn with better coherence.  
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Case study research is about the particular and not the general. Thus, the aim is not 
to generalize but rather to investigate the cases chosen and then to present them in a more 
specific way (Thomas, 2011, p. 3). This study aims to describe, illustrate and explore specific 
sukuk cases from multiple perspectives in such a way that has relevance to other cases, rather 
than either assuming that the findings might be generalized or presenting them as a unique 
instance (Costley, et al., 2010, p. 90). The case study research, therefore, provides a richer 
picture of the cases involved with different kinds of insights being generated, and especially 
analytical insights from different angles along with different sources of information. The 
analytical process is important for this type of research (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 21). For 
this reason, the cases are analysed from different angles, using various theories and 
standards. The discussion relies on the two main Sharia and financial perspectives to explore 
aspects of the cases. The analytical discussion is generated from different benchmarks such 
as the AAOIFI standards, the theory of agency and the types of risks defined by the Basel 
Committee.   
In case study research, it is important to highlight the purposes and objectives that 
motivated the research. This will determine the answer as to how the analytical framework 
to be used. This research has an evaluative purpose, which is one of the purposes of a case 
study. Here the researcher aims to see how well something is working, or has worked, which 
then helps in finding out what changes have occurred and if these have led to better or worse 
outcomes (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 100). Evaluating each case according to Sharia rules 
and risk/return allocations is necessary in order to determine the divergence between practice 
in applications are from the theory. Well-developed theories and standards are the basis for 
the evaluation.  
Moreover, among different types of cases, the research will use critical cases. 
Bryman (2012) explains that the critical case study is research that has a well-built theory, 
and a case is selected on grounds which allows for a deeper understanding of the 
circumstances and situations in which a hypothesis or hypotheses will and will not hold (p. 
70). Furthermore, in respect to the quantity of cases to be considered, Costley, et al. (2010) 
limits case study research to the details and intensive analysis of a single case, whereas most 
other authors including, Bryman (2012) widen this criterion to include the study of a single 
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or a relatively small number of cases. In this research, the aim is to deeply examine three 
sukuk applications in Saudi Arabia. The main practical advantage of this choice is that the 
small number of cases can produce a more profound understanding along with a more 
significant amount of information pertaining to the cases (Smith, et al., 1991, p. 35).   
6.4 Research Approaches  
The choice deductive and inductive approaches are mainly concerns whether 
observation or theory should come first. A deductive approach is when theory comes first 
and an inductive approach is when observation comes first. The deductive process represents 
the common view of the nature of the relationship between social research and theory. 
Bryman (2012, p. 24) explains that in deductive research ‘the researcher, on the basis of what 
is known about in a particular domain and of theoretical considerations in relation to that 
domain, deduces a hypothesis that must then be subjected to the empirical scrutiny. 
Embedded within the hypothesis are concepts that will need to be translated into researchable 
entities’. The opposite direction of the relationship between theory and observation is 
represented in the inductive approach. It is simply the research approach that involves the 
development of a theory as a result of observing the empirical data (Saunders, et al., 2012, 
p. 672). Studies that use induction are more likely to work with qualitative data and to 
practice different methods to gather data in order to establish a variety of views of 
phenomena. (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008, p. 5). These studies are likely to be particularly 
concerned with the context in which such events were taking place. Data collection and 
analysis are sensitive to the context targeting a holistic understanding of the issues. Hence, 
examining a small sample of matters might be more suitable than a large number as with the 
deduction approach (Saunders, et al., 2012, p. 145-146).  
In other words, deductive research aims to test a hypothesis, while inductive research 
aims to explore a topic, and thus the inductive method has an exploratory approach. In 
respect to the relationship between quantitative and qualitative research, qualitative methods 
are mainly associated with the inductive approach; whereas quantitative research associated 
with deductive approaches. However, this is not consistent as some inductive studies can be 
quantitative; whereas, some qualitative research can apply the deductive approaches by 
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starting from the formulation of hypotheses (David & Sutton, 2004). As this research works 
with qualitative data related to asset-backed sukuk aiming a holistic understanding of sukuk 
issues in order to establish different views on sukuk practices, this study can be safely 
classified as using the inductive approach. To be more precise, this research starts with 
specific observations regarding sukuk market to pave the way for the empirical chapters. 
Thus, the research will be able to draw conclusions after examining the three cases by using 
inductive method of reasoning.    
6.5 Data Collection Method  
Data collection methods comprise two terms; data and method. Data are the bedrock 
of the social knowledge and the sciences, where data are used to answer questions raised, 
and to generate useful and new understandings of phenomena (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 33). 
It is significant to point out that there is a distinction between evidence and data. Data is 
simply another word for information; whereas, evidence is a set of data mobilized in support 
of propositions (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 161). Although the terms methodology and 
method are in some cases used interchangeably, they are different (Miller & Dingwall, 1997, 
p. 27). A method simply refers to a technique or tool for data collection or analysis; for 
instance, surveys and interviews are methods for data collection whereas analysis of variance 
and thematic analysis are methods of data analysis. Methods are relatively specific and used 
in specific patterns, while methodology is a broader term which refers to the framework that 
the research is conducted within. Methodology is defined as the procedure related to a 
specific set of paradigmatic assumptions that lead to knowledge (O'Leary, 2004). Arbnor 
and Bjerke (2008, p. 3) explain that the methodology ‘contains a number of concepts, which 
try to describe the steps and the relationships needed in the process of creating and searching 
for new knowledge’. Methodology consists of practices and theories about the ways in which 
to conduct research. It consists of a package of assumptions about how the research is 
conducted as well as implying the appropriate methods to be applied. Methodology can be 
seen as a theory of how a study will proceed in order to produce valid knowledge and 
information with regards to the social and psychological world. It is all about making sense 
of the research in terms of the design and the process. Thus, a method is a concept as part of 
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the methodology that provides a clear framework for making a series of decisions regarding 
a specific research study (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 31).   
However, the term ‘data collection method’ is simply defined by Bryman (2012, p. 
46) as a technique for collecting data. Data collection methods are commonly divided into 
qualitative and quantitative methods. Quantitative research is mainly concentrated on the 
measurement of quantities. The process in this type of research often starts with data 
collection which is based on a hypothesis or experiment or theory, then followed by the 
usage of descriptive or inferential numerical methods. Accordingly, the research is mainly 
numerical and non-descriptive, using mathematics or statistics in an iterative process 
whereby evidence is evaluated and then the result of the research is generally a set of 
numbers that are usually conclusive (Rajasekar, et al., 2006).  
On the other hand, the qualitative method is described by Maanen (1983, p. 9) as 
having ‘no precise meaning in any of the social sciences. It is at best an umbrella term, an 
array of interpretative techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate and otherwise 
come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally 
occurring phenomena in the social world’. Moreover, David and Sutton (2004, p. 35) 
perceive this method as ‘a social method that employs no quantitative standards and 
techniques based on theoretical and methodological principles of symbolic interactionism, 
hermeneutics and ethnomethodology’. Accordingly, there are some essential features of 
qualitative research. It is mainly non-numerical and descriptive and uses words through the 
description of observed objects (Wicaksono, 2015). Also, it is usually exploratory and aims 
to derive meanings or feelings to describe a situation. It includes the use of specific 
instruments such as observation, questionnaires or structured interviews (Rajasekar, et al., 
2006). In qualitative research, the data collected are mainly naturalistic in the sense that these 
data are not placed into pre-existing categories and are not pre-coded at the collection stage 
(Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 33).  
From the above, it can be noted that, while the quantitative method generates shallow 
and broad data, qualitative methods will generate narrow but rich data. Also, while 
quantitative method is fixed and it is harder to change focus during the collection of data, 
qualitative methods are less fixed and can accommodate a shift in focus in the same research. 
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Hence, qualitative research tends to take longer due to the absence of a clear formula (Braun 
& Clarke, 2013, p. 4). In this research, despite using some quantities in some parts such as 
showing the size of the sukuk market or deciding the percentage of Sharia compliance, the 
qualitative method is the principal type used. Bricki and Green (2007) considered how to 
decide if the qualitative approach is appropriate, and stated that ‘if you want to: understand 
the perspectives of participants; or explore the meaning they give to phenomena; or observe 
a process in depth, then a qualitative approach is probably appropriate’. This research is 
based on understanding asset-backed sukuk in depth and observing the process of specific 
applications, and so the qualitative approach would be the most appropriate choice.  
In respect of types of data, a division is conventionally drawn between secondary 
and primary data. Primary data collection comprises the use of research tools, for instance, 
interview and questionnaire, for the specific purposes of a particular research. However, 
secondary data has already been collected by other researchers, government departments, 
and organisations or for personal purposes (Clarke, 1999, p. 66).  
This research is based on both primary and secondary sources. Available references 
are held in libraries, such as in books, journals, reports, conference and rules from the 
internationally-recognized Islamic financial authorities and institutions. The resolution of 
the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) are 
one of the main references in this study. Moreover, websites are sometimes used as a source 
to find up-to-date or otherwise unavailable relevant information. Furthermore, some official 
documents are derived from private sources since not all of the prospectuses studied are 
available in the public domain. This means that the researcher has attempted to find private 
sources in order to gain access to the desired information. In particular, the Zamzam sukuk 
is not available to the public and all related documents have been received as confidential 
data, after meeting some members of Musha’at Co. in Kuwait.    
6.5.1 Interviewing  
Interviewing is simply defined by David and Sutton (2004, p. 87) as involving 
‘asking people questions, but it is equally about listening carefully to the answers given’. It 
is a professional conversation with the aim of discourse regarding the participants’ 
perspectives and experiences plus capturing their concepts and language related to the topic 
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studied (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 77). Smith, et al., (1991, p. 71) pointed out that the 
interviewing in-depth has been considered to be the most fundamental instrument of all 
qualitative methods as it is the best tool for gathering certain types of information. Also, 
Costley, et al., (2010, p. 41) endorse this view, considering the interview instrument as a 
powerful method in investigating a subject, particularly as a qualitative method. 
Undoubtedly, interviewing is one of the most common methods of data collection within 
qualitative research (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 77).  
Interviewing is useful for the understanding, exploration, perception and 
construction of the topic as determined through questioning (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 81). 
It provides rich access to individuals’ opinions and personal views that enables further 
exploration of the topic concerned (David & Sutton, 2004, p. 91). While, the interviewing in 
qualitative research faces some complexity when designing targeted questions (Smith, et al., 
1991). Interviewing can take a very long time, especially since re-interviewing is not unusual 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 496). Also, data transcription from interviews consumes plenty of time 
since a well-transcribed interview may take between three to six times longer than the time 
needed to record it (David & Sutton, 2004, p. 91).  
There are a number of interview types, ranging from very detailed and structured to 
semi-structured schedules that use a topic-guide, and finally to less structured or unstructured 
interviews. The three main types are structured, unstructured and semi structured interviews. 
The structured interview aims to maintain a high level of repeatability and reliability, while 
the more unstructured interview aims to stress the depth and validity of data gained by 
allowing the interviewees to express their own views (David & Sutton, 2004, p. 87). 
However, semi-structured interviews have the advantages of both of these types, where the 
structure provides a specific list of issues or general questions to be covered rather than 
specific questions, and then there will be freedom to follow up these points. Due to this 
advantage, a semi-structured interview is the most commonly used kind of interview in social 
research (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 163).  
In this research, semi-structured interviews are applied with a list of particular issues 
to be covered as an interview guide. Thus, the interview process is flexible and the 
124 | P a g e  
  
interviewee has a great deal of freedom in how to respond (Bryman, 2012, p. 471). Also, 
open-ended questions are used in order to generate theoretical insights on the research topic 
(David & Sutton, 2004, p. 80). Open-ended questions are specifically chosen to encourage 
participants to offer details and more in-depth answers to increase the depth and validity of 
each interview, as this enables the interviewees to express their personal views. The 
questions focus on the issues found in the case study applications in order to explore the 
participants’ relevant views and experiences. This provides the research with rich data and 
will provide some explanation on the issues. The interviews were a professional 
conversation conducted with the most experts in the field of Islamic finance. 
Accordingly, the purpose was to evaluate the issues found in the empirical chapters. 
Conducting the interview after discussing the cases allows the research to discuss the 
identified practical problems and provides special information about the possible 
solutions. It also highlights the other views among scholars and shows the issues from 
different point of view.  
The research employs content analysis to examine the transcripts of the 
interview responses. The questions were designed in English and received the 
supervisors' editing and comments to ensure they will achieve the research objectives. 
Then, these questions have been translated to Arabic by the researcher since all of the 
candidates' first language is Arabic. For a language-verification purpose, the 
translation stage involves, once needed, a review of the translation by a bilingual 
reviewer. During the interviewing, all interviews were recorded for a validity purpose. 
Then, the recoded interviews were fully transcribed and typed into Word by the 
researcher after each interview has taken place.  
The researcher went through all of the textual data of the transcripts in a 
systematic way and coded the ideas, concepts and opinions. All data are coded from 
very basic codes to categories that reflect broader analytic themes to ensures 
comprehensive analysis to the content. The researcher proceeded from the detailed 
coding, to more generalised coding, which allowed at the final stage to create five 
separate analytical themes to manage the related topics with codes by using general 
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headings. This method used has resulted in some generalisation coding and helped to 
overcome the difficulties to establish generalised coding. It is finally yielded five 
major themes that best captured the critical issues discussed in the semi structured 
interviews. The first theme is the issues related to the guarantee of the securitized asset. 
Six questions were set to discuss the issues related to the guarantee of the assets, 
maintenance, insurance from agency, principle and periodical distribution and to bring 
the different interviewees' views in the aim of understanding the complexity of the 
structure. The second theme is the issues related to ownership which asks three 
questions to provide some details on limited possession, legal possession and the 
incentive fee. The third theme is issues related to the structure and three questions 
were asked to cover when not specifying the maintenance cost, not specifying agency 
costs and not separating transactions. Fourth theme is issues related to regulation 
which asks four questions about the regulation on sukuk prospectus, regulation 
implementing AAOIFI standards, regulation on Sharia board approval and the 
regulation on contradicting Ijma’. Last theme is issues related to the current sukuk 
industry which considers two main questions about issues related to the the importance 
of the current sukuk and issues related to Assessing the current sukuk market.  
 
6.5.1.1 Sampling Strategies   
Qualitative research tends to employ smaller sample sizes than in quantitative 
research. In some high-quality research, data from only a single participant or interviewee is 
studied and analysed in-depth. Although, there is no rule for sample size in qualitative 
research, a common size is between 15 and 30 individuals to be interviewed with the aim of 
identifying patterns across data. However, the sample size can be affected by the research 
aims and purposes, what will be useful for the analysis, what will increase credibility and 
also what can be achieved with the available resources and time (Patton, 2002, p. 244). 
Although statistical characterisation is not the aim, the sampling in qualitative research is 
often purposive. This means interviewees are chosen because they are expected to generate 
useful data for the research. To ensure that the interview sample is credible, one strategy is 
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to include a range of people that cover the main groups who can assist in gathering the 
specified information (Patton, 2002, p. 244).  
The research aims for a purposive sample of 25 experts and participants in the field 
of sukuk. The interviewees are selected to represent the active members and experts in sukuk 
market. One factor which was considered in the selection of interviewees was their education 
and experience have to be related to Islamic banking. The interviewees hold different 
positions in Islamic banks or Islamic universities including members in a number of Sharia 
supervisory boards and AAOIFI institution. This strategy allowed the researcher to receive 
a valued views and opinions related to the discussed issues. The highly engaged members 
were not easy accessible since their office telephone numbers were usually tried with no 
answer. Finding their personal number was one of the research obstacles, snowballing was 
the most effective way to know the targeted contact information (Bryman, 2012, p. 202). At 
the end of each interview the interviewee would be asked to introduce a capable person with 
his personal contact information.  
All of interviewees are male and under Saudi tradition the female researcher would 
find some difficulties to conduct a face to face interview. Thus, the researcher opted for 
telephone interviews as it is more appropriate according to the specified culture. The 
researcher uses an SMS to introduce myself, the aim of my interviewing and asking for their 
suitable time in order to conduct the interview. Mostly, there is no respond to my SMS expect 
4 of the interviewees which raise another obstacle to find who would be interested in taking 
part in the interviews. Here, where the researcher sought some help from friends, relatives 
or even some of the interviewed who have links with the targeted experts. Eventually, 25 
interviewees have been reached; among them was AAOIFI members, scholars who allow 
Sadara and also Zamzam sukuk as they represent the most related experts to current 
discussion. A summary of the respondents' experiences and coding is provided in the 
following Table.  
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Table 6-2 Features of Interviewees 
 C
o
d
e
 
 
C
a
te
g
o
ry
 
 
Location 
 
Position 
S1 
S
h
ar
ia
 
B
o
ar
d
 
Saudi Arabia  Chairman and Member of IFIs’ Sharia Supervisory Boards 
S2  Saudi Arabia  Council of Senior Scholars, Chairman and Member of IFIs’ 
Sharia Supervisory Boards 
S3  Saudi Arabia  Sharia Board Member at Islamic Bank 
S4  Saudi Arabia  Chairman and Member of IFIs’ Sharia Supervisory Boards 
S5 UAE Head of Sharia at Islamic Bank  
S6 Saudi Arabia  Council of Senior Scholars, Sharia Board Member of Islamic 
Bank 
S7 Bahrain Chairman and Member of IFIs’ Sharia Supervisory Boards 
S8 Kuwait Chairman and Member of IFIs’ Sharia Supervisory Boards 
S9 Kuwait Chairman and Member of IFIs’ Sharia Supervisory Boards 
S10 Kuwait Member of Sharia Supervision Panel at Islamic Institution 
S11 Saudi Arabia  Sharia Board Member at Islamic Bank 
S12 Saudi Arabia  General Secretary at AAOIFI 
B1 
S
h
ar
ia
 b
an
k
in
g
 
o
ff
ic
er
 
 
Saudi Arabia  Former Head of Sharia committee at Islamic Bank. 
B2 Saudi Arabia  Head of Sharia committee at Islamic Bank 
B3 Saudi Arabia  Senior Advisor at Islamic Bank  
B4 Saudi Arabia  General Manager of Sharia committee at Islamic Bank 
B5 Saudi Arabia  Secretary of Sharia Board at Islamic Bank 
B6 Saudi Arabia  Senior Advisor at Islamic Bank 
B7 Saudi Arabia  Senior Advisor at Islamic Bank 
B8 Saudi Arabia  Secretary of Sharia Board at Islamic Bank 
C1 
A
ca
d
em
ic
 
Saudi Arabia  Faculty member at Sharia College, Islamic University 
C2 Saudi Arabia  Former Professor of Principles of Jurisprudence at Islamic 
University 
C3 Malaysia Former faculty member at International Islamic University in 
Malaysia, Senior Researcher of ISRA 
C4 Saudi Arabia  Professor of Economics at Islamic University 
C5 Saudi Arabia  Manager of Islamic Financial Product Development Centre 
As the aim was to discuss certain problems and issues in the market of sukuk, a guide 
to topics or general questions was carefully prepared and refined. This process can take a 
long time until it is completely satisfactory in terms of the structure and the validity of the 
questions. The questions are specifically designed as a result of examining the cases studied; 
where all of the critical issues found in the cases have been highlighted and presented to the 
interviewees who may have some useful knowledge and different attitudes. The plan is to 
ask the same questions with the same structure to the targeted interviewees. However, some 
flexibility is offered to allow the interviewee to express personal views and to clearly add a 
higher degree of confidence concerning the answers received since the questions require a 
good deal of thought. Then, comparisons are conducted between the different views related 
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to sukuk issues. This process will enable the researcher to determine the critical issues in the 
market and to establish attitudes towards them.  
6.6 Data Analysis Method  
The most important decisions in qualitative research are made at the stage of data 
analysis. Deciding how to integrate the analysis, with the processing of the data collected, to 
achieve the research objectives is critical (David & Sutton, 2004, p. 195). However, at this 
stage, the researcher can feel that the qualitative data set is very chaotic and confusing. This 
is considered to be one of the difficulties of qualitative research in that it rapidly generates a 
considerable, cumbersome amount of data. Due to the attractiveness of its richness, as well 
as its reliance on prose in the form of interview transcripts or documents, it is difficult to 
find the appropriate analytic path (Bryman, 2012, p. 565). Also, the analysis of quantitative 
data is imposed by an external structure, making the process of analysis more 
straightforward, while the analysis of qualitative data is not fundamentally a technical or 
mechanical matter (Smith, et al., 1991, p. 108). This research is built upon some external 
standards which helps to evaluate the analysis process. For example, using the AAOIFI 
standards enables the research to focus on well accepted standards instead of embarking 
upon juridical discussions. Without clear standards, it is difficult to decide appropriate 
rulings since these are likely to be controversial. Moreover, in the financial area, the research 
attempts to apply Basel Committee categories of risks as a guide to identify the financial 
risks involved. In this regard, some researchers have found more than thirty types of expected 
financial risks. However, by using the Basel classification as an external structure enables 
the research to focus on the most significant types of risks. Undoubtedly, using these external 
structures helps to mitigate the issue of the unlimited generation of information in such a 
quantitative research.   
The qualitative data collection involves the accumulation of great amounts of mostly 
textual material, and an important stage of the analysis process is reducing the volume of 
data through the use of methods of organisation and selection (David & Sutton, 2004, p. 
195). In this research, a number of different analysis methods are required in order to achieve 
the desired results in the case studies. A research methodology may adopt a combination of 
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different methods to achieve specific results, and this is known as triangulation. The choice 
of the combination of methods attempts to give the best insights into sukuk issues, as the 
main aim of using mixed methods is to gain the benefits from all of the methods applied. 
Triangulation is used to seek convergence of meanings from several methods in order to 
validate and enhance the results of the research (Lindlof and Taylor, (2002). It is simply an 
attempt to combine the best of all the available options (David & Sutton, 2004, p. 45).   
6.6.1 Content Analysis  
Content analysis is commonly used as a method to analyse qualitative research data 
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). It is a systematic approach to analysing qualitative data, such as 
that from interviews with key informants and focus groups that can generate considerable 
volumes of information in order to organize it into themes or categories so as to make sense 
of the data. Qualitative content analysis has been defined as: ‘any qualitative data reduction 
and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify 
core consistencies and meanings’ (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p. 2). Commonly, qualitative 
content analysis is used to analyse transcripts of interview in order to model or reveal 
pattern’s in the information gained from interviewees. Content analysis starts with reading 
and then organizing the data in this study, the transcripts of the interview, followed by coding 
the data and placing them into different categories or themes. Coding serves as a method to 
compile, label and organize the data that allows the data to be summarized and synthesized. 
To link data collection with data interpreting, coding becomes the basis for developing an 
effective analysis. Thus, it is generally understood that ‘coding is analysis’ (Treiber, et al., 
2013). 
To be more precise, the research conducted a document content analysis. This 
analysis is done by produces rich descriptions and relevant interpretations of a single 
phenomenon, event, organisation, or programme. It is a systematic procedure for reviewing, 
examining and evaluating documents, of both electronic and printed materials, in such a way 
that empirical knowledge is produced and understanding is developed (Bowen, 2009). The 
analysis of documents is a valid research strategy with significant merits as a method used 
for the purposes of reform and evaluation. Documents are mostly reliable and valid sources 
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of background information in obtaining comprehensive and insightful views of a case. 
However, information in documents usually represents only one perspective and can 
sometimes be incomplete (Bowen, 2009). This research uses documents content analysis 
when analysing the official document of the published prospectuses. Although the 
prospectus documents provide a comprehensive understanding of a specific issuance of 
sukuk, it represents the view of only one party involved in the structure, the issuer. For 
example, the document might not disclose all possible financial risks for marketing purposes. 
Also, the prospectus might avoid mentioning some issues that contradict Sharia rules, which 
means that the analysis offered may be imprecise in some respects.  
The analysis of the prospectuses involved a focused reading with an initial superficial 
examination to find pertinent data and relevant information and then to look across all the 
found data to identify the main themes that summarise sukuk issues (Miles & Huberman, 
2003). By reducing the text to a number of themes, the research was able to focus on 
answering the questions. The discussion of this research is based on the three main questions 
that are related to Sharia compliance, financial risks and agency conflicts. Under Sharia 
analysis, two main themes are identified; (i) the theme of sukuk content is coded according 
to sukuk assets, sukuk ownership, sukuk principal, sukuk return, sukuk tradability and 
sukuk insurance and (ii) the theme of sukuk structure, different concepts are coded inah 
sale structure, wafa sale structure and lease to own structure. Similarly, the second 
category is financial examination which has also two main themes; (i) the theme of observed 
risk mitigation process is coded according the major risks; credit risk, market risk, 
liquidity risk, operational risk and Sharia risk and (ii) the theme of agency issues is coded 
according to moral hazards and adverse selections. In this research, the validity of the current 
content analysis refers to the correspondence of the categories, themes and coding. These 
patterns can be seen in the literature section especially in chapter 2 and 4 where the themes 
are clearly discussed. It has also explicitly appeared in the empirical study as well as in the 
conclusion chapter as the final results are drown under these categories.     
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6.6.2 Critical Analysis  
Deconstruction is a way of interpreting various texts. It is a method of critical 
analysis of literary and philosophical texts. Deconstructive reading has to be done by 
carefully focusing on words and also the context of words in order to discover conflicts 
in texts (Kilduff, 1993). The reading is for breaking down the data into its component 
parts as a standard technique for analysis (Okafor, 2013). The purpose of 
deconstruction is to decouple the component to permit inspection of each in its own 
right. In other disciplines, this method is applied as a device for critical thinking, 
bypassing the possibly misleading picture conveyed by the whole.  It is mainly used to 
prepare the data for other analytic processes such as summarization or manipulation, 
or even abstraction (Baty, 2009). 
This research applies critical analysis in the meaning of deconstructing the available 
materials related to the cases studied. The structures of the cases have been unpacked by 
separating each procedure into their basic elements to see its constituents. This requires 
extra effort to break data down and deconstruct the structures in order to formulate a 
response to the research questions. It is a powerful method for exposing the issues in 
asset-backed sukuk market and then analyse them. 
6.6.3 Secondary Analysis  
Recently, the secondary analysis of qualitative data has attracted more interest and 
discussion, while this type of analysis in quantitative data has been for many years a staple 
of research. Secondary analysis is defined by David and Sutton (2004, p. 25) as ‘any further 
analysis of an existing data set which presents interpretations, conclusions of knowledge 
additional to, or different from, those presented in the first report in the enquiry as a whole 
and its main result’. Furthermore, Hakim (2000, p. 24) defines this type of analysis as ‘any 
re-analysis of data collected by another researcher or organisation, including the analysis of 
datasets collected from a variety of sources to create time series or area-based datasets, with 
qualitative data, secondary analysis is supposed to permit the researcher to mine data where 
new interpretations are possible or that were not studied by the original researchers (Bryman, 
2012, p. 586). David and Sutton (2004, p. 25) further describe secondary analysis as simply 
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a broad term in which data is analysed by someone other than the original investigator. 
Secondary analysis is a feasible way to carry out the analysis of numerous already available 
reports (Hakim, 2000, p. 24). As this approach is considered to be relatively new in 
qualitative research, the current research aims to apply this method using the sukuk 
prospectuses. The prospectus is the best available primary source to the cases. Studying and 
examining the data available in the prospectuses conducted using an inductive textual 
approach. This approach enables the researcher to provide different kinds of analytical 
insights evaluating the cases and generating relevant findings.  
6.6.3.1 Sharia Analysis of the Cases  
This stage involves a number of procedures. First the Sharia problem is defined and 
the particular issue described with support from material in the prospectus. Then, the analysis 
mainly adopts the AAOIFI standards as a benchmark for the sukuk applications in their 
jurisdiction. The AAOIFI have issued a number of guidelines and standards to improve 
transparency, disclosure and governance of the fincial activites, including particular 
standards for sukuk. 
In this study, the selection of AAOIFI standards as a benchmark depends on 
deciding the relevant standards. These relevant standards are chosen according to the 
type of sukuk, the contracts involved, the procedures found in each case. Considering 
only sukuk standards without other related standards in AAOIFI list will not provide an 
actual evaluation. This is because sukuk in the market are structurally sophisticated, as 
they include a number of transactions other than the main contract, such as agency, wa’d, 
and sale contracts. This means that each of these subordinate contracts has to satisfy all 
relevant AAOIFI standards.  
This is supported by standard no. 17 clause 5/1/8/3, which states that ‘the contract 
that forms the basis of the issue must be complete with respect to its elements and 
conditions not including conditions that conflict with its objectives and rules’ (AAOIFI, 
2008).  According to this standard, all requirements of the basis of the sukuk have to be 
fulfilled, which means that this standard refers to other AAOIFI standards related to the 
contract that the sukuk are based on. Each prospectus has to detail the contract that the 
133 | P a g e  
  
sukuk are based on; for example, based on the contracts of musharaka, on ijara and 
must then follow all of its requirements.  For instance, ijara sukuk typically involve four 
contracts that must be processed, agreed on and signed: the sale contract, ijara contract, 
the promise to buy and at final stage. Therefore, evaluating an issuance according to 
sukuk standards only is not sufficient, as a number of examinations have to be conducted 
to create confidence concerning compatibility with Sharia. The assessment is then 
transformed into a percentage score to determine the extent of the application’s 
compliance with the AAOIFI standards. The analytical effort in this research aims to 
improve transparency related to Sharia compatibility since most of the supervisory 
authorities in the market lack knowledge of Islamic finance. 
6.6.3.2 Financial discussion on the Cases  
As indicated, the financial study is guided by the Basel risk types and agency theory. 
Under the standardized framework, the Basel Committee set clear types of risks, as 
illustrated earlier, and we have seen that sukuk structures differ from their conventional bond 
counterparts in terms of their risk exposure. The uniqueness of sukuk carries unique risks for 
different structures, even in regard to common risks.  
Thus, the discussion aims to examine risks involved in the cases examined to find to what 
extent they differ from SBS risks. In addition, the principal/agent relationship will be 
examined to identify the agency roles performed in the applications. In agency risk, the 
unique nature of each application leads to different relationships and different allocation in 
terms of the agency problem. This requires an evaluation based on their specific risks and 
levels of exposure. The research analyses the cases on the basis of these two main criteria.   
6.7 Criteria of the Research  
The most prominent criteria in evaluating social research can be summarized in four 
points. These are construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. These 
four design tests are well known in quantitative approaches. Most of researchers as Bryman 
(2012) and Morse (1994) consider these criteria for quantitative study only such. However, 
it is uncertain to what extent case study research can fulfil these criteria. The following 
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discussion attempts to explore how to achieve higher degrees of the four criteria in 
qualitative research and specifically in case study research.  
As considered by Bryman (2012) validity is in many ways the most important criteria 
in assessing the quality of research. The validity of a qualitative study occurs through the 
audit such as examining the interpretations, findings and also recommendations to assure the 
integrity of the drawn conclusions generated (Bryman 2012, p. 47). However, in case study 
research construct validity is related to the establishment of an operational measure for the 
theoretical concepts involved. Case study research can satisfy this criterion if the study’s 
general procedures and methods are defined explicitly in detail and if the study presents a 
complete picture of the cases including background information (Riege, 2003).  
Various techniques can improve construct validity in case study research. Perakyla 
(1997) suggests that, during data collection, it is recommended to use multiple sources of 
evidence. For instance, documents, interview transcripts, reports and others can protect the 
study against bias. A second technique mentioned by Griggs (1987) is during the data 
collection stage to provide a chain of evidence used in the study with sufficient citations of 
specific sources. For example, during field trips, verbatim interview transcripts along with 
the notes of observations can be used. A further technique is considered by Yen (2003) 
where, during the writing stage, the drafts of case study reports or interviews are reviewed 
by research assistants or other key informants as part of the data analysis; then, any unclear 
aspects will be changed.  
Internal validity refers generally to credibility. It is commonly referred to in 
quantitative research as the establishment of cause and effect relationships and is concerned 
with the question of whether or not a conclusion or finding includes a causal relationship 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 47). Case study research aims to find generative mechanisms that provide 
confidence in the inferences made about real life experiences. That is, the researcher does 
not only place emphasis on the major patterns of differences and similarities in the case 
studies, but also attempts to determine what components are important for the patterns 
studied and what mechanisms generated them. The questions concerned in case study 
research can involve; how meaningful and rich the descriptions provided are, and if the 
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findings and results are internally coherent as well as whether or not the concepts used in the 
research are systematically related (Riege, 2003).  
A number of techniques can be applied in order to increase the internal validity of 
the research. One important tool described by David and Sutton (2004, p. 28) that during the 
data collections an in-depth interview and a well of observation help the research to achieve 
higher internal validity. Miles and Huberman (2003) suggest that, during the data analysis 
stage, the use of cross‐nation or cross‐case pattern matching within cases allows for greater 
internal validity. Also, during data analysis, the display of diagrams and illustrations can 
help in explaining of the research. Yen (2003) suggests that emphasis during the data analysis 
stage should be on the internal coherence of the findings. This can be achieved through cross‐
checking the results.  
External validity refers to generalizability, and is mainly concerned with the specific 
findings of research being applied beyond the direct unit of analysis to a general picture. For 
example, in quantitative research applying surveys based on statistical findings helps to 
structure an externally valid research, and thus the main question will be whether or not the 
results can be generalized beyond the specific context (Bryman, 2012, p. 47). Case study 
research achieves this through the analytical generation that can result in analytical findings 
which can be generalized to some broader theory. A test of this criterion in case study 
research is whether or not the findings include enough thick descriptions for the reader to 
assess the potential appropriateness of transferability to their own settings (Riege, 2003).  
To increase external validity, there are a number of techniques that can be used. 
Marshall and Rossman (1989) suggest that, during the research design stage, the definition 
of the boundaries and scope of the study can assist in achieving reasonable analytical 
generalizations instead of statistical generalizations for as in quantitative research. Then, 
during the analysis, contributions will clearly be outlined and generalized within the 
boundaries and scope of the research, and not to larger cases or populations (Yen, 2003). 
Also, David and Sutton (2004, p. 28) perceive external validity as not only based on gaining 
as large number of interviewees, respondents or cases as possible, but where a well-chosen 
and relatively small sample can be far more useful than a larger one with a badly chosen 
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sample. Simply, a well-chosen sample seeks to mirror reality and thus increase external 
validity.  
Finally, reliability refers to dependability and is defined in qualitative research as if 
the procedures and operations of the study enquiry can be repeated by other investigators to 
reach similar results or findings (Riege, 2003). The basic question is whether or not the 
findings of a study are repeatable (Bryman, 2012, p. 46). This criterion is important because 
quantitative researchers are often interested in developing generalizable laws, and so seek to 
minimize the influence of the researcher which is a source of error or bias. This means that 
reliability may not been appropriate criterion for judging qualitative work or procedures. In 
case study research, problems also arise with this criterion since cases are not as static as 
measurements applied in quantitative research and thus, findings may differ. In fact, data 
from cases and events can vary and may not form one consistent picture (Riege, 2003). 
However, if we think of reliability more broadly as being about the trustworthiness or 
dependability of methods of data collection and analysis, then some measure of reliability 
will be applicable (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 279).  
A number of techniques have been suggested to achieve reliability in its broad sense. 
LeCompte and Goetz (1982) suggest that giving full account of ideas and theories during 
each stage of the research can help in achieving better reliability. In the research design stage, 
Yen (2003) places extra emphasis on the assurance of congruence between the features of 
the study design and the research issues in order to ensure reliability. The use of a structured 
or semi‐structured case study protocol has also been suggested by Yen (2003). Moreover, 
during the end of the data collection stage, Lincoln and Guba (1985) recommend the 
development of a case study database in order to provide a typical method of documenting 
and organizing the mass of data collected. Also, during data collection, Nair and Riege 
(1995) recommended that for data is recorded mechanically, for instance using video or 
audio taping. The current research should be incorporated the following criteria to enhance 
the quality of the chosen case study design. This helps the research to be more rigorous and 
reliable. Table 6-2 below shows the platform for the techniques applied in this research.    
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Table 6-3 Different Criteria for Case Study Research 
Criteria Stage  Technique Used  Research Process of the 
Techniques  
Construct 
Validity 
During data 
collection  
Sources of evidence   In-depth interviews external reports, external 
Sharia standards (AAOIFI).  
 
Internal 
Validity 
During data 
collection  
In depth interviewing  In-depth interviews to reveal the interviewee's 
views on asset-backed issues.  
During data 
analysis  
Display of diagrams and  
illustrations  
  
Evaluation  
Diagrams and tables where appropriate.  
  
Analysis does not rely on comparison only, 
but also evaluates the results.  
 
External 
Validity 
 
During design  Definition of the 
boundaries and scope of  
the study  
Defining the boundaries and scope of the 
study, then the findings can be generalized 
within this scope.  
During data 
collection  
Well-chosen sample  Purposive sampling of experts in the field of 
sukuk  
Reliability During data 
collection  
Recording data 
mechanically   
Recording all interviews conducted.  
This research aims to increase construct validity by using the following techniques: 
the explanation of the methods applied and the procedures used, including the details of the 
research design, approaches and methods. In addition, each case study has been introduced 
with background information relevant to the case’s circumstance, the issuer and value. Also, 
the study based on several primary sources such as in depth interview, external reports and 
external Sharia standard (AAOIFI). For internal validity, this research examines a number 
of concepts related to the field of sukuk in order to achieve systematic results. During data 
collection, in-depth interviews are used to discover individual views on the issues in the 
sukuk market. The interviews involve intensive individual conversation with only 25 
respondents, exploring their perspectives on sukuk issues. In addition, the research, 
diagrams, tables, charts and illustrations are provided where appropriate. The analysis does 
not rely on comparison method only, but goes further to evaluate the results from different 
angles.   
To increase external validity, the analysis in this research is mainly based on common 
issues among asset-based sukuk. The research findings involve detailed descriptions in order 
to the feature of transferability. The scope of the study has also been determined only 
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considering sukuk based on assets located in Saudi Arabia. It is important to note that the 
cases are carefully chosen to reflect different structures of sukuk related to assets. In addition, 
the choice of interviewees to be only these highly pertinent to Islamic banking is also 
conducted. For reliability purpose, some of this research’s findings would be repeatable, if 
the same procedures were used. Determining the level of Sharia compatibility in each case 
is repeatable as long as the same standards and operations are applied. The researcher also 
recorded all the interviews to generate more credible findings for higher reliability.   
6.8 Summary  
The main aim of this chapter was to describe the methodology used in the current 
research. The chapter demonstrates the methodology determined for all of the research 
stages. The appropriate design, approach, methods of data collection and analysis were 
carefully selected. The study has been formulated as case study research using an inductive 
approach employing qualitative methods. Data are treated through secondary, content and 
document analysis. The analysis is conducted within the scope of the study and the 
conclusion is drawn in the light of the research questions in order to achieve the research 
objectives. The case study design allows the researcher to identify the current problems of 
asset-backed applications in practice and then to measure aspects of them in evaluation. 
Qualitative data collection methods were chosen as the most appropriate tools for this 
research. The cases of sukuk would build a data source to conduct the interview with Sharia 
scholars. Importantly, the chapter introduces the specific criteria used to assess case study 
research and highlights how the current study fulfils these criteria. Construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity and reliability are taken into account to ensure the rigour 
of the research.  
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Chapter 7: Saudi Electricity Company Sukuk  
 
7.1 Introduction  
The Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) was instituted in April 2000 as a Saudi Joint 
Stock Company with a paid principal of SAR 33.7 billion. The SEC is a public company that 
is 74% owned by the Saudi government and 7% by Saudi Aramco, resulting in 81% 
government ownership.  In Saudi Arabia, the SEC is a dominant vertically integrated utility 
since it serves over 7.1 million customers. The company possesses 46 main plants with a 
total capacity of 58,462 megawatts. This capacity represents a considerable majority of 
Saudi’s entire generating capacity. The SEC serves the public with power generation, 
distribution, transmission and customer services, either by the company itself or by its 
subsidiaries spread across the Kingdom (SABC, 2012).   
During the sukuk issuance, SEC achieved a rating of A1/AA-/AA- (all Stable) by 
Moodys/S&P/Fitch (Deutsche Bank, 2012). The SEC sukuk credit worthiness and strength 
was significantly improved and underpinned by an over-collateralized reserve. The SEC to 
date has ended up with six series of outstanding sukuk worth $6,250,000,000. Two of the 
sukuk issued were in the local market in 2009 and 2010 and four in the global market; two 
series in 2012 and two other series in 2013 (SEC 2013, p.2). The discussion on this chapter 
focuses on the first global issuance in 2012. This discussion provides an analysis concerning 
Sharia and financial issues.    
7.2 SEC Sukuk in 2012  
On 3rd April 2012, the SEC successfully closed the issuing of a dual-tranche sukuk 
for $1.75 billion. This issuance is the world’s first international 30-year sukuk that has been 
divided into $500 million with 5 years to maturity (due 2017) and $1.25 billion with 10 years 
to maturity. These were managed by HSBC and Deutsche Bank to introduce the inaugural 
international sukuk by the SEC. They were sold to US investors and the issuance was well-
received and produced payments from over 440 investors in excess of $17.5bn (Deutsche 
Bank, 2012). The success can partially explain by to the use of the ijara structure being more 
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recognized by international investors. The same structure was also applied in April 2014 for 
the Saudi Electric Company’s issuance of $1.5 billion due in 2024 and $1 billion due in 2044 
(Latham & Watkins, 2015).  
As the SEC has a number of different issuances, there is a concern related to the 
structure if these issuances have the same or different SPVs? In other words, are these 
structures based on a one-off (stand alone) structure or a multi-seller structure? To determine 
the type of the 2012 SEC sukuk in respect of the type of SPV and structure, requires a general 
look at all of the SEC issuances. According to the offering circular (OC) for the 2012 
issuance, the SPV named the ‘Saudi Electricity Global Sukuk Company’ is an exempted firm 
with restricted liability established on 20 February 2012 in accordance with the Companies 
Law. The company has been established solely in order to participate in the transactions 
required for the issuance. This means that there is no relationship between this SPV and the 
two previous local issuances in 2009 and 2010. According to the OC for the 2013 issuance, 
the SEC established a single distribution company to act as SPV and named it the ‘Saudi 
Electricity Global Sukuk Company 2’ (p.66). Thus, the 2012 SEC sukuk uses a stand alone 
structure with an independent SPV especially invented for this specific issuance. Despite 
this, the transaction expenses will be relatively higher, and this will increase the levels of 
protection, independence and flexibility to customize securitization in order to meet 
investors’ desires.   
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7.3 Structure of 2012 Sukuk  
Figure 7-1 SEC Sukuk Structure 
  
Source: SEC Sukuk Prospectus.  
The structure of the first international Saudi sukuk was based on ijara as follows. The 
SEC established an SPV named the ‘Saudi Electricity Global Sukuk Company’. This was the 
issuer of the international sukuk and also the trustee for and on behalf of the investors. The 
cash received from investors was used to buy a rent-generating asset from the SEC. Once 
the SPV possessed the asset, it was leased back to the SEC; the SEC become the lessee and 
the SPV became the lessor for a period corresponding to the duration of the sukuk, which is 
for a 5-year term in respect of the 2017 Sukuk and a 10year term in respect of the 2022 Sukuk.   
In both Series, the SEC will pay rent to the SPV on a semi-annual basis pursuant to 
the relevant ijara Agreement that is designed to finance the periodic distributional amounts 
payable by the SPV. The SEC undertook the agreement of being the servicing agent of the 
issuance to be liable for maintaining and insuring the ijara assets, concerning both series, 
paying taxes and performing all structural repairs and major maintenance. Lastly, according 
to a binding promise, the SEC at maturity date will purchase the invested asset at an agreed 
price which will then be used for the repayment of the principal to the investors.   
SEC dual tranche sukuk structures are summarized in the following Tables 7-1 and 7-2. 
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Table 7-1 SEC First Tranche 
Title  SEC Sukuk  
SPV   Saudi Electricity Global  
Structure Type   Ijara  
Issue Size   $500,000,000  
Issue Date   3-Apr-12  
Maturity Date   3-Apr-17  
Return   2.665  
Fix or Variable   Fixed return  
Return Frequency  Semi annual  
Pricing   163.bp  
Book Runners   Deutsche Bank , HSBC  
Listing   London stock Exchange  
ISIN RegS  XS0764883806  
  
Table 7-2 SEC Second Tranche 
Title  SEC Sukuk  
SPV   Saudi Electricity Global  
Structure Type   Ijara  
Issue Size   $1,250,000,000  
Issue Date   3-Apr-12  
Maturity Date   3-Apr-22  
Return   4.211  
Fix or Variable   Fixed  
Return Frequency  Semi Annual  
Pricing  200.8 bp  
Book Runners   Deutsche Bank , HSBC  
Listing   London stock Exchange  
ISIN RegS  XS00767862914  
Accordingly, the SEC sukuk contains a number of documents with different 
obligations, as analysed in Table 7-3.   
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Table 7-3 SEC Sukuk Documents 
Document  Parties  Summary/ Purpose  
Sale and  
Purchase  
Agreement  
SEC   
(as a Seller) and  
SPV  
(as a Buyer)  
From the SEC’s perspective, this is the document under 
which it receives the liquidity.  
From the SPV’s perspective (on behalf of the 
Investors), this document provides the ownership of 
revenue-producing assets (ijara assets).  
Ijara  
Agreement  
SEC (as a  
Lessee) and  
SPV (as a  
Lessor)  
From the SEC’s perspective, this document gives it the 
possession and use of the Assets and thus its principal 
project continues without any interruption. From the 
Trustee’s perspective, this document generates a return 
from the received Asset.  
Service  
Agency  
Agreement  
SEC   
(as a Servicing  
Agent) and  
SPV (as a Lessor  
/Principal)  
From the Trustee’s perspective, this is the document 
that allows the Trustee to pass the liability for the 
Assets’ repairs, major maintenance, insurance and 
paying taxes back to the SEC.  
Purchase  
Undertaking  
(Wa’d)  
Granted by the  
SEC (as an  
Obligor) in favour 
of the  
Trustee  
From the Trustee’s perspective, this is the document 
that allows the Trustee to sell the Assets back to SEC in 
the event of default or at the maturity date. In return, the 
SEC is required to pay all outstanding payments 
(through an Exercise Price) and then the Trustee will 
pay the sukuk-holders.  
Sale  
Undertaking  
(Wa’d)  
Granted by 
Trustee in favour 
of the SEC (as an  
Obligor)  
From the SEC’s perspective, this is the document that 
allows it to buy the Assets back from the Trustee in 
certain situation.  
Substitution 
Undertaking 
(Wa’d) 
Granted by 
Trustee in favour 
of the SEC (as an  
Obligor) 
From the SEC’s perspective, this is the document that 
allows it to substitute the Assets that might be needed 
for selling or disposal with other assets which have the 
same value or greater. 
7.4 SEC Sukuk Rating  
The SEC sukuk have been rated as A1 by Moody’s, AA- by S&P and AA- by Fitch. 
Thus, the SEC sukuk have an adequate safety rating for the payment of financial obligations. 
Moody explained that ‘the current ratings assume that SEC's low risk business profile, 
supported by its fully integrated operations, will be maintained’ (Moody, 2012). However, 
this has raised concerns about their Sharia compliance. Generally, these three agencies do 
not comment on the transaction's compliance with Sharia law, as supported by S&P 
statement when discussing the rating of SEC sukuk: ‘we have not evaluated whether the trust 
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certificates are Sharia-compliant’ (Standard & Poor's, 2014). The issue raised is that the 
received ratings are based only on the issuer’s creditworthiness without any evaluation of 
the assets involved. This may raise the issue of fictitious assets.   
The SEC as a company has received a rating of A1 by Moody’s, AA- by S&P and 
AA- by Fitch, which reflect the exact ratings received by the current issuance. Moody 
expressed that clearly, ‘the rating agency's assignment of a provisional (P) A1 rating to the 
sukuk is in line with SEC's long-term issuer’ (Moody, 2012). Also, the Standard & Poor 
agency stated that the rating is based on the SEC’s creditworthiness: ‘the ratings solely 
represent our opinion about the likelihood of full and timely repayment of the trust 
certificates issued under the program’ (Standard & Poor's, 2014).  However, the principle 
basis of the rating is not in line with Sharia, as it should be based on the quality of the assets 
to show a real link with them assets. Thus, according to Sharia, the rating assessment of 
sukuk should be dependent on the performance of the asset in generating the cash to meet 
the timely obligations. In this respect, the principle basis and the procedure of the SECs, 
international ratings are not in line with the financial principles of Sharia.   
However, from a financial perspective, as the SEC aimed to gain access to 
international debt capital markets, there is no doubt that receiving such ratings or the sukuk 
allowed the issuance to be advertised in the international market. This SEC sukuk is its first 
USD-denominated sukuk after a number of years with only local currency denominated 
sukuk (Standard & Poor's, 2014). However, these sukuk were successfully concluded after a 
comprehensive roadshow covering key centres in Europe, Asia and the Middle East 
(Deutsche Bank, 2012). Based on the targeted investors, who are mostly less sensitive to 
Sharia compliance, receiving an investment grade from the three main rating agencies has a 
positive effect on the success of the issuance. Thus, this success has assisted in 
internationalizing the market for Saudi sukuk issuances.  
7.5 Sharia Perspective Analysis  
This analysis is divided into two main categories of issues related to analysing the 
content of the SEC sukuk, and issues related to analysing the structure. Each category is 
discussed through their main points; first demonstrating the situation with the SEC sukuk, 
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then supporting the demonstration with a statement from the OC, and finally presenting the 
Sharia assessment.   
7.5.1 Critical Analysis of the Content  
 I. SEC Sukuk Assets  
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
The assets of SEC are the 
relevant power generation 
assets which were 
available prior to the 
sukuk issuance.  
‘….to purchase from SEC 
all of the Seller’s rights, 
title, interests, benefits 
and other entitlements in 
and to the relevant power 
generation assets’ (p. 24). 
Standard No. 9, clause 3/1, ‘for 
the validity of an ijara contract 
concerning a specified asset, the 
lease contract should be preceded 
by acquisition of either the asset 
to be leased or the usufruct of that 
asset’.  
The available assets in this structure meet the Sharia requirements and show the first 
type of difference from traditional bonds. This is because these power generation assets were 
owned by the SEC prior to the contract and are identified in the contract. All conditions 
related to the assets in an ijara contract are achieved in this situation. However, there is a 
question raised that SEC has issued 6 series of sukuk, while in Sharia the same assets cannot 
be used for more than one sukuk investment, and thus care must be taken to ensure that 
different series of SEC sukuk have used different tangible underlying assets. In fact, all other 
local sukuk are based on istithmar sukuk, whereas the currently discussed issuance was the 
company’s first issuance that is based on ijara.  Istithmar sukuk give the sukuk-holders the 
right to undertake connection services and levy connection charges for specific years and 
specific sukuk assets. However, the invested assets in the 2012 issuance are entirely different 
which represent the beneficial ownership of the power generation assets. Thus, the SEC 
sukuk assets belong to two different categories. The 2012 SEC sukuk represent the ownership 
in tangible assets; whereas the other local SEC sukuk represent the usufruct or the services.  
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II. SEC Sukuk Ownership  
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
Sukuk transactions transfer only the 
beneficial ownership of the assets 
without the ownership of the real 
assets.  This is because the invested 
assets are the public power 
generation of electricity and the 
SEC does want to lose the 
possession and use of the assets in 
order for its principal project to 
continue without any interruption.   
‘Each certificate 
evidences an 
undivided beneficial 
ownership interest of 
the certificate holders 
in the trust assets in 
respect of the relevant 
series’ (p.28).   
  
Standard No. 9, clause  
3/1, ‘for the validity of an 
ijara contract concerning a 
specified asset, the lease 
contract should be 
preceded by acquisition of 
either the asset to be leased 
or the usufruct of that 
asset’.  
In sukuk, the investors have to become the legal owners of the assets, whether they 
are tangibles, usufructs or services, rather than being only nominal holders. This is clearly 
mentioned by the AAOIFI in Standard No. 18, clause 3/4, for a valid ownership, ‘legal 
possession includes the registration of a mortgage of immovable … that is valid under the 
law’. However, the SEC actually intended to legally maintain the assets and then the sukuk 
transactions have been designed to that effect. Therefore, instead of offering real ownership, 
the SEC offers only the right of returns to the investors. Therefore, two Sharia issues arised 
with the ownership of the SEC sukuk as follows. The first is that only beneficial ownership 
is provided to the investors. It is essential on the basis of the ijara contract that it represents 
the real ownership of the leased assets rather than only the right to receive the rent. According 
to real ownership, investors have to jointly bear the risks related to the power generation 
assets. For instance, in the case of the total loss of the assets, each investor will bear the loss 
according to his extent of ownership in order to satisfy Sharia principles such as ‘no reward 
without risk’ and ‘any benefit must be accompanied with liability’.  
The second issue raised is whether or not SEC transfers the possession of the power 
generation assets from its balance sheet to the investors? The criteria for testing whether or 
not the ownership has been legally transferred is that if the SEC investors cannot resell or 
pledge the underlying assets, then the issuer is the controller. In that case, the whole 
arrangement would be a financing arrangement and merely a debt rather than a true sale of 
an asset. This means that if the investors are able to redeem the underlying assets in the event 
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of default or the bankruptcy of the project, then the transformation has been properly 
transferred. However, it has been stated in the OC that ‘the certificates are limited recourse 
obligations and investors may not be able to seek full recourse for failure to make payments 
due on the certificates’. Therefore, such an ownership of the SEC sukuk is not real under the 
legal and Sharia perspectives. This right of disposal is a key issue that has received the 
attention of Sharia scholars. SEC must certify the transfer of ownership of the invested assets 
in its sukuk books to satisfy the Sharia requirements.  
III. SEC Sukuk Principal   
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
According to the purchase 
undertaking, on 3rd of April 
2017 in respect of the 2017 
sukuk and 3rd of April 2022 in 
respect of the 2022 sukuk, SEC 
will purchase sukuk from the 
Trustee on behalf of the 
investors at a nominal price 
which is pre-determined plus 
any related extra amount.  
The statement under 
undertaking that ‘the 
exercise price will be the 
aggregate of; (i) the 
outstanding face amount 
of the Certificates; (ii) any 
accrued but unpaid 
Periodic Distribution 
Amount … relating to 
such certificates’ (p.27).  
In  clause  528,  it  is 
permissible for a lessee in 
a sukuk ijara to undertake 
to purchase the leased 
assets when the sukuk are 
extinguished for its 
nominal value, provided 
he (lessee) is not also a 
partner, mudharib, or 
investment agent.  
The scenario of leasing is different from other transactions, whereby it is permissible for 
the issuer, as a lessee, to undertake the purchase of the leased assets for its nominal value, 
provided that the lessee is not a partner, mudharib, or investment agent. The concern here is that 
the SEC is the investment agent pursuant to the service agency agreement. According to 
AAOIFI standards, the purchase undertakings under ijara sukuk can be calculated by 
reference to the market value of the underlying assets. Thus, it is not permissible for the SEC 
to undertake the purchase of ijara assets at face value on the maturity dates. In addition, it is 
important to note that investors, according to Sharia also, have to bear the risk of the total 
loss of the asset. This means that, if the asset is destroyed in any circumstances, the SEC will 
                                                   
28 Based on the AAOIFI pronouncement on sukuk, 13 and 14 February, 2008.  
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not be able to buy the assets whether at a nominal or market price. Thus, investors in SEC 
sukuk have to face the risk of capital loss in some circumstances.  
IV. SEC Sukuk Return   
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
SEC sukuk investors are 
paid twice a year with a 
fixed return of 2.665% 
in respect of the 2017 
sukuk and 4.211% in 
respect of the 2022 
sukuk.   
Periodic distribution payable semi-
annually, on the third day of each 
April and October in each year … 
calculated at the rate of (i) in the 
case of the 2017 Certificates, 
2.665% per annum on the 
outstanding face amount of the 
2017 Certificates …, and (ii) in the 
case of the 2022 Certificates, 
4.211% per annum on the 
outstanding face amount of the 
2022 Certificates (p.27). 
Standard No. 9, clause 
5/2/1, ‘the rental must be 
specified, either as a lump 
sum covering the duration 
of the ijara contract, or by 
instalments for parts of the 
duration. It may also be for 
a fixed or variable 
amount’.  
From the Sharia perspective, the lease contract in the SEC sukuk has created a 
financial obligation to pay the rental to the investors according to Standard No. 9, clause 
5/2/2, ‘the rental is made obligatory by the contract’. The SEC (as a lessee) has to make 
rental payments at regular intervals to the trustee (as a lessor) that must be specified in such 
a way as to prevent any possible dispute. Therefore, the SEC has to guarantee paying an 
obligation to the investors, who legally have the right to receive the rent, and it will be 
calculated by reference to a fixed rate.  
However, if the net income generated from the assets is higher than the periodic 
payment to be made, access will be retained by the trustee as an incentive fee for the positive 
behaviour of management according to the statement in the prospectus of ‘payment of the 
residual amount (if any) to SEC as an incentive payment’ (2012, p.32). On the other hand, 
the structure does not show any guarantee of the rental payment from a third party. This 
means that given any inability of the SEC to pay the rental, then investors may face some 
loss of their return according to the statement in the OC that ‘any such failure may result in 
a loss of revenue and increased costs and accordingly may have a material adverse effect on 
SEC’s reputation, business, financial condition, results of operations and affect its ability to 
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satisfy its obligations to make the relevant payments under the Transaction Documents to 
which it is a party in order for the Issuer to pay amounts due on the Certificates’.   
 V. SEC Sukuk Maintenance   
Situation   Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
According to the ijara 
agreement, SEC bears the 
ordinary costs of maintenance 
and repair required for the 
regular usage of the Assets.  
According to the servicing 
agent agreement, the major 
maintenance and repair of the 
assets are transferred to SEC. 
Also, under the liabilities of 
ijara sukuk, it has been agreed 
in this sukuk that the lessee 
(SEC) will bear all the risks 
related to the total loss of the 
leased assets.  
‘The Lessee shall, at its own cost 
and expense, be responsible for 
the performance of all ordinary 
maintenance and repair required 
for the ijara Assets …. SEC (in 
its capacity as servicing agent) 
will be responsible for insuring 
the ijara assets relating to each 
Series, performing all major 
maintenance and structural 
repairs. Under the ijara 
Agreement, the lessee bears the 
entire risk of loss of or damage 
to the ijara assets…’ (p.115).  
Standard No. 9, 
clause 5/1/7, ‘the 
lessor may not 
stipulate that the 
lessee will undertake 
the major 
maintenance of the 
asset that is required 
to keep it in the 
condition necessary 
to provide the 
contractual benefits 
under the lease’.  
In this structure, the cost of ordinary maintenance, major maintenance and total loss 
are all borne by the SEC, while according to the AAOIFI only ordinary maintenance can be 
borne by the lessee. It is strictly forbidden to transfer the assets’ liabilities to the lessee; 
however, transferring these liabilities through a separate agency agreement will not change 
the Sharia rules. As the SEC ijara contract includes a statement that the lessee, in capacity 
of agency, will bear all liabilities related to the leased assets, this makes the contract of ijara 
invalid according to the agreement among all four main schools of Islamic jurisprudence. 
However, the SEC sukuk, under the servicing agency agreement, can continue to service the 
leased assets and perform the major maintenance, while the expenditures have to be 
reimbursed by the trustee.  
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VI. SEC Sukuk Tradability  
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
The  SEC  sukuk  represent 
undivided beneficial ownership of 
the available power generation 
assets. Currently, SEC sukuk are 
traded in the secondary market in the 
London Stock Exchange under the 
name ‘Saudi Electricity Global 
Sukuk Company 2.655% Certs  
03/04/17 USD’.  
Application has been 
made to the London 
Stock Exchange plc. 
for the Certificates to 
be admitted to trading 
on the London Stock 
Exchange plc.’s 
regulated market  
(p.32).  
Clause 1 29 , Sukuk, to be 
tradable, must be owned 
by sukuk-holders, with all 
rights and obligations of 
ownership, in real assets, 
whether tangible, 
usufructs or services, 
capable of being owned 
and sold legally.   
According to Sharia, the assets must be tangible rather than a cash flow. If sukuk 
represents only the right to the cash flow, this may raise concerns over being in debt. The 
AAOIFI announcement emphasizes the ownership of sukuk assets, and the actual ownership 
of the assets is a pre-requisite for sukuk trading. It is clearly stated that ‘sukuk, to be tradable, 
must be owned by sukuk-holders’. The ownership includes all rights and obligations in real 
assets, whether tangible, usufructs or services. However, the SEC sukuk represents beneficial 
ownership of available assets and thus the trading of these sukuk will not show any 
indebtedness and would be permissible accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                   
29 Based on the AAOIFI pronouncement on sukuk, 13 and 14 February, 2008.  
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VII. SEC Sukuk Insurance  
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
The SEC as a vital company in the 
Kingdom of Saudi maintains 
comprehensive insurance that 
covers the damage and the loss of 
its assets including sub-stations 
and power plants. Thus, in the 
case of the total loss of the 
underlying assets of the SEC 
sukuk, the SEC will ensure that all 
insurance proceeds are paid to the 
sukuk-holders. However, if the 
insurance company was unable to 
cover all the payments required, 
then the SEC undertakes to cover 
such a shortage.  
‘The servicing agent is 
responsible for 
ensuring that the ijara 
assets relating to each 
series …. Each 
servicing agency 
agreement provides 
that if the insurance 
proceeds …. are less 
than the full 
reinstatement value of 
the relevant insured 
relevant ijara Assets 
…, the servicing agent 
undertakes to pay any 
shortfall amount’ 
(p.29).  
Standard No.9, clause 
5/1/11, ‘it is permissible 
for the issuer or the 
certificate holders to 
adopt permissible 
methods of managing 
risk… such as 
establishing an Islamic 
insurance fund with 
contributions  of  
certificate holders, or by 
participating in Insurance 
(takaful)’.  
The first concern is the type of insurance, where the traditional form of insurance is 
not permitted under Sharia. This is because Sharia considers such a deal to lie under the 
prohibition of substantial gharar. In addition, the coverage of any shortage from the 
insurance by the SEC is not permitted and is considered one of the major issues related to 
Sharia compliance. This results in the SEC guaranteeing the principal for the investors, 
which renders the transaction merely a loan rather than a Sharia-compliant instrument.   
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7.5.2 Analysing the Structure 
 I. Inah Sale Structure  
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
The SEC sold only the 
beneficial ownership 
of the power 
generation assets to the 
investors. Then, 
investors sold the 
owned beneficial 
ownership to the SEC 
on a deferred payment 
basis at cost plus the 
received return.   
SEC will sell to the trustee 
pursuant to the purchase 
agreement in respect of each 
series the relevant ijara assets  
… SEC will lease from the 
trustee the relevant ijara  
assets for a five-year term in 
respect of the 2017  
Certificates and a ten-year 
term in respect of the 2022 
Certificates (p.26).  
Standard No.9, clause 8/5: ‘if 
the leased asset was purchased 
from the lessee before it was 
leased back to the lessee on the 
basis of ijara muntahia 
bittamleek, a reasonable period 
of time, between the lease 
contract and the time of the sale 
of the asset to the lessee, must 
have expired, to avoid the 
contract of inah.   
In the SEC sukuk, the issue of an inah sale may exist where the sale of an asset is 
followed by a buy-back at an increased price. The practice of inah sale purchases is not 
accepted by the majority of scholars and is also contrary to international Sharia standards 
such as those for the AAOIFI and the International Fiqh Academy. Inah sale has been 
regarded as a disguised loan with interest (riba). However, the AAOIFI avoid considering 
the current issuance as an inah sale.  The reason for this is that an inah sale does not exist if 
the assets sold are repurchased after a period of time that can cause a change of the assets’ 
condition and price. In SEC sukuk the usufruct remains in the investors’ possession for 5 and 
10 years which is long enough to expect changes in the power generation assets. Therefore, 
the SEC under the ijara basis avoids the issue of an inah sale.   
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II. Wafa Sale Structure  
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
SEC sells its power 
generation to the 
investors with the 
undertaking from both 
parties to pay back the 
assets’ nominal price 
and to receive the 
power generation 
assets through purchase 
and sale undertakings.   
Redemption of the Certificates; 
pursuant to the purchase 
undertaking in respect of each 
Series, the Trustee … requires 
the SEC to purchase all of its 
rights, title, interests, benefits 
and other entitlements in and to 
the relevant ijara assets. 
Pursuant to the Sale  
Undertaking in respect of each 
Series, the SEC requires the 
trustee to sell to the SEC all of 
its rights, title, interests, benefits 
and other entitlements in and to 
the relevant ijara Assets (p.25).   
Standard No.9, clause 8/2: 
A promise to transfer the 
ownership by way of one 
of the methods is a binding 
promise by the lessor. 
However, a binding 
promise is binding on one 
party only, while the other 
party must have the option 
not to proceed. This is to 
avoid a bilateral promise 
by the two parties which is 
prohibited in Sharia 
because it amounts in 
essence to a contract.  
In the SEC sukuk, the sale of wafa can be noticed in the following features. The investors 
benefit from the assets bought through obtaining regular rental payments. Secondly, in spite 
of being owners, investors will not be responsible for the assets and for any damage caused. 
Finally, the bilateral promise involved in the structure turns out to be a clear version of a 
wafa sale. In fact, according to these features, the relationship between the SEC and investors 
becomes closer to a lender and borrower relationship rather than lessee and lessor. The loan 
here is the capital received by the SEC with the benefit for the investors of receiving a fixed 
return of rental payment. To avoid the wafa sale involved in the SEC sukuk, a binding 
promise could be provided from only one party to avoid the essence of the wafa structure.   
However, an objection is raised in the study by Al-Marshadi (2013) that such sukuk are 
not wafa sales. This is because the buyers (investors) can sell the right of ownership to a 
third party through trading the SEC sukuk in the secondary market without referring to the 
seller (the SEC). The possible transfer of ownership to a third party is considered as a 
permissible way to avoid a wafa sale. This objection can be accepted only if the third party 
will not have any obligation to the main issuer (the SEC). Trading the SEC sukuk when third 
parties are involved will not result in any changes in the investors’ obligations in returning 
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the assets at their par value. According to the current case, a third party is only a substitution 
of the previous investor and will act exactly as the previous party did without any minor 
changes. Indeed, the claimed third party included is a substitution party rather than an 
independent third party. As this is the case, even if all investors are changed in the secondary 
market, this will have no effect on SEC sukuk in all unlawful obligations.  
7.5.3 Overall Rating  
SEC sukuk have been analysed based on the AAOIFI standards in order to conclude 
with an overall rating. Tables 7-4, 7-5 and 7-6 show the assessment of the SEC sukuk 
according to all relevant standards of the AAOIFI; if the situation of SEC sukuk is compatible 
with the particular standard, a case will receive a rating of 1; if it is partially compatible, it 
will receive 0.5; if there is no clarification about the requirement, the case will receive a 
rating of 0 and finally if it contradicts the standard, it will receive -1. 
Table 7-4 Results of SEC Sukuk According to Standard no.9 
Standard no.  Clause no.  Compliance  Value  
No.(9)  
Ijara  
  
3/1  Compliance  1 
3/2  Contradiction  -1 
4/1/2  Compliance  1 
5/1/1  Compliance  1 
5/1/4  Compliance  1 
5/1/5  Contradiction  -1 
5/1/6  Compliance  1 
5/1/7  Contradiction  -1 
5/1/8  Contradiction  -1 
5/2/1  Compliance  1 
8/7  Contradiction  -1 
No.(9) ijara  
Related to  
Wa’d  
8/2  Contradiction  -1 
8/3  Contradiction  -1 
Total                        -1 out of 13    
    
Table 7-5 Results of SEC Sukuk According to Standard nos.17-18 
Standard no.  Clause no.  Compliance  Value  
155 | P a g e  
  
No.(17)  
Sukuk  
  
5/1/8/1  Compliance  1 
5/1/8/2  Compliance  1 
5/1/8/3  Partial compliance  0.5 
5/1/8/4  Partial compliance  0.5 
5/1/8/5  Compliance  1 
5/1/8/6  Contradiction  -1 
5/1/8/7  Contradiction  -1 
5/2/1  Compliance  1 
No.(18) 
Possession  
3/4  Absent  0 
Total                          2 out of 8    
   
Table 7-6 Results of SEC Sukuk According to Standard no.23 
Standard no.  Clause no.  Compliance  Value  
No.(23)  
Wakala  
3/1  Compliance  1 
3/2  Compliance  1 
3/3  Compliance  1 
4/2/C  Absent  0 
5/2  Contradiction  -1 
Total  2 out of 5  
Aggregate Percentages Compliance: 3/26=11.5%  
The final results show a low level of compliance to AAOIFI standards, as only 11.5% of 
the requirements are fulfilled.  The application is far away from the spirit of Sharia as most 
of the essential requirements are not fulfilled. As indicated previously, this issuance targeted 
US investors which may have motivated the issuer to imitate bonds rather than to follow the 
distinctive nature of sukuk.    
7.6 Observed Risk Mitigation Process  
This discussion focuses on the risk exposure among SEC investors. In the prospectus, 
there is a discussion related to the risk factors which is divided into risks related to the issuer, 
to the business, to the Kingdom, to the certificate, to enforcement, and finally additional 
risks. However, the following sector highlights risks associated with the Basel framework 
which is mainly found under the risks related to the certificate.   
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7.6.1 Risk Factors   
 I. Credit Risk  
Relying on the credit risk of the SEC rather than the ijara assets can appear to be 
more attractive to global investors. In this respect, the SEC have received proper sound 
investment grade credit ratings, and is the only lessee without any other lessees involved. 
This means that credit risk would occur if the SEC fails to discharge the rental payment or 
the final purchase payment. Thus, the case of credit risk will be limited to the event of SEC 
bankruptcy.   
The exposure to capital loss risk is mitigated by the purchase which is to be 
undertaken at the assets’ par value. In fact, the purchase undertaking cannot be executed in 
the case of the total loss of the assets. However, this risk is relatively low because the SEC 
is obliged to cover any shortage in the assets’ insurance. Based on Sharia, there should be 
higher exposure to the capital loss risk than is available with the SEC sukuk, since investors 
have to bear the risk of any damages or total loss of the ijara asset. For instance, if the asset 
is destroyed, the SEC will not be obligated to buy the asset or cover any insurance shortages, 
but rather this is the investors’ obligation. In fact, the reason for applying such an unlawful 
procedure is that investors, especially internationally, typically seek an investment with 
higher guaranteed capital with less concern about to Sharia compliance.  
II. Market Risk  
The return in the SEC sukuk is based on the interest rate, which increases the 
exposure to the risk of fluctuations in the market. It is expected that the value of the sukuk 
would fall if the market interest rate rises. In fact, the SEC 4.211 % sukuk due in April 2022 
has fallen in all but one of five recent months, among a broader sell-off of GCC sukuk. The 
yield on the sukuk advanced by 12 basic points during March 2013, which is the highest 
monthly gain since they were traded in 2012, to 3.28 per cent (Farazi, 2013).  
Early redemption risk is also associated with interest rate risk. This risk is incurred 
when investing in a fixed rate sukuk due to the embedded call option. The SEC may redeem 
all, but not some, of the sukuk of any of the series after giving prior notice to redeem the 
scheduled maturity date. In this event, SEC investors will mainly be forced to reinvest the 
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proceeds at a lower rate of return. This possible risk among investors cannot be totally 
mitigated; however, it mainly depends on the interest rate in the market. In fact, the interest 
rate of these sukuk is relatively low, which lowers the exposure to prepayment risks.  
As the SEC sukuk is a global issuance, the foreign exchange risk is mostly 
unavoidable. The share capital and reporting currency of the SEC is denominated in Saudi 
Arabian Riyals. Any cost incurred in the project of the underlying assets is calculated in 
SAR, which is different from the currency of the issuance. SEC will pay amounts due on the 
sukuk in US dollars; while most investors are located in Asia and Europe. This means that 
most of the investors measure their investment returns by reference to a currency other than 
US dollars. Therefore, the investment in these sukuk entails considerable foreign exchange 
risks for both the SEC and investors. Exposure to this risk is higher in the series with 10 
years maturity since fluctuations in the exchange rate are expected. These fluctuations 
directly influence the SEC and investors, which may result in a loss by either the sukuk-
holders or the issuer.  
The SEC signed forward exchange currency contracts with local banks in order to 
fix the US dollar exchange rate against the Euro exchange rate aiming to protect the SEC 
from currency rate fluctuations and to cover the SEC’s prospectus commitments (p.F-26). 
After that, the SEC is able to produce all US dollar obligations without any major estimated 
risk. However, investors are still greatly exposed to currency risk. From their perspective, 
being more liquid is a possible way to manage the currency risk. This means that the 
tradability of the SEC sukuk in the secondary market reduces exposure to this risk. Moreover, 
the currency risk can be managed by a multi-currency issuance. This can assist investors by 
mitigating the long exposure to the risk. For example, instead of issuing both of the series in 
dollars, one tranche can be denominated in USD and the other may be denominated in EU 
currency.  
III. Liquidity Risk  
The liquidity risk of the SEC sukuk is relatively under control, since these sukuk are 
based on available assets. In addition, the SEC’s exposure to this risk has been mitigated by 
trading the sukuk on the London Stock Exchange. However, SEC sukuk-holders can be 
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exposed to some aspects of liquidity risk because the sukuk secondary market, in general, is 
less active in comparison with their counterparts in the traditional market. Thus, there is a 
possibility of the inability to sell SEC sukuk for the desired amount in some periods.  
IV. Operational Risk  
With SEC sukuk, the operational risk related to asset risks is minimized a result of 
segregating the investors from the ownership of the real assets. This means no that there is 
no direct influence of the misuse of assets or any failed internal processes, while the legal 
risk appears clear in the possibility of conflict between different laws. With the SEC sukuk, 
the ijara assets are located in Saudi Arabia, a Sharia incorporated jurisdiction, while the SPV 
(sukuk trustee) is located in the Cayman Islands, which is a secular jurisdiction that permits 
a choice of applicable laws for financial contracts. Then, the SEC sukuk are globally 
purchased by both Muslim and non-Muslim investors. In fact, these sukuk certificates and 
transaction documents are governed by English law. This is because the laws applied have 
to include those of the Sharia-incorporated jurisdiction (where the SEC and the ijara assets 
are located). Thus, SEC sukuk-holders share the added risk of courts not enforcing a foreign 
judgment in a country where sukuk assets exist (Raheem, 2014). Despite this, it is likely that 
the securities laws in Saudi Arabia are applicable under certain circumstances. In the OC, 
there are different statements that show the differences in the law applied. For example, it is 
stated that ‘such sale agreement will be governed by Saudi law’; however, in other places 
that ‘the trustee will enter into the sale undertaking on the closing date in favour of SEC, 
which will then be governed by English law’ and also that ‘the certificates and any non-
contractual obligations arising out of or in connection with them are governed by English 
law’. To avoid any possible risk of law conflicts, the SEC sukuk give the English courts 
dominance in dispute situations, as it is stated that ‘the English courts are valid under English 
law and is not restricted under Saudi Arabian law’. However, it has been pointed out that 
English law can sometimes contradict Sharia rules. This can explain the reason for the SEC 
OC including a clear statement that the issuance may be contrary to Sharia law in some of 
its possible future stages.   
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V. Sharia Risk  
Although, the SEC sukuk have been revised and approved by both the HSBC 
Amanah Central Sharia Committee as well as Dr. Hussein Hamid Hassan, who is the Sharia 
advisor of Deutsche Bank AG, the issuance, as discussed previously, contains a number of 
Sharia issues. This was a result of following different standards rather than those of the 
AAOIFI, as some advisors approve other views related to specific issues. Therefore, such 
fatwas cannot be entirely relied on until investors have obtained their personal independent 
Sharia advice concerning compliance. This advice has been stated in the SEC OC, that 
‘potential investors should obtain their own independent Sharia advice as to the compliance 
of the transaction documents and the issue and trading of the certificates with Sharia 
principles’. This particular step can mitigate the exposure to Sharia risk and increase the 
investors’ confidence concerning compliance, since each investor will abide by their 
independent advisor’s ruling. However, it would be advantageous and more practical if the 
Sharia supervisory boards did not limit their fatwa to the direct compliance or non-
compliance of the structure without giving details and evidence to bolster investor 
confidence in respect of its Sharia compliance, especially in controversial Sharia matters.   
The conclusion that can be drawn from discussing SEC sukuk risks is that the major risks 
facing SEC sukuk-holders mainly refer to the issuer’s creditworthiness rather than the assets 
in the pool. This is a typical consequence of investors not being the legal owner of the leased 
assets; thus, investors will not have any recourse to the assets in the case of insolvency. In 
this respect, critical issues related to agency theory can be highlighted.  
7.6.2 SEC sukuk and Agency issues  
In the SEC sukuk, a number of agency conflicts are accentuated due to the 
segregation between ownership and the assets’ management. The costs can refer to the loss 
in the SEC sukuk’s value caused by the SEC following their own specific interests rather 
than the best interests of the sukuk-holders. In this structure, several parties are involved, and 
the SEC as an originator, agent, lessee, and servicer means that there is a great exposure to 
agency problems. The following discussion attempts to identify the agency problems that 
can have a direct impact on the performance of the sukuk. Different aspects of informational 
asymmetry in favour of the SEC are the main cause of this problem.  
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An agency problem arises with Sharia-sensitive investors and the SEC concerning 
the compatibility of the issuance with Sharia. Usually, investors cannot evaluate accurately 
to what extent the issuance is consonant with Sharia rules. In this respect, the HSBC and 
Deutsche Bank Sharia advisors act as intermediaries to ensure compliance and thus mitigate 
the informational asymmetries between the SEC and investors. Although their fatwa 
contradicts some of the AAOIFI standards, the fatwa it does not provide any specific 
classification of its basis and evidence, but rather provides a general statement on being 
compatible with Sharia. On this issue, the SEC advises investors to not rely on the fatwa 
provided and to request independent advice. However, after the fatwa is published, SEC may 
benefit from the absence of Sharia supervisors. This is because Sharia advisors do not have 
any authority to supervise sukuk procedures after sale. This may result in a moral hazard due 
to the SEC not following all Sharia rules and requirements. The problem becomes more 
serious since Sharia advisors cannot perform any further investigation of the SEC’s specific 
future performance due to limited access and monitoring. Thus, investors have to blindly 
rely on the initial fatwa provided by the HSBC and Deutsche Bank Sharia advisors without 
any attempt to confirm the compatibly of subsequent performance.   
In the SEC sukuk structure, the rental payments generated from certain power 
generation assets is distributed to investors. However, investors face information 
asymmetries in assessing those assets, the services, quality and the lessee preceding the 
investment. Related to the assessment of the assets, an agency relationship occurs between 
the SEC and investors concerning the type of asset. Not all of SEC’s power generation assets 
are securitized, according to the statement in the OC describing the securitized assets that 
they are ‘certain power generation assets’. These particular assets include a considerable 
volume of non-public information that gives SEC the incentive to transfer only low quality 
assets and retain the best, causing an adverse selection. The incentive is to transfer the risky 
assets with their excessive risk to the investors in order to limit SEC’s exposure to exogenous 
and endogenous risks. The problem becomes critical without sufficient monitoring, 
inadequate transparency and the presence of information asymmetries.   
There is a further asymmetrical information issue which arises related to the value of 
the power generation assets. There might be no actual relationship between the cash received 
by the SEC and the value of these assets, caused by a sale that does not disclose the actual 
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value of the assets. Investors aim for a purchase with confidence that the cash paid reflects 
the value of the securitized assets because paying a higher price than the assets’ value may 
affect the proceeds and the final purchase. For instance, if a partial loss occurs to the 
securitized assets, this directly leads to a reduction in the rental payment.  Also when a total 
loss of the asset occurs, this means a total loss to the incoming returns and the principal. 
Added to this, there is no authorized access available for the investors to ascertain the quality 
of services, management and agency provided as to whether or not the actions taken were 
proper and adequate. As investors are unable to examine the competence related to these 
features, the quality of the securitized assets along with hazards of malpractice cannot be 
estimated. Therefore, investors do not have any access to assess the price of these securitized 
assets, which may result in adverse selection on the assets’ value. This problem becomes 
more critical in the SEC structure due to the substitution undertaking. The composition of 
the SEC sukuk assets may change over the life of the sukuk pursuant to the terms of the 
substitution undertaking. In substitution, the SEC should be required to certify that the value 
of the new leased assets being placed into the pool is of an equal or greater value than the 
prior assets. With the current situation of no official access to examine and monitor the 
leasing assets, a circumstance of moral hazard over incentives arises.     
In fact, the SEC retains some of the asset risk associated with the underlying assets. 
To illustrate this, the SEC buys insurance for the securitized assets. However, if the insurance 
company becomes unable to cover the assets, the SEC declared it will incur the shortage. 
Transferring the asset risks to the SEC would greatly motivate the incentives to be more 
compatible with the investors’ interests and to mitigate risks arising from asymmetric 
information. This implicit risk sharing mechanism, with the issuer as a guarantor and 
investors as a source of return, bears critical importance to how investors rely on issuer’s 
performance. Adding to this, the SEC sukuk structure aims to reduce the incentive to monitor 
and evaluate the securitized assets through two other vital procedures: the undertaking for 
the final purchase based on the nominal value, and that the cash flows from the securitized 
assets are fixed. The SEC undertakes to purchase the assets in the pool at their nominal value, 
which will encourage the SEC’s performance to be in favour of the assets. This procedure 
also minimizes the incentive asymmetry between investors and the SEC related to the 
invested assets. This purchase undertaking shows a dimension of sharing between the SEC 
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and investors, resulting in an optimal mechanism to manage the incentives. Moreover, for 
better control of agency costs, there must be some commitment towards the proceeds from 
the assets under the ijara basis. In the SEC sukuk, the return is precisely determined as a 
rental payment, aiming for a better management of the agency costs. This commitment of 
the future cash intake mitigates the agency risks that result from the information asymmetry. 
Through these two mechanisms, investors become less concerned about the asset’s 
performance and are only interested in the coupon payments since the SEC undertakes to 
buy the underlying assets according to their face value and not the market price.    
7.6 Summary  
In the SEC sukuk structure, the main critical issue is related to the guaranteed assets. 
No actual relationship exists between the investors and the assets, from different 
perspectives. Firstly; the total loss and partial loss risks have been transferred to the SEC. 
Secondly, all types of maintenance costs and liabilities of the assets are incurred by the SEC. 
This is a long with limited access to the assets and no possible recourse to them in the case 
of insolvency. These features can explain the reason for the SEC rating not estimating the 
quality and value of the assets in the pool, but rather only the SEC’s creditworthiness. In 
fact, as the first global Saudi sukuk, the SEC sukuk succeeded in generating sufficient 
liquidity. However, the aim of sukuk transactions is the segregation of a specific set of cash 
flows from the power generation assets, to issue the sukuk based only on the cash flows. 
Thus, it can be said that the structure amounts to no more than a replication of a conventional 
fixed income product only, with the higher costs of the financial structuring and Sharia 
approval. In addition to that, some Sharia issues have not been justified according to the 
AAOIFI standards, and the structure was synthesized without altering the asset risks, market 
risks and credit risk. The investors receive semi-annual payments with estimated returns of 
2.665% and 4.211%, without any link to the real market so that market fluctuations are 
reflected in in the prices.  
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Chapter 8: Sadara Chemical Company Sukuk  
 
8.1 Introduction  
Sadara is a joint stock chemical company that is incorporated under Saudi laws on 
24th December 2012, which has strategic significance for Saudi Arabia (Sadara, 2013). The 
Sadara complex is located in Jubail Saudi Industrial City. It is planned to be one of the major 
integrated chemicals services facilities in the world. The complex will be the largest ever 
constructed in one phase, and will comprise of 26 totally-integrated industrial units (ICIS, 
2013). The Sadara project will be developed on a tight schedule and is currently on track to 
deliver its first products during the second half of 2015, with full production estimated by 
the end of 2016 (SCC, 2013).    
The Sadara Chemical Company released public sukuk certificates approved by the 
CMA on 13th of March 2013. Two days after that, the prospectus was published and recently 
the issuance took a place in April 2013. These sukuk were issued by an indirect subsidiary 
of Sadara, named the Sadara Basic Services Company (SBSC) which was established in 
October 2011 with limited liability, as a company to issue Sadara certificates with no 
operating history (Sadara, 2013, p. 54). The offering was limited to either the Saudi national 
investors or legal persons with a Saudi permanent establishment. The proceeds of the 
offering will be used to finance the construction and delivery of the Sadara complex (SCC, 
2013, p. 12). The discussion in this chapter focuses on the Sadara sukuk structure in terms of 
both Sharia and financial issues.  
8.2 Public Offering of Sadara Sukuk  
The Sadara sukuk were equivalent which would SAR 5.25 billion to fulfil part of the 
project cost since it requires an estimated total of SAR 72.4 billion ($19.3 billion) (Sadara, 
2013, p. 12). In this respect, the Sadara Chemical Company declared that the closing of the 
Sadara sukuk was hugely successful, resulting in 2.6 times oversubscription with 
approximately $10.5 billion received (Fletcher, et al., 2013). To satisfy the strong demand 
from Saudi investors, Sadara enlarged the issuance from SAR 5.25 billion to SAR 7.5bln 
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(Rasameel, 2013). Thus, Sadara sukuk became the largest financing project ever in the 
Middle East (Dewar & Hussain, 2014). The reason behind this successful financial deal was 
the involvement a group of more than eight export credit agencies, and a range of various 
financial banks, Islamic commercial institutions and the Saudi Public Investment Fund 
(Milbank, 2013).  
8.3 Structure of Sadara Sukuk  
Figure 8-1 Sadara Sukuk Structre 
  
Source: Sadara Sukuk prospectus.   
The most notable features of the Sadara sukuk structure are its size, complexity and 
flexibility. The Sadara Company established the SBSC in order to issue the certificates and 
then to receive 100% of the issuing price. After that, according to the OC, a number of staged 
procedures were to occur as follows:   
i. The first stage is the musharaka agreement (partnership agreement). The agreement 
is between Sadara and the SBSC. The SBSC contributed the price received from the 
issuance in cash as a capital contribution to the musharaka. Whereas, Sadara 
simultaneously contributed to the musharaka with an in-kind contribution. The in-kind 
contribution consists of all its benefits, entitlements and rights in and to the contribution 
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assets30, with a valuation agreed among the partners of about SAR 202.7 million. Since 
musharaka is not a body capable of entering into any contract, both parties to the 
musharaka agreement assigned the Sadara Assets Leasing Company as a musharaka 
authorized agent to act on their behalf.  
ii. The second stage is the isistisna’ agreement (procurement agreement). The 
agreement was between the musharaka authorized agent (acting on behalf of the 
managing partner and other partners) with Sadara in its capacity as procurement 
contractor according to this agreement. The procurement contractor will receive the 
capital contribution of the musharaka agreement by depositing it into the project 
account. Then, the procurement contractor will involve the contractors to obtain the 
delivery of the project assets.  
iii. The third stage is the forward ijara agreement. The musharaka authorized agent 
entered into a forward ijara agreement with Sadara as a lessee. In other words, the 
two parties involved are musharaka authorized agents who act on behalf of the co-
lessors; Sadara as the issuer and Sadara as lessee. The co-lessors decide to lease the 
future assets to Sadara on a forward basis prior to the delivery date and the return is 
the advance rental payments. After the delivery date, the agreement will continue 
on an actual basis and the return will be the rental payments34. As the lessors are a 
joint enterprise between Sadara and the issuer, the lease assets will be limited to the 
issuer’s proportional interest in and entitlement to the project assets. Thus, the issuer 
will be solely eligible to obtain both payments, the advance rental payments and the 
rental payments. These payments made by Sadara to the issuer will finance the 
payment of the periodic distribution amounts by the issuer to the Sadara sukuk 
investors.  
iv. The fourth stage is the agency agreement. The managing partner on behalf of the 
co-lessors will appoint Sadara as the service contractor. The service contractor  
                                                   
30 The land lease agreement with the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu (Sadara, 2013, p. 15). 34 'Advance 
Rental Payments and the Rental Payments paid under the forward lease agreement will be paid by the lessee to 
the issuer by payment directly to the transaction account’ (Sadara, 2013, p. 18).  
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will agree to act as an independent service contractor for the co-lessors to perform 
and discharge certain services during the contract term.  
v. The final stage is the maturity date. The forward ijara agreement is based on lease-
to-own. For the lease-ending ownership, the project assets will finally be owned by 
Sadara and then all of the sukuk will be terminated. The investors’ capital will 
gradually be paid by periodic distribution until it is finally redeemed.   
As stated previously, the issuance is characterized as a complex structure, and the 
complication occurs when a Saudi Joint Stock Company looks for assets in order to issue 
Sharia-compliant sukuk. The Royal Commission for Yanbu and Jubail granted the industrial 
land lease contract to Sadara Chemical Company, since this land is required as a basis for 
the istisna’ and forward ijara structures. This transfer underpins the issuance of these sukuk; 
however, there were some prohibitions on the assignment or transfer of the land to the SBSC. 
In order to design the structure around to avoid this complication, the agreement of 
musharaka was conducted to achieve an unincorporated partnership between SBSC and 
Sadara (IFN, 2014). The issuance of Sadara is generally summarized in Table 8-1:  
Table 8-1 Sadara Sukuk Offering 
Title  Sadara Sukuk  
Issuance Type  Domestic market- public issue  
SPV   Sadara Basic Services Company  
Structure Type  Musharaka/ Ijara  
Issue Size  SAR 7.5 billion ($2 billion)  
Issue Date  02-April-2013  
Maturity Date  02-April-2029  
Coupon Rate  6 month SAIBOR +) 95 bps  
Fix or Variable Return  Floating  
Return Frequency  Semi-annual  
According to the above structure, the Sadara sukuk includes more than 12 documents 
that are mentioned in the OC. However, according to the structure, the four main documents 
are: the musharaka agreement, procurement agreement, forward lease agreement and service 
agency agreement, which are summarized in Table 8-2:  
Table 0-2 Sadara Sukuk Documents  
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Table 8-2 Sadara Sukuk Documents 
Document  Parties  Purpose  
Musharaka  
Agreement  
Sadara  
(as a party in the 
partnership) and  
SBSC  
(as another party)  
From Sadara’s perspective, this document 
provides the eligibility to share the received 
capital with the SBSC.  
From SBSC’s perspective, this document 
provides shared ownership on the assets.  
Procurement  
Agreement  
Musharaka authorized  
agent   
(as purchaser) and  
Sadara (as contractor)  
From the Musharaka authorized Agent’s 
perspective, this document provides the 
ownership of revenue generating assets at a 
future time.  
From Sadara’s perspective, this is the document 
that provides the funding.  
Forward  
Lease  
Agreement  
SBSC and Sadara  
(as co-lessors) and  
Sadara  
(as lessee)  
From the issuer’s perspective, this document 
generates the return required for the sukuk.  
From Sadara’s perspective, this is the 
document that provides Sadara with the 
possession and use of the future assets.   
Service  
Agency  
Agreement  
Musharaka authorized  
agent   
(as lessor) and  
Sadara (as servicing  
agent)  
From  Musharaka  authorized  agent’s 
perspective, this is the document allows the 
liability for the underlying assets’ major 
maintenance and repairs to pass to Sadara.  
8.4 Critical Analysis from Sharia Perspective  
In this discussion, the AAOIFI standards are used for the guidance in analysing the 
Sharia issues. To evaluate to what extent the Sadara sukuk are compliant with Sharia, a 
number of critical issues are addressed. The issues are discussed under two main categories; 
these related to the content of Sadara sukuk and those related to the structure.  
The discussion in each category covers three elements; a demonstration of the Sadara 
sukuk situation, providing support from the OC to confirm the situation, and lastly the 
relevant standard from the AAOIFI in order to achieve an accurate Sharia assessment of this 
structure.   
168 | P a g e  
  
8.4.1 Critical Analysis of the Content  
 I. Sadara Sukuk Assets  
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
The subject matter of the 
forward ijara contract in 
the Sadara sukuk is based 
on unavailable assets. 
The description and 
completion date of these 
assets have been clearly 
specified in the OC.  
  
The project assets to be constructed 
are; (i) the butyl glycol ether and 
amines … plants; (ii) a plant to 
convert hydrochloric acid to 
chlorine... it will be implemented in 
four phases: program FEED – ended 
August 2010; project FEED– ended 
December 2011; EPC– expected to 
end October 2015; and 
commissioning and start-up 
expected to end June 2016 (p.8).  
AAOIFI  under  
Standard No.9 stated on 
defining ijara as it is ‘a 
contract giving a legal 
title to legitimate and 
identified usufruct for a 
defined period of time in 
exchange for a 
legitimate and 
determined 
consideration.  
As the Sadara sukuk assets are unavailable, there are two essential AAOIFI 
requirements. The first is the detailed description of the future assets and the second is the 
specification of the delivery date. As seen previously, these two requirements have been 
applied in the Sadara sukuk. Moreover, the AAOIFI Standard No.9, clause 3/5, adds that the 
future assets have to be delivered during the contract: ‘an ijara contract may be executed for 
an asset undertaken by the lessor to be delivered to the lessee … In this case, an agreement 
is reached to make the described asset available during the duration of the contract’. Sadara 
sukuk is compatible with this requirement as the specified delivery date is in 2016 while the 
maturity date is in 2018.   
However, the concern that may arise is related to the description of the Sadara assets. 
It is required that the asset be described precisely using certain specifications in a manner 
that does not result in any future controversy or ambiguity. The AAOIFI Standard No. 9, 
clause 3/5, states that ‘an ijara contract may be executed for an asset undertaken by the lessor 
to be delivered to the lessee according to accurate specifications’. The question raised here 
is whether or not the description of the Sadara sukuk assets is adequate according to Sharia 
requirements. In other words, has the description provided been specified in a way that will 
eliminate any future dispute at the delivery date? Are the investors (as lessors) able to decide 
whether or not the asset received meets the specifications? In fact, as the Sadara sukuk 
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inventors are not well informed about the future assets, the OC gives the procurement 
contractor (Sadara) the responsibility to judge the delivered assets. It is stated that ‘upon 
delivery, the procurement contractor will be responsible for ensuring the project’s assets: (a) 
to comply with the agreed technical specifications (as set out in the procurement agreement); 
(b) that they are in good condition and satisfactory for the purposes contemplated by the 
Forward Lease Agreement …’. Accordingly, the point raised point cannot be agreed on for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, the decision on the delivered assets has been transferred to 
Sadara, due to its experience with such assets, and not due to insufficient information being 
received by investors. Secondly, the criteria to decide the suitability and compatibility of the 
assets delivered have been mentioned in the OC in both the procurement and forward ijara 
agreements. Thus, the investors are well-informed in the OC about the future Sadara assets 
along with all criteria required for the adequacy of the assets. Therefore, the Sadara sukuk 
can be safely categorized with no Sharia concerns related to the future assets as they are 
sufficiently described along with the delivery date during the life of the sukuk.   
II. Sadara Sukuk Ownership   
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
The investors own only the 
interests, rights, benefits in, to and 
under the leased assets and thus 
each sukuk shows the beneficial  
ownership of the underlying assets.  
Prospective 
certificate holders 
should note that 
they do not have 
physical  
Standard No. 9, clause 3/1, ‘for 
the validity of an ijara  
contract concerning a 
specified asset, the lease 
contract should be preceded  
According to that, holding these 
sukuk does not enable investors to 
any physical possession of the 
Sadara future assets.  
entitlement to the 
project assets  
(p.45).  
  
by acquisition of either the 
asset to be leased or the 
usufruct of that asset’.  
According to this particular 
ownership, Sadara investors will not 
have any recourse to their owned 
assets in the case of Sadara’s 
insolvency and any other cases.  
No certificate 
holder shall have 
any recourse to the 
leased assets…’ 
(p.66).  
Standard No.18, clause 3/4 
provides more requirements 
for a valid ownership that has 
to fulfil the ‘legal possession 
includes the registration of a 
mortgage of immovables… 
that is valid under the law’.  
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To validate the contract of ijara, an ownership is required, either of the asset or the 
usufruct. However, Sadara provides only beneficial ownership with considerable restriction 
to the assets according to statement that ‘the rights of the issuer to sell, assign, transfer or 
dispose of the contribution assets … are strictly limited’. More critical is the legal registration 
of the assets under the investors' ownership. This is because the AAOIFI in the above 
Standard specifics the legal registration of a mortgage of immovables as a requirement for 
valid ownership. In the OC of the Sadara sukuk, there is no clear statement in respect of the 
legal registration of the assets under the investors’ possession. However, if the assets are 
legally registered under the investors’ possession, this will no doubt provide the investors 
with access to the assets in the event of insolvency. In fact, Sadara investors have no recourse 
to the assets except under the purchase undertaking. This restriction applied to the Sadara 
investors and upon the assets, means that the assets are registered under the investors' 
ownership. As discussed, the restriction has three aspects; investors do not physically own 
the assets nor the usufructs and they only receive beneficial ownership. In addition, their 
beneficial ownership is restricted to certain commercial behaviour that has been specified in 
the OC. Finally, Sadara investors are not eligible to any recourse to Sadara assets in the case 
of insolvency. As a result of these aspects, investors are not the legal owners of the Sadara 
assets and Sadara sukuk offered only an illegal ownership to overcome some of Sharia 
requirements.   
III. Sadara Sukuk Principal   
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
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The capital of the Sadara sukuk 
is entirely guaranteed in two 
situations: the first is following 
the scheduled termination date 
of the sukuk, where the 
principal will be redeemed 
gradually starting with the first 
repayment date on around 15th 
December 2018 and ending 
with the final repayment date.  
The issuer will partially 
redeem the certificates pro 
rata in an aggregate amount  
… The termination 
distribution amount will be 
either: (i) the aggregate 
outstanding face amount of 
the certificates at the 
relevant time (taking into 
account any partial 
redemption … (p.4).  
According to AAOIFI 
Clause 5 31 , ‘it is 
permissible for a lessee in a 
sukuk ijara to undertake to 
purchase the leased assets 
when the sukuk are 
extinguished for its 
nominal value, provided he 
{lessee} is not also a 
partner, mudharib, or 
investment agent’.  
The second situation is when 
the event of total loss occurs, 
and any shortage in the 
principal, after insurance costs, 
will be covered by  
Sadara (as a lessee).  
If such a lessee termination 
sum is not paid within 60 
days of the occurrence of the 
total loss event … the lessee 
shall be obliged to pay any 
total loss shortfall amount 
immediately  
(p.19).  
Standard No. 9, clause 
5/1/8, ‘the leased asset is 
the responsibility of the 
lessor throughout the 
duration of the ijara, 
unless the lessee commits 
misconduct or negligence. 
The lessor may take out 
permissible insurance on it 
whenever possible, and 
such insurance expenses 
must be borne by the 
lessor.  
In general, the capital received from the sukuk cannot be guaranteed in any cases or 
circumstances. However, the scenario of the lease-to-own sukuk is different, as it is 
permissible to re-buy the assets at their nominal value and thus the AAOIFI permits such a 
purchase provided that the lessee is not a partner, mudharib, or investment agent. In fact, the 
lessee in this structure is a partner under the musharaka agreement. Thus, it would not be 
permissible for the lessee to purchase the assets at their nominal value. The principal received 
has to be redeemed for the Sadara sukuk according to the market value or fair value of the 
assets under the mutual agreement between Sadara and the issuer at the time of execution. 
In the case of the total loss of the assets, the capital cannot be guaranteed by the lessee unless 
the damage occurring was due to negligence. According to the OC, Sadara can voluntarily 
                                                   
31 This is based on the AAOIFI pronouncement on sukuk, 13 and 14 February, 2008.  
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pay any total loss shortfall amount in the case of total damage, which shows that the capital 
received from investors is not guaranteed in this situation. This is an important step towards 
a more Sharia-compliant instrument.   
IV. Sadara Sukuk Return   
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
Sadara investors are entitled to 
receive a semi-annual return of 
6 months SAIBOR plus 95 
basic points per annum. This 
periodic amount will be paid 
by Sadara to the SBSC as an 
advanced rental payment and 
then as a rental payment.  
Prior to and including the 
lease commencement date, 
the advance rental payments 
made by Sadara to the issuer 
will fund the payment by the 
issuer to certificate holders 
of the periodic distribution 
amounts (p.8).  
Standard No. 9, clause 
5/2/1, ‘the rental must be 
specified, either as a lump 
sum covering the duration 
of the ijara contract, or by 
installments for parts of 
the duration. It may also be 
for a fixed or variable 
amount’. 
Prior to the completion date, if 
Sadara fails to pay the advance 
rental payments, the payments 
will be guaranteed by Aramco 
and Dow.  
‘The completion guarantors 
are two parties; divided as 
follows: 65% from Saudi 
Aramco and 35% from  
Dow and is limited to the 
period up to the lease 
commencement date …  
The completion guarantees 
guarantee the timely 
payment of all amounts due 
in respect of the sukuk  
facility until the project 
completion date’ (p.114).  
Standard No. 9, clause 
5/2/2 ‘the rental is made 
obligatory by the 
contract’.  
In an ijara contract, it is essential to specifically determine both the amount and the 
time of the rental payments. The Sadara sukuk have met both requirements since the OC 
precisely clarifies both elements of the rental payments. In addition, the situation given 
failure to pay the return of the Sadara sukuk is generally in line with Sharia principles. This 
is because Sharia does not guarantee the investment’s return except if it is a rental payment. 
Rental payments are a strict obligation in Sharia. However, after the project completion date, 
there is no assurance or guarantee that the periodical distribution amounts will be paid, and 
the only available source would be Sadara’s activities. This is according with the OC which 
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states that ‘the termination of the completion guarantees the project completion date, these 
assets, including receipts from the operating revenues of Sadara, will be the sole source of 
funds available to Sadara to meet its obligations to make payments to the issuer’. This phase 
of the project does not show any contradiction with Sharia rules.  
V. Sadara Sukuk Maintenance  
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
It is the responsibility of Sadara 
as a lessee to bear the cost of 
routine maintenance.  
Routine maintenance required 
in respect of the lease assets 
will be the responsibility of the 
lessee, and it will bear the cost 
of such routine maintenance 
(p.299).  
Standard No.9, clause  
5/1/7, ‘the lessee should 
carry out operating or 
periodical (ordinary) 
maintenance’.  
The responsibilities for major 
maintenance have been 
transferred to Sadara as the 
service contractor under the 
service agreement. However, 
the cost of such maintenance 
will be reimbursed by the 
managing partner on behalf of 
the co-lessors.  
  
The services will mirror the 
responsibilities of the 
managing partner under the 
forward lease agreement.  
Specifically, they will include 
performance of the following 
tasks; major maintenance …. 
The managing partner will 
then be required to reimburse 
the service contractor each 
service charge (p.301).  
Standard No.9, clause 
5/1/7 ‘the lessor may 
delegate to the lessee the 
task of carrying out such 
maintenance at the 
lessor’s cost’.  
According to the Table above, the Sadara sukuk appear to be in line with the Sharia 
rules related to both types of maintenance. However, there is a statement in the OC to ‘set 
off the services charges: The obligation of the managing partner, acting on behalf of the co-
lessors, to pay the service charges to the service contractor will be set-off against the 
obligation of the service contractor (acting in its capacity as lessee) to pay the equivalent 
service charge as a supplementary rental payment under the forward lease agreement or, as 
the case may be, as part of any lessee termination sum under the forward lease agreement’. 
Service charges include major maintenance costs, meaning that the costs will be finally 
transferred back to Sadara under the payments of the supplementary rental. Thus, a concern 
still exists regarding not fulfilling the Sharia requirement.   
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VI. Sadara Sukuk Tradability   
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
In April 2013, the CMA 
has accepted Sadara 
sukuk to be traded in the 
Saudi  Stock Exchange 
(Tadawul).   
 The application has been made, 
and all requirements have been 
met, for the certificates to be 
admitted to listing on the Saudi 
Stock Exchange … There is 
currently no established secondary 
market for the sukuk, and there can 
be no assurance that one will 
develop after the certificates are 
issued’ (p.53).  
Standard No.17, clause 
5/2/8, ‘it is not permissible 
to trade in certificates of 
ownership of usufructs of 
a described asset before 
the asset from which 
usufruct is to be made 
available is ascertained…’  
In the Sadara sukuk, there are two main stages: when the assets are under construction 
and when the assets become available. There is no doubt of the permissibility of trading the 
sukuk when the assets are delivered; however, the issue arises in the first phase. According 
to the AAOIFI, it is generally prohibited to trade sukuk that are based on debt, such as 
forward ijara sukuk. However, the Sadara sukuk do not only involve debt, as they include 
the share of the invested land under the musharaka contract. The OC states that the 
‘musharaka assets, such as the contributions by the partners (including the in-kind capital 
contribution by Sadara of its rights, benefits and entitlements in and to and under the 
industrial land lease contract)’. This was specifically studied by the Sharia board to ensure 
that the value of the land equals more than one-third of the value of the sukuk in order to 
validate trading as indicated by S432 (2016).  
VII. Sadara Sukuk Insurance  
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
The construction, development 
and also the operation of the 
Sadara project involves 
numerous risks prior to and after 
the project completion date. 
Thus, Sadara maintains 
operational insurance, asset 
‘Insurance means 
operational and third 
party insurance and 
such other insurances 
relating to the lease 
assets’ (p.382). 
Standard No.17, clause 
5/1/8/7, ‘it is, however, 
permitted to an independent 
third party to provide a 
guarantee free of charge’.  
                                                   
32 S4 is one of the interviewees in Chapter 10.  
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insurance and third party 
insurance. 
It is important to highlight that 
the insurer of the Sadara sukuk 
has specific aspects. There are 
now two insurers who have 
ratings of A- or above from 
S&P, these being Tawuniy 
whose rating is A-, and The 
Mediterranean and Gulf 
Insurance and Reinsurance 
Company whose rating is A-’.  
A permitted insurer is 
deemed to have a 
rating of at least A- by 
S&P or an equivalent 
rating from AM Best, 
Moody’s or Fitch  
(p.585).   
Standard No.9, clause 5/1/11, 
‘it is permissible for the issuer 
or the certificate holders to 
adopt permissible methods of 
managing risk … such as 
establishing an Islamic 
insurance fund with 
contributions of certificate 
holders, or by participating in 
Insurance (takaful).  
  In Sadara’s insurance, the third party insurance is accepted in Sharia rules; however, 
the insurer has to be independent and the guarantee has to be free of charge. In the Sadara 
sukuk, there is no statement that indicates the existence of any charge. However, the 
statement that ‘the Saudi Aramco shareholder and the Dow shareholder agreed to subscribe 
to equity interests in Sadara Company of 65% and 35%, respectively’ thus raises the concern 
of third party independence. In fact, Aramco and Dow guaranteed the advance rental 
payment and the delivery of the constructed assets. This particular insurance can be provided 
by the lessee, as discussed in the rental issue, or any other relevant party. In addition, the 
operational insurance is covered by two specific insurers. These are, Tawuniya whose rating 
is A-, and The Mediterranean and Gulf Insurance and Reinsurance Company. In this case, 
the Islamic version of takaful has been applied, which is a step towards a more Islamic 
instrument. However, the Mediterranean and Gulf Insurance and Reinsurance Company 
appear to be a commercial insurance company, which raises Sharia concerns about applying 
non-Islamic insurance.   
8.4.2 Critical Analysis of the Structure  
 I. Lease‐to‐Own Structure  
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
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Forward ijara agreement 
under Sadara sukuk is 
based on ‘lease to own’. 
In this structure, the 
assets will be possessed 
by the lessee when 
Sadara (as a lessee) has 
paid of all the advance 
rental payment and the 
rental payment.  
‘Forward lease agreement will 
terminate automatically on the 
scheduled lease termination date… 
and on such date, the colessors will 
agree to sell to the lessee all of the 
issuer’s (as a colessor) ownership 
interests in, to and under, the lease 
assets. On the scheduled 
termination date, the lessee will 
have paid all the advance rental 
payments and rental payments … 
on a (lease to own) basis’ (p.20).  
Standard No.9, clause 
8/3, ‘in all cases of 
transfer of ownership by 
way of gift or sale, it is 
necessary, when the 
promise is fulfilled, that a 
new contract be drawn 
up, since the ownership to 
the property is not 
automatically transferred 
by virtue of the original 
promise document that 
was drawn up earlier’.  
According to AAOIFI Standard, when transferring the leased asset’s title to the 
lessee, it is not permissible to structure the contract of forward ijara to conclude 
automatically with the possession of the item that includes the benefit. However, this can 
become permissible if it is conducted in a separate document from the document of forward 
ijara. In this respect, the Sadara sukuk include to an automatic exercise of ownership, while 
the statement of the automatic practice will be related to the termination of the lease. The 
ownership of the leased assets will be transferred back to Sadara after the final instalment is 
paid with a separate contract but not on an automatic basis (S4, 2016). This means that Sadara 
sukuk have two separate stages; firstly, the provisions and terms governing the forward ijara 
until the end of the contract which will be automatically terminated, and secondly Sadara 
possesses the asset in a new separate purchase document.  
II. Inah Sale Structure 
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
The Sadara sukuk structure 
involves a situation where 
the investors as buyers 
lease the underlying assets 
to Sadara, and after a 
specific period re-sell them 
back to Sadara.   
The business plan 
requires funding to lease 
the Issuer’s proportional 
interest in and 
entitlement to them to 
Sadara (as lessee) on a 
‘lease to own’ basis 
(p.87).  
Standard No.9, clause 8/5, ‘if the 
leased asset was purchased from 
the lessee before it was leased 
back to the lessee on the basis of 
lease to own, a reasonable period 
of time, between the lease 
contract and the time of the sale 
of the asset to the lessee, must 
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have expired, to avoid the 
contract of inah’.  
According to the AAOIFI, the permissible way to overcome the inah issue is by 
observing the lapse of a period of time in order to make physical or value changes to the 
underlying assets during the specified period. This period has to be long enough so that the 
leased assets or their value could have changed. In the Sadara sukuk, there exists a relatively 
long-term basis, with tenure of approximately 16 years, and even early termination can only 
be triggered after the 5th anniversary, which is long enough for the assets to change in value 
in the market.  
It seems that Sadara have followed a new structure to overcome such an inah issue. 
To illustrate this, inah contains two main transactions: buying assets and then reselling the 
same assets. The Sadara sukuk contain these two main transactions; however, with two 
different assets. The first payment received from the investors is to cover the partnership 
contract to engage in investing in the land: ‘on the closing date, the issue price of the 
certificates will be paid to the Issuer. The Issuer will then pay the contribution … of the 
musharaka Agreement in-cash as a capital contribution to the musharaka’. Then, under the 
musharaka, the non-existing assets will be constructed. The second transaction is to lease-
to-own the assets and considers the unavailable assets, while the first transaction dealt with 
the available land. Two transactions are conducted with two different assets, which can be 
seen as a device invented to overcome the issue of inah.   
8.4.3 Overall Rating  
The following Tables show the assessment of the Sadara sukuk according to the 
AAOIFI standards. As mentioned, a score of 1 point is for a Sharia compatible situation; 0.5 
points is for partial compatibility; 0 points is for the unclarified requirement and -1 is for a 
non-compatible situation.   
Table 8-3 Results of Sadara Sukuk According to Standard no.9 
Standard no.  Clause no.  Compliance  Value  
  3/5  Compliance  1  
3/6  Compliance  1  
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No.(9)  
Ijara  
  
  
4/1/2  Compliance  1  
4/1/3  Compliance  1  
5/1/1  Compliance  1  
5/1/4  Compliance  1  
5/1/5  Compliance  1  
5/1/6  Compliance  1  
5/1/7  Compliance  1  
5/1/8  Compliance  1  
5/2/1  Compliance  1  
8/1  Compliance  1  
8/6  Compliance  1  
8/5  Compliance  1  
8/7  Contradiction  -1  
No.(9) ijara 
Related to Wa’d  
8/2  Contradiction  -1  
8/3  Compliance  1  
Total 15 out of 17   
    
Table 8-4 Results of Sadara Sukuk According to Standard nos.17-18 
Standard no.  Clause no.  Compliance  Value  
No.(17)  
Sukuk  
  
5/1/8/1  Compliance  1  
5/1/8/2  Compliance  1  
5/1/8/3  Partial compliance  0.5  
5/1/8/4  Compliance  1  
5/1/8/5  Compliance  1  
5/1/8/6  Contradiction  -1  
5/1/8/7  Contradiction  -1  
  5/2/8  Compliance  1  
No.(18) 
Possession  
3/4  Absent  0  
Total  5.5 out of 8   
Table 8-5 Results of Sadara Sukuk According to Standard no.23 
Standard no.  Clause no.  Compliance  Value  
No.(23)  
Wakala  
3/1  Compliance  1  
3/2  Compliance  1  
3/3  Compliance  1  
4/2/C  Absent  0  
5/2  Compliance  1  
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Total  4 out of 5 
Aggregate Percentages Compliance in: 24.5/30=81.7%  
The aggregate compliance of Sadara sukuk is far higher than that of the SEC sukuk. 
The Sadara sukuk have achieved 81.7% while the SEC sukuk achieved only 11.5%. Both 
issuances are from Saudi Arabia; however, the Sadara sukuk are domestic while SEC sukuk 
are international. This is because the unprecedented features involved in the former’s 
structure are more harmonious with AAOIFI standards and highlight better the distinctive 
nature of sukuk, and thus it can be said that these sukuk have made a remarkable step forward 
in the primary market. But although the overall result is a positive step towards SBS, there 
are still some critical issues that require more attention to further improve the final result33.   
8.5 Observed Risk Mitigation Process  
As discussed, the risks associated with the Basel framework mainly involve credit 
risk, market risk, liquidity risk and operational risk. Consideration of these risks is 
accompanied by the discussion of the Sharia risk.   
8.5.1 Risk Factors  
 I. Credit Risk  
As the Sadara sukuk are based on unavailable assets, there is a risk of a delay in 
delivery. It is possible that the constructed assets may not be complete on the project 
completion date. However, to mitigate this risk, Sadara (as a procurement contractor) will 
pay to the issuer compensation for any delayed delivery with respect to each delay period.  
According to this agreement, the delayed delivery compensation amounts have to be 
reasonable, fair and a genuine pre-estimate of losses born by the issuer as a consequence of 
Sadara’s failure to fulfil the delivery strictly according to the terms of the agreement. The 
delayed delivery compensation will fund the issuer’s payment of the periodic distribution 
amounts. This is specified in the OC as follows: ‘In the circumstance in which Sadara has 
not constructed all of the Project Assets, such failure would lead to a non-delivery under the 
Procurement Agreement, causing: (i) payments of Delayed Delivery Compensation being 
                                                   
33 These issues are discussed in chapter 10 in interviews chapter with prominent scholars.  
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due from Sadara on a periodic basis if such non-delivery continues after the date specified 
as the Target Completion Date’.  
In addition, there is a possible risk that the Sadara Company will fail to discharge the 
advance rental payment obligation, which would lead to financial loss for the sukuk-holders. 
In addition, there is a possible risk related to the purchase undertaking, as Sadara may fail to 
pay back the nominal value. This means that the credit risk in these sukuk is limited to the 
failure or bankruptcy of Sadara as it is the only party who is responsible for the obligations. 
Sadara states in the OC concerning the possibility of such a failure that ‘any such material 
adverse effect could materially reduce the funds available to meet its obligations to make 
payments to the Issuer under the sukuk transaction documents’. However, Sadara attempts 
to minimize the credit risk through investing in financial institutions with reliable credit 
ratings. It limits itself to the institutions with ratings by Fitch Ratings Agency of ‘A –’or 
better. Also, the insurance provided for the leased assets, operational costs and advance 
rental payments give some protection from this risk.  
II. Market Risk  
Typically, as with all other securities, Sadara investors are exposed to interest rate 
risk. However, the nature of the Sadara sukuk limits the exposure to such risk because the 
returns on Sadara sukuk are adjusted regularly to reflect changes in short-term interest rates 
(LIBOR). The floating rate offered in ijara appears more appropriate and desirable 
considering the changing market and economic conditions, especially as the Sadara sukuk 
lifetime is relatively long. This is because, if the benchmark interest rates rise, the Sadara 
sukuk will pay higher returns, resulting in investors bidding up the prices of these sukuk.  
The Sadara sukuk are structured with a floating rate of return to insure against rising 
interest rates and to protect investors if the rates rise. Also, when rates fall, the Sadara 
investors maintain the advantage of interest rate clearance. In reality, the SBSC as an issuer 
and not the investors will pay a premium for this protection from rising interest rates. For 
this reason, the SBSC enters into a number of interest rate contracts in order to lower funding 
costs and the exposure of interest rate risk related to obligations. Under these contracts, the 
SBSC agrees with other parties to exchange, at particular intervals, the difference between 
the floating and fixed interest amounts measured on an agreed amount.  
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An early termination risk can be caused by the interest rate risk in favour of the issuer. 
There is a possible risk in the Sadara sukuk that they will be terminated before the maturity 
date pursuant in whole, but not in part, at the option of the issuer. Facing this risk is possible 
on any periodic distribution date after the 5th anniversary of the closing date, or following a 
tax event, or following an inter-creditor event. In the case that the early termination of the 
forward ijara agreement takes place before the delivery date, the co-lessor will pay to the 
lessee ‘the lessor termination sum’. This sum includes the aggregate of all advanced rental 
payments received by the lessor up to the termination date. However, if the forward ijara 
agreement is terminated after the delivery date, the lessee will pay to the issuer ‘the lessee 
termination sum’. The lessee termination sum includes the unpaid rental payments and any 
other obligated amounts often and including the date of termination, since early termination 
may not be a favourable situation for the investors in the Sadara sukuk. To mitigate such a 
risk, the issuer is required to pay a profit on early termination. The payment is considered 
under the forward ijara agreement as an applicable additional early payment amount. Also, 
for mitigation purposes, the issuer of the Sadara sukuk is required to provide notice within a 
specified period of not less than 30 or more than 60 days to the sukuk-holders.  
In addition, market risks involve the risk of changes in currency exchange rates. The 
currency risk cannot be predicted due to unexpected currency fluctuations. However, the 
Sadara sukuk-holders will not face this risk because the Sadara sukuk are locally distributed 
to Saudi national investors and denominated in Saudi Riyals. Moreover, Sadara’s activities 
are also denominated principally in Saudi Riyals. Thus, the Sadara Company at present does 
not have major exposure to currency risk and Sadara is not required to adopt any hedging 
programme for currency risk.  
III. Liquidity Risk  
Sadara sukuk exposure to liquidity risk is high because they are based on unavailable 
assets. The uncertain liquidity caused by unavailable assets has been insured by Aramco and 
Dow. In addition, despite these sukuk being based mainly on debt (unavailable assets), the 
Sadara sukuk have been listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange for the purpose of managing 
liquidity risk. However, the Sadara sukuk cannot be traded quickly enough to prevent any 
predicted loss. This is because of the lack of an active Saudi secondary market, which may 
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result in the inability to sell the Sadara sukuk at a reasonable time and reasonable price. As 
this is the case, it is difficult or impossible to isolate the liquidity risk; however, it can be 
managed through regular monitoring to observe the availability of sufficient funds to meet 
any future desire for liquidity. The monitoring includes the observation of future net cash 
flow on a regular basis; then, any period which shows a sizeable negative net cash flow will 
be taken under consideration. This assessment of the liquidity of the Sadara sukuk can be 
considered as a supplementary tool in managing this risk.   
IV. Operational Risk  
Sadara sukuk may face operational risk that affects the assets partially or totally. The 
partial loss of the assets means any partial damage or destruction of the leased assets due to 
any occurrence or event. In the case of partial damage of the production facility assets, there 
would be no possibility to transfer production to different assets, which would force the 
suspension of manufacturing. This may influence the investors’ returns which at this stage 
are based on Sadara’s activities, so that ‘any such material adverse effect could materially 
reduce the funds available to meet its obligations to make payments to the issuer under the 
sukuk transaction documents’. However, if Sadara were to suffer a total loss of the 
production facilities, the ijarah of the leased assets would be terminated, and then any 
shortfall amount could be optionally covered by Sadara as previously discussed. With partial 
loss, no hedging programme is adopted by the issuer to mitigate the risk which is mainly 
transferred to Sadara using specific techniques.   
With regards to the legal risk, the Sadara sukuk are governed by two different sets of 
law: the Saudi law and English law. These two legal frameworks will govern different areas 
in this issuance. For example, the payment administration, the musharaka, the forward ijara, 
procurement, and service agency agreements are governed by Saudi law, while the 
completion guarantees, undertaking agreement, and the issuer’s security agency agreement 
are governed by English law. Here, legal risks arise since more than one law governs the 
issuance, and in addition these laws have to operate in line with Sharia. In fact, Saudi law 
seems to face no problem of contradicting Sharia as it is itself based on Sharia law; however, 
the English law applied may face such a risk. English law presents a particular problem when 
in conflict with Sharia. English law always prevails over the Sharia law when there are 
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disputes, but the Sadara sukuk provides a management tool to overcome such an issue. 
Sadara state clearly in the OC that the liabilities predicated on English law will only be 
enforceable if they do not contravene Saudi law and Sharia principles.  
With regards to the law in Saudi Arabia, there are a number of possible risks that can 
occur which have been indicated in the OC. The first is that the enforceability of Saudi law 
is not fully developed. Also, the judicial precedents from Saudi courts are not binding on 
subsequent decisions.  Furthermore, Saudi court decisions are generally not recorded.  These 
three factors create additional judicial uncertainty and a greater exposure to legal risk. The 
second problem is that interpretations concerning the Sharia compliance of the Sadara sukuk 
documents may vary among different Saudi courts. For example, a court in the Kingdom 
may decide that the musharaka agreement is invalid and thus the contract is void. Then, the 
Saudi court may consider the investors’ interests in the musharaka as merely a debt claim 
on the underlying leased assets. In this case, the court may render the Sadara sukuk void, as 
a not-tradable sukuk, in order to be compliant with Sharia since the sale of debt is mainly 
prohibited under Saudi law. Another possible situation for the Sadara sukuk is that a court in 
the Kingdom may take into account the invalidity of conducting two transactions in one 
agreement concerning the same asset. Therefore, there is a possible legal risk for the ‘lease-
to-own’ in the forward ijara agreement to be invalid as well as the forward ijara agreement, 
which may be considered unenforceable in the case that the Saudi court adapts the previous 
view. If that is the case, the issuer would not be able to force Sadara to pay the amounts due, 
according to the forward ijara agreement, leaving the issuer without adequate cash to provide 
the obligated payment due under the sukuk.   
V. Sharia Risk  
The Sadara sukuk have received approval from different groups of scholars. These 
are the joint Sharia committee formed by Alinma and the Albilad Investment Company, the 
Deutsche Bank Sharia Advisor and the Sharia Committee of Riyadh Capital. These three 
groups consist of different scholars, which add more strength to the Sadara sukuk. This has 
resulted in a higher level of assessed compliance and also a number of regular Sharia issues 
in the sukuk market have been mitigated or even eliminated.   
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Although, the Sadara sukuk have achieved a high level of compliance, there are still 
some unresolved issues. For example, the ownership and principal issues are still not fully 
in compliance with Sharia, as previously discussed. Also, there is the issue of lease-to-own 
and the existence of two sales, where one for which it has been stated clearly in the OC, that 
‘there is a risk that the forward lease agreement could be unenforceable if it is held to 
constitute two transactions in one agreement concerning the same asset, right, or service’ 
(Sadara, 2013, p. 43). For this reason, to overcome such an issue, the OC has states that 
‘prospective certificate holders should note that different Sharia advisors, and courts and 
judicial committees in the Kingdom, may form different opinions on identical issues and 
therefore prospective certificate holders may wish to consult their own legal and Sharia 
advisors to receive an opinion as to the compliance or otherwise of the certificates and the 
sukuk transaction documents with Sharia principles, if they so desire’. In the fact, Sadara 
sukuk can be considered to be highly Sharia-compliant in comparison with most other sukuk 
in the market.    
Having discussed the Sadara sukuk risk, the conclusion is that there is a special exposure 
to assets risk. In the case of the total loss of the assets and inadequate with insurance, Sadara 
may choose not to cover such a shortfall, resulting in a loss incurred by investors. This 
particular risk is a step forward towards a real link between investors and the underlying 
assets, since this exposure is a typical consequence of investors being the legal owners of the 
leased assets. However, there are critical issues related to the agency relations between 
Sadara and the investors, as examined in the following discussion.   
8.5.2 Sadara sukuk and agency issues 
A number of types of moral hazard and adverse selection problems are inherent to 
the Sadara sukuk structure. The presence of informational asymmetries is more harmful to 
Sadara sukuk investors as they are more exposed, after delivery, to credit and asset risks 
compared to other securities based on ijara. In the Sadara sukuk, agency relationships appear 
when Sadara is an originator, a contractor, a lessee and a servicer, showing an inherent 
exposure to the agency problem. Firstly, there is a possible conflict between Sadara as an 
originator and the investors caused by the asymmetrical information concerning the value of 
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the invested land and assets. As the Sadara sukuk reached around $3 billion in value, this 
raises the concern on that the cash paid is greater than the value of the invested assets. 
Investors do not have access so as to measure and evaluate the current and future Sadara 
assets. However, in this respect, the Sharia board asks for a neutral third-party estimation to 
ensure the actual relationship between the cash received and the invested assets. Involving a 
neutral third party aimed to reduce the risk of adverse selection caused by the information 
asymmetry that is in favour of Sadara. This relationship also has a Sharia dimension because 
it is important to present a true link between investors and assets.   
In addition, Sadara, as a contractor of the leased asset with investors as owners, has 
eliminated the agency conflict that may arise in this case. This is because Sadara and the 
investors are parents under the musharaka agreement. Investors, as owner of the assets, seek 
well-constructed assets to increase the value of their investment. Sadara, as a partner, has the 
same incentive towards the lease assets, resulting in a situation where the contractor has 
sufficient motivation to perform well. In spite of that, Sadara investors have no access to 
monitor the contractor, but the partnership involved has reduced the need for monitoring. 
Therefore, investors can be more confident that they are investing in reliable future assets. 
In addition, after delivery, investors have no authorized access to ascertain the quality of the 
assets owned and whether or not Sadara’s actions have been in favour of the assets. However, 
due to co-ownership, investors can more certain that Sadara will maintain a high quality of 
service, management and performance. Although there is a possibility of the misuse of the 
principal or the asset revenues, the Sadara sukuk structure involves two hedging procedures 
to reduce the moral hazard. These are the undertaking about the final purchase based on the 
face value and the cash flows from the lease assets. Sadara undertakes to buy the assets at 
their face value, meaning that Sadara will be the final owner of the assets, which benefits the 
lessee’s performance to be in favour of the assets. This purchase undertaking presents a 
dimension of sharing between Sadara and their investors, aiming for a better mechanism to 
manage the incentives. Also, in the ijara sukuk the return is determined, which minimizes 
the moral hazard. This commitment about the proceeds from the assets on the ijara basis can 
be seen as a control over the agency costs. The return is determined as an advance rental 
payment and a rental payment that can mitigate the agency risks resulting from the 
information asymmetry. As a consequence of these two mechanisms, investors are less 
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concerned with the lessee’s performance and are only interested in the coupon payments 
since Sadara will pay a specific return and buy the leased assets at maturity at their face 
value. Therefore, investors have little incentive to monitor the asset’s revenues or the 
invested cash.  
It is important to highlight that the risk of the total loss of the asset is incurred by the 
investors, which is a distinctive feature of this structure. This means a loss to investors of the 
incoming returns and the principal. Transferring the assets’ risks to the investors results in a 
conflict between the investors’ interests and those of Sadara as a lessee. Sadara as a lessee 
can bear the loss of the assets only in the case of neglect. In the case of a total loss, Sadara 
has an incentive to show no negligence in performance so as to transfer the loss to the 
investors. The problem becomes more critical in the case of high levels of information 
asymmetry. Sadara, as an originator, contractor, lessee and agent, is in a position to receive 
all information related to the assets and their loss, while investors have no official access to 
evaluate or measure the loss. This particular procedure satisfies Sharia rules; however, 
agency conflicts arise.  
8.6 Summary  
In this chapter, the Sharia implications and the financial basis for the Sadara sukuk 
have been examined. The main issue, based on the AAOIFI Standards, is that it appears 
certain that prevalent contradictions in the ijara contract relate to ownership of the Sadara 
assets. In the Sadara sukuk, the ijara agreement might have some characteristics of an ijara 
contract because the transaction involves the right to use the usufruct of the asset; however, 
the ownership provided is still a concern. Sadara sukuk do not provide a sufficient ownership 
since the assets at all time, are in the possession of Sadara, during both stages of the 
transaction.   
However, this structure has a number of distinctive features that helps it to be more 
compliant with Sharia and to be a more effective financial instrument. Firstly, the inah 
structure is eliminated by specifying two separate assets with two different contracts: the 
musharaka agreement and the forward ijara agreement. Secondly, the partnership featured 
in the musharaka agreement has eliminated a number of possible hazards in the investment. 
187 | P a g e  
  
This agreement reduces the risks caused by the information asymmetry between Sadara and 
their investors. The Sadara sukuk structure is a step forward in the sukuk industry to satisfy 
both financial and Sharia demands.   
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Chapter 9: Zamzam Towers Sukuk as a Case 
Study  
  
9.1 Introduction  
The Zamzam sukuk is the first implementation of an Islamic time-share financing in 
the sukuk market. The proceeds will fund the infrastructure of Zamzam Tower, which is a 
part of Abraj al-Bait complex within the King Abdul-Aziz endowments. The project of the 
Zamzam Tower has been secured by an affiliate of the Kuwait-based International Lease 
Investment Company called Munsha’t Company. The total project is one of the largest 
construction projects in the world, measuring around 1.4 million square metres and it is the 
fourth tallest freestanding structure in the world reaching 480 m high (Riazat, 2006).   
In December 2003, Munsha’t Co. issued a $390 million Zamzam sukuk for a tenure 
of 24 years to finance the construction (Mohieldin, et al., 2012). The project is a 31 storey 
building and includes 1240 residential units on land adjacent to the Holy Mosque in Makkah 
(Al-Zoubi, 2003). The Zamzam issuance during the first two weeks, according to Al-Ameri, 
the managing director of Munsha’t Co., was over-subscribed by 135 per cent (Al-Mine & 
Al-Bashir, 2012). Then, at the end of June 2006, the issuance achieved success with total 
cash of $900 m (Merrill Lynch International, 2008). This is because these timeshare sukuk 
are for project located in a high-demand area in Makkah according to the Riyadh Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry. Investment during the last three decades has reached $75 billion, 
and in Makkah land can cost up to $65,700 per square metre, which is more expensive than 
Manhattan or Mayfair (Riazat, 2006). In fact, around 3 million people visit Makkah during 
Ramadan and around 4 million during Hajj. Typically, the monthly rental for a tiny 33 sq. 
metre apartment with a view of the Ka'ba view, costs around $123,000 during the Hajj 
period; whereas a studio with a city view in low season costs roughly $4,500 for one week 
(Riazat, 2006). The holders of the Zamzam sukuk will own the lease of an apartment 
completed in September 2006 that ranges from a studio to a royal suite. A studio apartment 
costs $5,000 for one week in the off peak season during the 24-year period; however, the 
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cost of the same apartment rises to $22,000 during the first two weeks of Ramadan; and up 
to $80,000 during the last 10 days of Ramadan (Arab news, 2004). The same formula for 
prices extends to and applies to all the other classes units, as these sukuk were priced 
according to view, unit size and season. The Zamzam sukuk are comprised of 57040 
certificates that represent a fractional ownership of the right to utilize a specific part of the 
building for a specific time per year over 24 years.   
9.2 Origin and Process of the Zamzam sukuk Structure  
The Zamzam sukuk are an example of an innovative type of security that includes a 
number of concepts to satisfy both Sharia standards and Saudi law. In Saudi Arabia, the law 
does not allow for any foreigner to own a property located in the country. This was the main 
obstacle facing Munsha’t Co. when commencing the project, since non-Saudi investors are 
barred from the project. Therefore, Munsha’t Co. searched for a product that could comply 
with Saudi Arabian law as well as Sharia law (Amer & Radenarmad, 2012). The company 
studied the demand for short-term accommodation in Makkah along with its prices according 
to the Islamic calendar to develop a product that applies the concepts of time-sharing, 
fractional ownership, and forward ijara under the framework of 24-years reversionary 
ground lease (Shamsiah, 2010, p. 82). By combining these concepts, Munsha’t Co. issued 
the sukuk intifa’ which allowed, for the first time, both  
local and foreign investors to invest in and own real estate in Makkah.  
The structure of the Zamzam sukuk involves forward ijara sukuk in a special sense. 
To illustrate this, the King Abdul-Aziz endowments signed the ijara contract with the 
Binladin Group on the basis of a BOT (build-operate-transfer) agreement for 28 years. 
According to this agreement, the Binladin Group will construct four towers, a shopping 
complex, and a hotel for the King Abdul-Aziz endowments as payment. Secondly, the Group 
as an originator, in turn, appoints Munsha’t Co. as an SPV to fund and operate the 
construction and then to transfer it back to the Group at the end of the lease period. Thirdly, 
the Binladin Group subcontracted the construction and signed a forward ijara contract with 
Munsha’t Co. to build the construction, and thereafter the company packages the assets of 
the forward ijara into sukuk for investors. In the forward ijara framework, Munsha’t leased 
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the assets under construction to investors for 24 years, who paid the advance rental in one 
lump sum, through sukuk intifa’ that generate the  
required finance proceeds valued at $390 million. The investors subscribed for future 
benefits, and then Munsha’t Co. disburses the proceeds to the contractor34 and consultants 
who were to deliver the completed asset to Munsha’t Co. on behalf of the investors by 
September 2006. After delivery, investors have the right to use the property or invest this 
right by selling or sub-leasing it to a third party (Amer & Radenarmad ،2012). Therefore, it 
is important to note that the ground belongs to King Abdul-Aziz endowments; the buildings 
belong to Munsha’t Co. with the proviso that the long-term ownership of the buildings would 
eventually transfer to the endowments. The intifa’ or benefit of the units belongs to the 
sukuk-holders for 24 years.  
Figure 9-1 Zamzam Sukuk Structure 
  
Source: (Amer & Radenarmad, 2012)  
According to the above structure, the Zamzam sukuk include the following 
documents summarized in Table 9-1 below:  
                                                   
34 The contractor and developer of the project is the Saudi Binladin Group, the Sauid’s largest construction 
company (Arab news, 2004).  
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Table 9-1 Zamzam Sukuk Documents 
Document  Parties  Purpose  
Ijara  
Agreement  
Munshaat Co.  
(as a Lessee) and  
Binladin Group  
(as a Lessor)  
  
From the Munsha’t Co.’s perspective, this is the 
document that provides a 24-year reversionary ground 
lease with the endowment.  
From the Binladin Group’s perspective, this is the 
document that obligates the subcontractor to build a 
high-quality service facility.  
Constructing  
Agreement  
Munsha’t Co.  
 (as a Purchaser) 
and  
Binladin Group  
 (as a Contractor)  
From the Munsha’t Co.’s perspective, this is the 
document that provides the ownership of revenue 
generating assets at a future time.  
From the Binladin Group’s perspective, this is the 
document that provides the funding.   
Forward 
ijara  
Agreement  
Munshaat Co.  
 (as a Lessors) 
and  
Investors  
(as a Lessee)  
From the Munsha’t Co.’s perspective, this document 
generates the return required for the constructing the 
project.  
From the investors’ perspective, this is the document 
which provides them with the possession and use of 
future assets.   
Service  
Agency  
Agreement  
Investors  
(as a Lessor) and  
Munshaat Co.  
(as a Lessee)  
From the investors’ perspective, this is the document 
that allows them to pass the liability for periodical 
maintenance and management of the property.  
From Munsha’t Co.’s perspective, this document 
generates return to cover the assets’ expenses.  
9.3 Sharia Perspective Analysis  
For the Zamzam sukuk, from a Sharia perspective, an analysis is required of both the 
content and the structure, aiming to provide an overall assessment. The analysis and the final 
assessment would be mainly based on the AAOIFI standards. As the Zamzam sukuk did not 
provide a prospectus for the issuance, the analysis proceeds according to the information 
stated in the documents of the sukuk and the annual reports of Munsha’t Co.  
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9.3.1 Critical Analysis of the Content  
 I. Zamzam Sukuk Assets  
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
The sukuk are based on 
unavailable assets. 
September 2006 is the 
agreed date for delivery. The 
assets are specifically 
identified to the investors.  
‘The deed owner acknowledges 
that he had inspected the 
specifications of the tower and 
housing units with all furniture 
included’35.  
Standard No.9, clause3/5, 
‘an ijara contract may be  
executed for an asset 
undertaken by the lessor to 
be delivered to the lessee 
according to accurate 
specifications’.  
The information provided about the unavailable asset to Zamzam sukuk investors 
satisfies this standard. As stated, all of the details of the unit’s location descriptions of the 
furniture were clarified in a way that prevents any future dispute. With regard to the delivery 
date, AAOIFI in Standard No.9, clause 3/5 provides for the forward ijara contract that ‘an 
agreement is reached to make the described asset available during the duration of the 
contract’. The Zamzam sukuk were estimated to deliver the project within three years from 
the issuance date and then the beneficiary investors would be able to utilize the unit for the 
remaining term. In fact, the Zamzam sukuk have no Sharia criticism related to the future asst. 
This is because, in principle, future usufruct can be securitized as an existing asset without 
any concern from AAOIFI, according to Standard No.17, clause 3/2/2, it allows for the 
securitization of un-available usufruct and this is considered to be one of the sukuk types 
represented by the ‘certificates of ownership of usufructs of described future assets’ 
(AAOIFI, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
35 Note that the prospectus is of only one page and thus all of the following statements refer to the same page.   
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II. Zamzam Sukuk Ownership   
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
The Munsha’t Co. through this 
issuance transfers a residential 
usufruct to the investors with open 
commercial behaviour. Investors 
physically possess a share of the 
future project; they receive a 
fractional ownership of the right to 
use a definite part of the Zamzam 
project over 22 years.  
However, there are some agreed 
limitations on the behaviour 
towards the real ownership of the 
residential units.  
‘The deed owner shall 
have the right to 
assign, sell, grant, 
donate, bequeath or 
lease the deed to a 
third party after 
completion.  
The beneficiary may 
not make any 
alteration or addition 
to the said residential 
unit’.  
Standard No. 9, clause  
3/1, ‘for the validity of an 
ijara contract concerning a 
specified asset, the lease 
contract should be 
preceded by acquisition of 
either the asset to be leased 
or the usufruct of that 
asset’.  
The AAOIFI requires physical ownership, either to the asset or the usufruct, to 
validate the sukuk, while the Zamzam sukuk does not represent any physical ownership to 
the asset but rather of the usufruct. More importantly, the fractional ownership has to take 
the form of a legal transfer according to Standard No.18, clause 3/4 which indicates that 
valid ownership involves a ‘legal possession that includes the registration of a mortgage of 
immovable … that is valid under the law’. Although there is no clear statement in the contract 
regarding the legal registration of the usufruct, the holders are able to elect a number of 
different preferences from which to profit. They can specify exchange periods via a 
specialized affiliate of the Munsha’t Co. called Mas Co., or to sub-lease the contracted period 
to an agreed tenant who desires to visit Makkah, or even just to re-sell the security to an 
interested buyer. This shows that the holders have direct access to their owned usufruct. If 
the Munsha’t Co. becomes bankrupt, as a consequence of economic downturn or a severe 
financial distress, this should not affect the investors in the of Zamzam project since they 
have leveraged the investment for ‘right-to-use’ the product; however, there remains a risk 
if the Munsha’t Co. becomes insolvent since it may cease to operate the project which would 
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result in the loss of the benefits enjoyed by sukuk-holders. It can be concluded that the 
investors received an acceptable level of ownership that satisfied the standards of the 
AAOIFI despite the risk issue.  
III. Zamzam Sukuk Principal  
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
The principal was paid according to the 
unit size, season and view. At maturity, 
investors will transfer their usufruct 
back to the issuer without any cash in 
turn because the paid price was for the 
rent that has been utilized. However, the 
only situation where payment would be 
guaranteed by the Munsha’t Co. is when 
the asset is not delivered. It is the 
responsibility of the Munsha’t Co. to 
bear the refund risk of the initial 
purchase price paid to the investors as 
compensation.  
‘If the project is not 
completed ‘he shall 
have the right to 
recover the amounts 
paid by him for the 
period during which 
he has not got any 
benefit’.  
Standard No. 17, clause 
5/1/8/7, ‘the prospectus 
must not include any 
statement to the effect 
that the issuer of the 
certificate accepts the 
liability to compensate 
the owner of the 
certificate up to the 
nominal value of the 
certificate in situations 
other than torts and 
negligence’.  
Zamzam sukuk represents no guarantee of the principal during the project. The 
capital received from the investors is not guaranteed unless the issuer fails to provide the 
future usufruct. This is compatible with the AAOIFI Standard which states that Zamzam 
sukuk investors have to bear the risk of capital loss unless delivery is postponed. It is also 
mentioned in Standard 9, clause no.4/1/3 that, ‘if the lessor fails to deliver the asset to the 
lessee on the date specified in the ijara contract, no rental is due for the period between the 
contract date and the date of actual delivery’. Thus, the Zamzam sukuk appears to be 
compatible with AAOIFI standards in respect of the principal received.     
IV. Zamzam Sukuk Return   
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
There is no expected return until the 
asset is delivered. After delivery, 
investors can receive, further to 
their personal benefits, return 
generated from the asset.  
‘The deed owner shall 
have the right to … lease 
the deed to a third party 
after completion and 
handing over of the 
tower, in condition that 
Standard No. 9 clause 
5/1/8/7 states that ‘the 
prospectus must not 
include any statement 
to the effect that the 
issuer of the certificate 
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However, it is important to note 
that annual, marketing fees and 
other additional fees will be 
deducted by the issuer from the 
income.  
the procedure shall be 
taken with the knowledge 
of Munsha’t Co. or its 
respective’.  
… guarantees a fixed 
percentage of profit’.  
Related to the returns, the Zamzam sukuk are compatible with Sharia in two critical 
aspects. Firstly, the profit is not guaranteed, and secondly the return is linked to the real 
market for both the investors and issuer. Investors can sub-lease the units to other Muslims 
from all over the world for a rent that is based on market value. The return of the Zamzam 
sukuk depends on the demand for hotel rooms in Makkah, which varies according to the 
seasons. Some months are more popular than others; however, the pattern of demand has 
been reflected in the sukuk prices. The return for investors would be the differences between 
the advanced rental payment and the rental received based on the market price. This return 
is not guaranteed; however, prospective purchasers are informed that they can expect an 
average rental return of between 10% and 15% per year which is a high return in comparison 
with the prevailing rates in the real estate sector (AlMine & Al-Bashir, 2012). This high rate 
of return reflects the significant risk born by the investors, as a negative situation can be 
expected when there is no demand for the property or it generates low rental payments that 
are not sufficient to provide a net income.  
On the side of the issuer, the Munsha’t Co. estimates the return from the rent to be 
the difference between the rate paid to the Binladin Group and the rate received from 
investors. The Munsha’t Co. expects a 26% rate of revenue from this project (Ahmed, 2004). 
It also believes that demand for these sukuk will be very high and predicts return from the 
investment in excess of $800 million in the first three years (Al-Mine & AlBashir, 2012). 
According to the second Munsha’t Co. report, the company achieved great financial results 
within the initial years, since its revenue in 2004 soared from 1.5 million Kuwaiti Dinar at 
31 fils per-share to reach 11.8 million dinar at 142 fils per-share in 2005 (Kettell, 2014).  
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V. Zamzam Sukuk Maintenance  
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
The Zamzam sukuk involve annual fees 
for maintenance whether the asset is 
utilized or not. These fees not only cover 
the costs of ordinary maintenance, but 
also include the expenses for the 
property’s management.  
The fees are contractually payable 
annually by the investors. However, the 
annual fees may not be sufficient to meet 
all the expenses. In such a case, the 
sukuk-holders will pay additional 
amounts in subsequent years to cover the 
shortfall.  
‘The deed owner 
undertakes to pay his 
shares in the estimated 
expenses to cover 
management and the 
cost of periodical 
maintenance’.  
Standard No. 9, 
clause 5/1/7, ‘the 
lessee should carry 
out operating or 
periodical (ordinary) 
maintenance’.  
In the Zamzam sukuk, the maintenance structure generally satisfies Sharia rules, as 
investors as lessees are only responsible for periodical maintenance. However, the concern 
raised is the gharar involved in the maintenance cost. Generally, according to AAOIFI 
Standard No.9, clause 5/1/7, the rental payments in the long term have to be adjusted to 
prevent any dispute afterwards: ‘in case the rental is subject to changes (floating rental), it is 
necessary that the amount of the rental of the first period of the ijara contract be specified. 
It is then permissible that the rentals for subsequent periods be determined according to a 
certain benchmark. Such benchmark must be based on a clear formula which is not subject 
to dispute’. Similarly to the rental payment, the maintenance cost payment has to be 
measured with a clear formula in order to enhance the holders’ confidence and prevent any 
possible dispute. It is essential in Sharia to overcome excessive gharar, uncertainty and 
hazard in increasing the maintenance costs for other hidden purposes. Thus, linking the 
annual fees of the Zamzam sukuk with a clear benchmark or a clear percentage of rates is 
necessary to avoid disputes and satisfy Sharia.   
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VI. Zamzam Sukuk Tradability   
Situation  Statement  AAOIFI Standard  
No trading is possible 
prior the delivery; 
whereas, after delivery the 
issuer allows for trading 
these sukuk with some 
fees.  
‘The deed owner 
shall have the right 
to sell … to a third 
party after 
completion’.  
Standard No. 17, clause 5/2/8, ‘it is not 
permissible to trade in certificates of 
ownership of usufructs of a described 
asset before the asset from which 
usufruct is to be made available is 
ascertained’.  
The trading feature of the Zamzam sukuk shows compliance with Sharia rules. These 
sukuk cannot be traded until the assets are delivered because this would be tantamount to the 
trading of a debt instrument. After delivery to the owners’ satisfaction, the Zamzam sukuk 
represent an available asset that can be traded.  However, trading the Zamzam sukuk inherits 
a risk associated with demand for the unit. The level of this risk depends on the season, even 
if the project is overall in a high-demand location, since some sukuk represent weeks in the 
off-peak season. In addition, the secondary market for these sukuk is not well-developed, 
which is discussed below in terms of the liquidity risk.    
9.3.2 Critical Analysis of the Structure  
 I. Forward Ijara Structure  
Situation  AAOIFI Standard  
In this forward structure, investors paid the 
rental in advance as a lump sum.  
   
  
Standard No. 9, clause 3/5, ‘it is not a 
requirement of this lease that the rental 
should be paid in advance as long as the lease 
is not executed according to the contract of 
salam’.  
The contract of the Zamzam sukuk does not 
include any clarification with regard to the 
case that the units received differ from their 
description.  
Standard No. 9, clause 3/5, ‘should the lessee 
receive an asset that does not conform to the 
description, then he is entitled to reject it and 
demand an asset that conforms to the 
description’.  
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The Munsha’t Co. failed to complete the 
Zamzam project by the end of September 
2006 and extended the period for another 
two years. Thus, the Munsha’t Co. paid 
compensation rather than providing a 
similar unit according to the contract 
(Radenarmad, 2015).  
Standard No. 9, clause 4/1/3, ‘if the lessor 
fails to deliver the asset to the lessee on the 
date specified in the ijara contract, no rental 
is due for the period between the contract 
date and the date of actual delivery, and the 
rental should be reduced accordingly’.  
Although, the AAOIFI show some flexibility in this regard, as long as no indication 
of salam is mentioned, these sukuk have been structured with an advance rental payment for 
the purpose of generating funds. On the other hand, the AAOIFI has a strict attitude towards 
a case where the asset received differs from the description. Despite the contract not 
clarifying such a case, it would be the investors right to reject the asset.   
If the delivery is postponed, the scholars are agreed that the lessor has to pay the 
compensation, as the AAOIFI has stated, by reducing the rental received accordingly. In fact, 
the Munsha’t Co. failed to complete the assets by the end of September 2006 and the 
company applied a consensus ruling rather than providing similar units. However, regarding 
the delay, the contract promised ‘to provide a similar unit and no compensation will be paid 
unless if such a situation continues for three consecutive years’.  
II. Timeshare Structure   
Situation  AAOIFI Standard  
The  Zamzam  sukuk  involve 
the timeshare structure since these sukuk 
allow the holders to utilize the assets for 
a specified time for a number of years 
according to the amounts mentioned on 
the contract. 
In Standard No. 9, clause 4/2/3, ‘an ijara 
contract may be signed with several lessees 
being entitled to the same specified usufruct 
of a particular asset and duration of 
rent…This case is one form of timesharing 
in benefiting from the usufruct’. 
Although this was the first attempt to 
apply this structure in the market of sukuk, 
no Sharia boards monitored and 
maintained adherence to Sharia. 
Standard No. 17, clause 5/1/8/4 related to 
sukuk states that ‘there is a Sharia board that 
approves the procedures of the issues and 
monitors the implementation of the project 
throughout its duration’.  
The structure of timeshare is considered under the ijara contract, according to the 
AAOIFI. This was the first timeshare sukuk to be issued and the Munsha’t Co. received an 
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ISO prize for the uniqueness of this structure (Munsha'at, 2005). Despite that, there were no 
Sharia boards involved. In fact, the Zamzam sukuk were monitored by a Sharia scholar who 
worked for Munsha’t Co. rather than a particular Sharia board for the specific issuance. The 
Munsha’t Co. has appointed a reliable Sharia controller named Dr. Anwar Shuaib, who 
monitors all the activities, documents and procedures of the Munsha’t Co. and updates his 
fatwa annually. In all the published fatwa since 2004 until 2015, all of the activities of 
Musha’at were, including Zamzam sukuk, compatible with Sharia (Munshaat, 2015). The 
Sharia complaint level of this structure reaches a high position in comparison with other 
issuance of sukuk, but there is a concern related to the excessive risks involved in the 
investment without informing the investors. The concern is related to the amount of gharar 
involved, and whether it is substantial or minor, since the only gharar that can cause the 
financial transaction to be declared null and void according to the AAOIFI is substantial 
gharar. It has been stated in Standard 31, clause no. 4/2 that ‘gharar violates the transactions 
when it satisfies four conditions …. If it is excessive in degree’. Thus, the transaction can be 
null and void according to the amount of risk that has been concealed. The amount of risk 
borne by Zamzam sukuk-holders is discussed in the next section to decide the extent of 
gharar taken by investors.  
9.3.3 Overall Rating  
The research has analysed the Sharia issues related to the Zamzam sukuk with the 
support of statements from official documents in order to conclude with an overall rating 
based on AAOIFI principles. The Tables above have shown the evaluation of the Zamzam 
sukuk according to all relevant standards of the AAOIFI. As indicated, if the situation of the 
Zamzam sukuk is compatible with the standard, the issuance will receive a score of 1, partial 
compatibility will receive 0.5 points, absent receives 0 and finally contradictions of the 
standards receives -1 point.  
Table 9-2 Results of Zamzam Sukuk According to Standard no.9 
Standard no.  Clause no.  Compliance  Value  
  
  
3/1  Compliance  1  
3/3  Compliance  1  
3/5  Compliance  1  
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No.(9)  
Ijara  
  
  
  
  
4/1/2  Compliance  1  
4/1/3  Compliance  1  
4/2/1  Compliance  1  
4/2/2  Compliance  1  
4/2/3  Compliance  1  
5/1/1  Compliance  1  
5/1/2  Compliance  1  
5/1/4  Compliance  1  
5/1/5  Compliance  1  
5/1/6  Compliance  1  
5/1/7  Absence  0  
5/1/8  Compliance  1  
5/2/2  Compliance  1  
7/1/6  Compliance  1  
Total  16 out of 17   
    
Table 9-3 Results of Zamzam Sukuk According to Standard nos.17-18 
Standard no.  Clause no.  Compliance  Value 
No.(17)  
Sukuk  
  
  
5/1/8/1  Partial compliance  0.5  
5/1/8/2  Compliance  1  
5/1/8/3  Compliance  1  
5/1/8/4  Partial compliance  0.5  
5/1/8/5  Compliance  1  
5/1/8/6  Compliance  1  
5/1/8/7  Compliance  1  
No.(18) Possession  3/4  Compliance  1  
Total  7 out of 8 
  
Table 9-4 Results of Zamzam Sukuk According to Standard no.23 
Standard no.  Clause no.  Compliance  Value  
  
No.(23)  
Wakala  
3/1  Compliance  1  
3/2  Compliance  1  
3/3  Compliance  1  
4/2/C  Absent  0  
5/2  Compliance  1  
Total 4 out of 5  
Aggregate Percentages Compliance: 27/30=90 %  
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As mentioned, the Munsha’t Co. aimed to achieve total satisfaction of the AAOIFI 
Standards in this specific issuance. However, the Tables show that, from a total of 30 
AAOIFI Standards, these sukuk are compatible with only 24 Standards. Nevertheless, the 
high result for aggregate compliance cannot be ignored as they achieved 90% which is the 
highest percentage among the three applications in this study. This high result is attributed 
to the real ownership of the assets, meaning that there is no guarantee of the principal or the 
returns.    
9.4 Observed Risk Mitigation Process  
The discussion focuses on the risks involved in the structure of the Zamzam sukuk. 
It is an important part of the study since the inherent risks have not been addressed by 
Munsha’t Co. in their presentation to the public. This may be attributed to the fact that 
Zamzam sukuk have been issued via a contract document. This does not usually mention the 
risk factors. Therefore, the holders of these sukuk will be involved in an investment without 
a full understanding of the risks that they may be exposed to especially with such a new 
product in the market. In the short term, not clarifying the risk factors in the investment may 
enable effective marketing; however, in the long term, this can affect these sukuk negatively. 
After completing the project, there may be a loss of the confidence about these sukuk due to 
the earlier misunderstanding between the issuer and investors about the possible risks. In the 
following, sections highlight the risk factors based on the specific innovative structure of 
these sukuk.    
9.4.1 Risk Factors  
 I. Credit Risk  
Each sukuk involves credit risks in activities where success depends on a 
counterparty. This means that if one party to the Zamzam sukuk fails to discharge an 
obligation this causes the other party to bear a financial loss (Munsha'at, 2005). Accordingly, 
credit risk includes the possibility that the Munsha’t Co. as a borrower and the investors as 
counterparties will fail to meet their annual obligations in accordance with the agreed terms. 
Thus, the credit risk fot the Zamzam sukuk involves various unique aspects that include the 
obligations of both parties. Firstly, parties to Zamzam sukuk can default on their annual 
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payments. Maintaining cash flow is essential for a smooth and viable project; however, a 
situation of default can lead to short falls in the project’s cash flow and then to the financial 
losses. When a substantial proportion of sukuk members default, this can seriously affect the 
funds required for ongoing expenditures, causing extra losses of revenue as well as increase 
in costs, particularly marketing expenses. The large number of individual investors increases 
the possibility of default as the project will be influenced by an individual’s wishes, financial 
status and ability to meet obligations. Adding to that, the long tenure of 24 years adds an 
extra pressure on these sukuk since the credit risk during 24 years related to investors’ 
creditworthiness is less predictable.   
Cases of default by Zamzam investors could be caused by a number of factors, such 
as an overall downturn in the economy or the financial distress of a specific individual that 
may have an impact on the investors’ capacity to maintain their payment obligations. 
Members may also decide to default if the annual levies raised are perceived as unjustified. 
They may also decide to default if the quality of the received service, maintenance, 
experience or confidence in management is not satisfactory. Thus, if the Munsha’t Co. 
chooses to default on its obligation and provides poor service, this will undoubtedly have a 
negative impact on the members and may result in default or possibly termination. Therefore, 
it is important to address the other aspect of credit risk, where the Munsha’t Co. fails to 
provide a satisfactory quality of real estate. Failing to provide the Zamzam assets with a high 
quality of service can lead to financial loss since the decline in Zamzam members’ 
satisfaction levels or even that of their guests is a key risk to be considered by the Munsha’t 
Co.  
Because it is a key risk, the contract of the Zamzam sukuk addresses an agreement 
related to default risks of both the Munsha’t Co. and the investors. On the investors’ side, 
the document stated that ‘if violation by the deed owner for the conditions stated in the deed 
became frequent, Munsha’t Co. or its authorized representative shall have the right to 
consider the deed as null and void and resell it in order to be refunded. The refunded price is 
in proportion with the number of years remaining from the utility period and attributed to 
the price of the above deed deducing thereof any due amounts from him’. The Munsha’t Co. 
has the right to resell the sukuk and be compensated for any financial loss caused by the 
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investor to mitigate the negative impact of such a risk. On the other hand, the document for 
the issuer states that ‘if events beyond the control of Munsha’t Co. prevented the deed owner 
to use the first period, the date of use starts shall be carried forward to the second year then 
Munsha’t Co. undertakes to enable owner to utilize either the residential unit or provide 
similar unit. In case such an event continued for three consecutive years… he shall have the 
right to recover the amounts paid for the period during which he has not benefited’. Both 
statements include an agreement in the case of frequent default concerning when the default 
procedures should be initiated. For instance, if an investor fails to pay the annual fee, the 
issuer can exercise the right to resell the sukuk and cover the unit’s expenses but only in the 
case of frequent defaulting. Also, in the event that the Munsha’t Co. fails to fulfill its 
obligation, the certificate holder can exercise the right to take legal action and force the issuer 
to refund their payment after three years.  
The Zamzam sukuk issuer can manage this risk in the following ways. The first is by 
providing high quality assets, facilities and services. The credit risk can also be minimized 
through engaging only members with high liquidity which requires more efforts during 
marketing stage. However, it will have a positive effect in mitigating the credit risk and thus 
protecting the project from incidents of financial distresses. Also, increasing the annual fees 
is typical in any timeshare structure; however, to avoid default, a number of strategies can 
be implemented. Increasing the annual fees should be implemented wisely in order to 
maintain the satisfaction of investors’ by explaining in the contract the possibility of such 
increase. A more practical strategy is to control annual fees by pegging the annual costs as a 
percentage of rack rates. This measure can enhance the investor’s confidence in the justice 
of the annual payment. For instance, the system of maintenance costs for a resort project in 
Egypt adjacent to the Red Sea was between 10% to 15% of rack rates when the property was 
leased on a short-term basis (E.Hawk, 1985). This system of annual costing allows for cost 
escalation36 by Munsha’t Co. while simultaneously providing a measure to satisfy Zamzam 
sukuk-holders. It is also possible to consider the maintenance and management costs when 
selling these sukuk by adding these costs to the purchase payment in order to avoid any 
                                                   
36 Cost escalation refers to the changes in the cost or price of specific assets, goods or services in a particular 
economy over a period.  
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possible risk of future increases Zamzam members. For example, some operators in this field 
add the expected fees during with the selling price (Hovey, 2002). This procedure can help 
the the Munsha’t Co. to maintain a high quality service without undue financial pressure 
being placed on Zamzam members.   
Capital Loss Risk  
Zamzam sukuk holders are subject to high capital loss risk since these sukuk can only 
be resold at market value, and not at the purchased price. Typically, timeshare bonds lose 
their market value immediately after purchase since they are counted as real estate paid in 
advance and not as an investment in real estate. This is in addition to the loss of marketing 
costs that represent a significant percentage of the final timeshare price, amounting to at least 
43 per cent which is a considerable proportion compared to the figures for print, television 
and electronic media costs worldwide accounting for around only 10 per cent of sales 
(Powanga, 2008). This means that the Zamzam sukuk do not reflect the actual price of the 
asset, it but include a sizeable percentage of marketing costs. Thus, it is inevitable that their 
nominal value will decline immediately after purchase. In fact, this particular risk makes 
Zamzam sukuk less attractive as an investment product and more appropriate for personal 
use, since investors mainly look for a deal with a greater level of capital guarantee.   
II. Market Risk  
Market risk refers to the possibility of the value of Zamzam sukuk fluctuating over a 
short period of time. The Zamzam sukuk are based on real estate, which is typically less 
volatile and this in turn lowers the exposure to this type of risk. In addition, the holders are 
less exposed to this risk as the asset is located in a high-quality area. The value of the 
Zamzam sukuk, therefore, will not sharply change as a result of fluctuations in market prices. 
This is true even though the resale prices are expected to be lower than the fair price, since 
the lower price, as discussed 37 , is reasonably predictable and is not caused by market 
volatility. However, there are two aspects of the Zamzam sukuk that may intensify the market 
risk. Firstly, the sukuk may be exposed to this risk due to difficulties in measuring the market 
                                                   
37 Previously, in capital loss risk.  
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risk for a project under construction. Secondly, the long maturity of 24 years plays a role in 
increasing the potential impact of this risk.   
Market risk also includes interest rate risks. As far as the Zamzam sukuk are 
concerned, interest rate risks can be considered as the rate of return risks since the value of 
these sukuk is not related directly to fluctuations in benchmark interest rates but rather to the 
actual value of the underlying assets. This means that due to the nature of these sukuk, 
investors are exposed to the risk of fluctuations in the return rate based on the asset’s value 
in the market. Despite this, the rate of return depends on the quality of the time, view and 
size of the sukuk, and so drastic changes are unlikely. Thus, the Zamzam sukuk are subject 
to a low risk of changes in the return rate.  
Moreover, foreign exchange rate risk is another component of market risk. This is 
the risk that the value of the Zamzam sukuk will fluctuate due to changes in foreign exchange 
rates. The Zamzam sukuk are denominated in the contract in US Dollars and consequently 
there is a currency mismatch. The issuer, Munsha’t Co., is a Kuwaiti company that records 
all its transactions in Kuwaiti Dinars; whereas, investors are globally widespread using 
various currencies. Thus, any unfavourable exchange rate fluctuations can negatively 
influence the value of these sukuk, where any appreciation of the US Dollar against the 
Kuwaiti Dinar will invariably result in a loss. However, currency exchange rate changes can 
often result in profit for the issuer. For example, the recent weakness of the US Dollar relative 
to the Kuwaiti Dinar has been in favour of the Munsha’t Co. For this reason, the company 
chose US currency which does not fluctuate significantly against the Kuwaiti Dinar in order 
to maintain this risk at an acceptable level (Munshaat, 2004, p. 12). The foreign exchange 
risk is mostly unavoidable from the investors’ perspective. If the base currency of the 
investors is other than in US Dollars, the return to Zamzam sukuk-holders will be influenced 
by changes in the value of the currency.  
III. Liquidity Risk  
In timeshare markets, the highest risk exposure is associated with liquidity (Hovey, 
2002). Investors in the Zamzam sukuk are highly exposed to liquidity risk as a result of two 
main factors that enhance illiquidity. The first is that these sukuk are issued on an unavailable 
project that was predicted to be completed within three years. During the construction period, 
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the uncertainly about liquidity is higher because of the failure possibility of failure. Despite 
this, the asset is guaranteed by Munsha’t Co. until delivered, and the sukuk-holders will bear 
some of the risk since they will not be able to gain access to their assets to compensate for 
their capital loss if the issuer becomes bankrupt at this stage. The second aspect of Zamzam 
liquidity risk is the absence of an organized secondary market, and this risk is also enhanced 
by the inactive primary market. The Zamzam sukuk are negatively influenced by the limited 
issuances of timeshare sukuk in the Islamic financial market. Adding to this, an organized 
secondary market through the Internet where investors individually trade their sukuk is not 
available, as it is in some of international timeshare bonds. More importantly, selling 
Zamzam sukuk at their fair price and within a reasonable time seems unachievable because 
it is typical for timeshare bonds to lose some of their value after purchase (Hovey, 2002). 
This is because the ownership in a timeshare is different from ownership in traditional real 
estate because timeshares represent the advance purchase of a property where aggressive 
advertising and promotion has been used (Powanga, 2008). Furthermore, the reselling 
process of the Zamzam sukuk occurs through the appointment of Mas Co., which receives a 
percentage for their marketing effects that will further reduce the final price received by the 
investor.  
Due to the above situation, it is difficult or impossible to avoid liquidity risk; 
however, it is important to take into account that this risk can be mitigated by efficient 
marketing and a good reputation. As the timeshare sukuk market is less active in comparison 
with their counterparts in the traditional market, these two mitigation processes have to be 
efficiently managed. The lack of marketing or a bad repetition can result in the loss of 
investor confidence so that these sukuk become illiquid. For this reason, the Munsha’t Co. 
appointed the Mas Co. in order to market these sukuk across the Muslim world. During the 
first stage, the Mas Co. achieved a high sales percentage exceeding 70% which was above 
expectations (Munsha'at, 2005). This success proved that the level of demand for the 
properties was one of the highest in the world (Riazat, 2006). However, during the marketing 
stage, there was no adequate transparency concerning the potential risks of the investment. 
The liabilities in the selling document were indicated without any explicit indication of the 
risks involved. In spite of this, timeshare sukuk are exposed to greater risks than other types 
of sukuk, and almost all sukuk issuances disclose their risk factors. Unfortunately, the 
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Zamzam sukuk, therefore, received a negative reputation that may have a detrimental 
influence on investors at a later stage. This negative reputation is reflected in the content of 
some public websites. A great number of complaints have been published on social 
networking sites with claims about the issuer’s misleading38. This seriously will negatively 
influence the liquidity and marketability of these sukuk.   
As a result, more effort is essentially required in order to improve the liquidity risk. 
In practical terms, the Mas Co., on behalf of the Munsha’t Co. has to develop a sufficient 
secondary market programme under its management that allows Zamzam investors to sell 
their units as they could with other international timeshare bonds (Powanga, 2008). The 
market introduced would have to be managed by Mas Co. in order to monitor the prices and 
to control supply and demand. For example, it can be organized through the Internet using 
any online facility to mitigate the expected illiquidity.  
Involving investors in marketing can increase their confidence in the product and mitigate 
some of the pressure upon Mas Co. as an international marketing company. This may also 
reduce the amounts paid by investors for marketing the Zamzam sukuk. In fact, enhancing 
the ability to individually sell Zamzam sukuk will, in turn, have a positive impact on the 
project overall by increasing liquidity, confidence and reputation.    
IV. Operational Risk  
Zamzam sukuk involve operational risks, since any negative incident in operating the 
project can put the holders at risk. There are many inherent operational risks within the 
activities and processes of the Zamzam project, such as business risk, risk of operational 
losses, human resources risk, tangible asset risk and the risk of major unexpected 
deterioration. Operational risk may also arise if the sub-contractor fails to provide investors 
with the asset according to the specifications identified, quality and date. According to the 
Zamzam contract, this risk of failure has to be transferred to the Munsha’t Co. and an 
equivalent unit or refund should be provided to the sukuk-holders.  
                                                   
38 There was a campaign on Facebook against the Zamzam sukuk issuer that received around 1389 ‘likes’ and 
more than 700 comments to indicate about the issuer’s misleading.   
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Also, two other stages in the Zamzam sukuk face the operational risk. During the 
marketing stage, there was a risk for Zamzam sukuk concerning finding the required number 
of investors. Failure in this could have led cost escalation that in turn would increase the 
level of financial distress. In such a situation, investors may face an additional cost risk; 
however, this possible situation was avoided by the Munsha’t Co.. The company stated in 
its 2005 report that ‘sales in cooperation with MAS Co. reached 70% of the units offered for 
sale. This percentage exceeds by far the targeted sales as per the plan … The funds have 
enabled the company to meet all expenses without the need to make further calls from the 
Investors in the Zamzam Project’ (Munsha'at, 2005). The last statement shows the risk of 
additional costs where the investors in Zamzam sukuk would be called when the project 
failed to redeem all expenses. In addition, the investors have been informed in the contract 
that ‘the deed owner undertakes to pay his shares in the estimated expenses for to cover 
management and the costs of periodical maintenance’. Thus, during the period of 24 years, 
investors can expect additional cost each year whether for maintenance or management costs.  
During the second stage, where the project has been delivered and is functionally 
operating, there is a risk concerning the exchange facility that may face the investors. 
Zamzam members have a chance to postpone their right for one year according to the agreed 
contract. Although, this facility is an attractive feature for Zamzam sukuk-holders, the service 
is not free of charge and is naturally subject to the availability risk and cannot be guaranteed. 
Thus, the holders can encounter a situation where they lack access to the facility, which was 
considered an advantage when the decision was made. Moreover, the investors are strongly 
influenced by the risk of low quality operations due to them being permanent lessees for 24 
years. Any failure because of poor operations can directly influence the holders and may 
increase the fees for the of Zamzam sukuk, decrease the value of the sukuk, and increase the 
risk of exposure to the defaulting members. However, efficient management is a key aspect 
to mitigate operational risk, since the failure in that can have a significant bearing on the 
operation of the scheme. In addition, it would be useful to perform an operational review 
which would provide insight into the Zamzam project process. The review should also 
provide an assessment of the quality of the Zamzam properties and their amenities along 
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with the management capabilities. This process can then guide the issuer concerning the 
operational strengths, weaknesses and threats related to the Zamzam project.   
Asset Risk  
Zamzam Towers are subject to risk of partial or total destruction. It is possible for 
the project to face major or minor destruction due to any event such as a fire in the complex. 
In the case that the asset is totally destroyed, Munsha’t Co. as a lessor is obligated to bear 
the total risk according to both Sharia and the contract. The company has to provide a similar 
alternative to the assets or the contract will be terminated and will be also compensated for 
the non-utilized period. On the other hand, for the risk of partial loss, the Munsha’t Co. as a 
lessor has to incur the total actions and costs unless the destruction was caused by the 
investor’s neglect. The company considers the costs of impairment and damages of assets 
annually. According to the report, ‘the Group assesses at each reporting date whether there 
is an indication that an asset may be impaired’ (Munshaat, 2006). Despite the fact that, the 
asset risks are incurred by the Munsha’t Co., there is a concern about increasing the annual 
fees paid by investors due to the destructive events, especially in the case of the Zamzam 
sukuk which have no external supervision and no precise indicators.  
Legal Risk  
All Zamzam sukuk agreements come under Saudi law and also have been scrutinized 
by Saudi law firms. The Zamzam sukuk are regulated by Saudi timeshare law and it is stated 
in the document that ‘any dispute related to this deed shall be subject to the justification of 
the courts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ (Zamzam contract, undated). The Zamzam sukuk 
agreements are generally in line with Sharia, since the rights, risks, and returns provisions 
included, as discussed, do not show any clear contradiction with Sharia principles. This has 
a positive impact on mitigating the legal risk that may occur due to the conflict between 
Saudi law and the practice of non-Sharia compliant sukuk. Although Saudi legal regulations 
operate in a Sharia-incorporated jurisdiction, there are some negative features. The 
enforceability of Saudi law is not fully developed as the judicial precedents from Saudi 
courts are not binding on subsequent decisions. This may result in some loss of the investor’s 
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rights as they are the weaker party. This creates further judicial uncertainty and also more 
exposure to legal risk, especially concerning the rights of investors.   
Also, the main obstacle facing the Munsha’t Co., as mentioned, is the Saudi law 
which does not allow foreigners to own any property or land located in Makkah city. 
Although the issuer, as discussed, successfully overcame this legal problem, there is a legal 
risk that may occur due to changes in Saudi legal regulations. The timeshare market is a 
developing sector that can change their regulations occasionally as the Saudi timeshare 
industry aims to work tirelessly in order to protect the market from the adverse influence of 
any threats. Therefore, with 24 years tenure, it is relatively high for these sukuk to face some 
changes in the regulations. The Saudi regulations have been updated several times after the 
first decree was issued in 2006 in which consumer protection was the focus. This means that 
any changes are more likely to benefit the consumer more than the issuer, and thus to be in 
favour of Zamzam sukuk-holders.   
In this regard, time-sharing has become a common activity since 2005, especially in 
the two Holy cities of Makkah and Medina, and the Saudi government has withdrawn the 
ability to engage timesharing practices for non-Saudis in these cities. The Saudi embassy 
attributes this decision to the intensive infrastructure construction projects commenced by 
the Saudi government, which involve the construction of a considerable number of new 
hotels to meet the high demand in the two cities. The decision was made with immediate 
effect; however, it includes units in the two cities of Makkah and Medina only and other than 
through inheritance (Saudi Embassy, 2014). Moreover, the decision was made in order to 
protect the parties involved in timesharing from the intentional or unintentional misuse 
(Timeshare Elimination, 2014). In this respect, the Zamzam sukuk are purchased globally by 
different Muslim investors all over the world according to the previously applicable law; 
however, the immediate effect of the decision will be to target the activities of the reselling 
and marketing of the project, except for inheritance, that can be practiced with non-Saudi 
parties. Undoubtedly, this has had a negative impact of the liquidity of these sukuk due to 
the decrease in demand.     
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V. Sharia Risk  
Each sukuk issuance needs to be approved by the Sharia board as a Sharia compliant 
investment. Also, the Sharia board has to revisit the process occasionally to eliminate any 
possible contradictions that may occur afterwards. In the Zamzam sukuk, there is no explicit 
indication in the contract that emphasizes the compatibly of these sukuk with Sharia and 
there is no specific official approval published by a Sharia board to assert that the issuance 
is consistent with Sharia principles. Typically, the issuance includes decisions of a Sharia 
committee that consists of different scholars to add more strength to these sukuk as Sharia-
compliant products. However, the Munsha’t Co. received only overall approval for the 
activities and practices. Dr. Anwar Shuaib expressed in Munsha’s 2010 report that ‘in our 
opinion, the contracts and transactions executed by the company during Financial Year 
ending 31.12.2010 that we have reviewed were Sharia compliant (Munshaat, 2010). The 
revision process is also updated annually at issuer level, and not at the level of the issuance 
under the reports of Munsha’t  
Co. which up to the year of 2015 were approved with total compliance with Sharia 
(Munshaat, 2015). More specifically, the structure of Zamzam sukuk, as discussed, has 
achieved a high level of Sharia compliance. A number of sukuk matters have been overcome, 
such as the critical issues of ownership, the principal and returns which are generally in line 
with Sharia standards. This particular issuance satisfied the AAOIFI standards and thus there 
is no great Sharia risk subject to the issuer and investors.   
9.4.2 Zamzam sukuk and agency issues  
The conclusion that can be drawn from the study of the risks involved in the Zamzam 
sukuk is that the major risks that face the Zamzam sukuk-holders mostly refer to the project 
rather than the creditworthiness of Munsha’t Co. since the structure is backed with a real 
asset. This is a typical consequence of the investors being the legal owners of the invested 
assets; thus, Zamzam investors, if the issuer defaulted, are able to access recourse to the 
assets. Despite the advantage of full recourse to the assets, this structure is not the optimal 
choice for investors. To prove that, the agency theory can highlight the critical financial 
issues found in the structure.   
212 | P a g e  
  
In the Zamzam sukuk, agency problems can refer to loss of the investment as a result 
of Munsha’t Co. following their interests rather than the optimal interest for the sukuk-
holders. In this structure, a number of agency relations are involved, with Munsha’t Co. as 
an issuer, manager, servicer, and contractor. Prior to the investment, potential investors faced 
information asymmetries in assessing the unavailable assets, unavailable services and 
unavailable management. Munsha’t Co., or its representative, may not provide the assets 
with adequate management and services that would severely affect the value of the sukuk. 
Revenues from Zamzam assets vary according to the quality of the assets’ management, 
services and conditions. Low quality, poor service and the worsing conditions of the assets 
would mean expectations of lower return. In such a case, investors may lose their returns and 
become unable to sub-lease or re-sell units because of the adverse selection problem.   
In fact, there is an adverse selection problem that appears during the marketing stage. 
These sukuk have been advertised as a personal investment product. As a result, a number of 
individuals hold more than one sukuk to obtain higher returns. The Munsha’t Co. and its 
affiliated company, the Mas Co., had the incentive to cover the investment risks and show 
only the great return expected. Their incentive was to have better advertising and marketing 
and to rapidly exclude these units and their excessive risks from their books. This can explain 
the reason for not clarifying the possible risks; although most sukuk issuances do indicate 
the risks factors to the investors. Adding to this, the structure was relatively new with no 
prior application, and this misled some investors who invested inappropriately39.  
In addition, there is another dimension of agency conflict that occurs between 
Zamzam sukuk-holders and the Munsha’t Co., or its representative, as a contractor. The 
asset’s value will be influenced by the contractor’s effort, capability, inherent skills and other 
aspects that cannot be observed. These unobserved aspects can have a direct influence on 
the final value of the Zamzam units. Adding to this, the investors in the units are not able to 
monitor the contractor, resulting in a situation where the contractor has no sufficient 
incentive to perform well. Consequently, investors can be misled to invest in poorly 
                                                   
39 According to unofficial sources, situations were described where investors were misled to invest in four units 
and ended with no cash returns for several years (http://www.aqarcity.com/t757713.html).  
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constructed units. Moreover, after delivery, the Munsh’at Co. is responsible for maintaining 
a high quality of service; however, an incentive to provide a low quality of service may arise. 
Munsha’t Co. as a manager may misuse the units, misuse the fees and spend them on its own 
interests rather than to maintain adequate performance. In this respect, if the annual fees are 
increased, the manager is expected to provide better periodical maintenance and 
performance. However, the higher annual fees received by Munsha’t Co., or its affiliate, 
means that it is more likely for investors to suffer greater agency costs.   
Another critical issue is related to the uncertain costs inherent in the structure and 
incurred by the investors. The annual fees, that include the cost of managing the project by 
the Munsha’t Co. or its representative, are subject to change. The company determiners the 
costs along with a situation of information asymmetry between the determiner and the 
provider. As a result, investors in this project have to realize that the actual outcome is 
unverifiable because the net income from sub-leasing is calculated after deducting the 
variable fees. The net profit is severely influenced by annual fees, especially when there is 
no specific indicator to rely on and the amount is totally determined by the agency which is 
also a beneficiary of the payment. The Munsha’t Co. allows for itself to receive a periodical 
fee for the management from the investors, and that becomes more harmful to the latter given 
the information asymmetry in favour of the company. The investors are considered as merely 
silent or sleeping partners with no right to oversee and monitor the activities of the 
entrepreneur throughout the contract period without the company’s consent. This can explain 
some of the complaints published by investors on Facebook that the annual fees have reached 
a level almost equal to the re-rental price (Facebook, 2014). It is possible for the investors in 
this case to face a type of moral hazard problem of the over-reporting of annual costs that 
can be counted as one of the main problems concerning these sukuk. This is because the 
structure does not include any strategy to mitigate this problem.  
Given the critical information asymmetry that appears in the structure, there are a 
number of mechanisms that have been used to limit agency costs. Establishing a 
compensation agreement, prior to delivery, in favour of investors40 makes the structure more 
                                                   
40 If the agent fails to deliver the project.  
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effective in reducing the agency risks. This can motivate the Munsha’t Co. to act in the 
investors' best interests. Also, after the project is delivered, if some of the risk associated 
with the investment is retained by Munah’at Co, this can reduce the degree of the moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems generated by the information asymmetry. The default 
risk of members will be incurred by Munsha’t Co. as it receives more information and can 
deal efficiently with the risks better than investors. The information asymmetry favours the 
Munsha’t Co., and it is more sensible for this party to bear the risk of default. This will 
induce the Munsha’t Co. to provide the best quality service in order to prevent any possible 
risk of defaulting. In this structure, the better services provided mean the safer it is for the 
Munsha’t Co. to maintain the management and maintenance fees. On the other hand, from 
the point of views of the investors’ obligations paying the fees means consistent access to 
advantages of the sukuk. Although, investors do not bear the default risk of the members, 
they have an incentive to maintain their obligations on order to have access to the securitized 
assets. Thus, the structure of the Zamzam sukuk has some devices to stimulate a high level 
of effort provided by both the principal and the agent in order to maintain the Zamzam 
project.  
Although the structure of the Zamzam sukuk shows a balanced distribution of the 
default risk according to the level of information held, investors bear other excessive risks 
related to liquidity, capital loss and operational risk. It is typical that the yield on the 
investment is based upon the risks taken; however, the associated costs are significantly 
higher for the achievement of a capital gain. The return of Zamzam sukuk involve a number 
of liabilities that can lead to inadequate profit. The re-rent price will be subject to four times 
deductions; first the cost of the unit, then the marketing fees, the fees for the Mas Co. 
changing the tenant and finally the annual fees for maintenance and management. Thus, the 
actual level of risk taken by investors is not rewarded with sufficient return on the 
investment, as these sukuk involve relatively low rates of return with significant risks borne. 
The adverse selection and moral hazard problems are not merely a theoretical risk; they, 
however, can cause instability in, and even failure of, the return to investors as discussed. 
Therefore, the agency problems inherent in the Zamzam sukuk structure show the main cause 
of reluctance on the part of investors to invest in such a type of sukuk. The presence of 
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asymmetric information, agency costs and risktaking can be considered as a major reason as 
to why Zamzam sukuk have not been preferred as a mode of finance.   
9.5 Summary  
The Zamzam sukuk is an implementation of Islamic time-sharing finance. It is an 
example of an innovative security that includes a number of concepts to satisfy both Sharia 
standards and the Saudi government. This investment achieves a high level of compliance 
with Sharia rules. It did not contradict any consensus opinion, but rather shows better 
harmony with the rules. This positive result provides these sukuk with a distance from Sharia 
risks, since being more compatible with Sharia reduces the exposure to Sharia risks. The 
Zamzam sukuk involve a higher exposure to all other types of risks, and particularly credit 
risks. There is no assurance to receive any cash return on these sukuk except the right-to-use. 
These major risks that face Zamzam sukuk investors mainly refer to the business rather than 
to the issuer’s creditworthiness, because the structure is backed with real assets.  
Although the investment involves critical risks that may cause it to lose its 
competitiveness as a financial instrument, it is important to note that, if the Munsha’t Co. 
becomes insolvent as a result of any financial distress or an economic downturn, this will 
have no direct influence upon the Zamzam sukuk-holders. This is because investors have 
leverage in their investment, principally for the right-to-use. This is a typical result of the 
investors becoming the legal owners of the underlying assets.  
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Chapter 10: Qualitative Analysis of the Struggle 
for Sharia Compliance within the Sukuk Market 
 
10.1 Introduction 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with 25 specialists in Islamic finance to 
discuss the critical issues that face the sukuk industry as identified in the case studies. By 
analysing the views of practitioners, academics and experts, the aim was to highlight the 
scholars’ views with their evidence of adopting conservative or liberal opinions on the issues. 
The qualitative findings can highlight insights into the causes of disputes among Sharia 
boards on particular issuances. The findings may also provide suggestions on how to 
harmonize or encourage the convergence of views on the market. More importantly, this 
chapter also provides an understanding of how the participants deal with Sharia restrictions. 
This will be of service in finding practical solutions to apply in the market to satisfy both 
Sharia and financial sides on critical matters. The chapter further attempts to offer a 
qualitative assessment of the contemporary sukuk market from various perspectives. By 
discussing the assessments of experts, this may assist in understanding current strengths and 
failures which can pave the way for positive reforms and future developments.   
The respondents included Sharia scholars, members of Sharia Boards, members of the 
AAOIFI institution, employees in Islamic banks, Sharia academics and Islamic economists. 
The designing of the questions was guided by the issues discovered in the three case studies 
in order to explore the respondents’ views, basic evidence, approaches and experience with 
these matters. The lengths of interviews varied depending on the participant; however, the 
interviews, they lasted on average for 40-60 minutes. For analytical purposes, the vivo coding 
and initial coding were applied in the first phase, followed by focused coding.  
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10.2 Critical Issues Related to the Sukuk Industry 
Based on the cases studies presented, five main themes are categorized to cover all 
the critical issues related to: the guarantee, ownership, structure, regulation and the current 
market. These are discussed below.    
10.2.1 Issues Related to the Guarantee  
Different aspects of the guarantee are the main issue that faces the Islamic financial 
industry. The concept of risk-taking is an essential requirement for any Islamic investment 
while the market is reluctant to incur any further risks. Each of the cases discussed earlier 
has provided information on different aspects of the guarantee. The following highlights the 
critical aspects of guarantees in the sukuk market.   
 I. Issues Related to the Guarantee of the Securitized Asset  
Sukuk involve granting the investor a share of a tangible asset along with a 
corresponding share of the total risk, while the SEC sukuk and Sadara sukuk have secured 
freedom for their investors from the risk of the loss or damage to the physical assets.  
Table 1 shows the responses of interviewees towards bearing the risk of damage.  
Table 1: Issues related to the guarantee of the securitized asset  
Research Question   
Q1: In the case of the assets’ deterioration, what is the ruling if the issuer bears the loss 
instead of investors? How to justify the investors’ ownership from Sharia point of 
view?  
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   In total loss, it is not allowed for the issuer to incur the loss.  
2   In partial loss, it is controversial to maintain the exact rental 
payment.  
Concluding theme:   The association between the investors and the securitized 
asset is crucial to indicate a real investment.  
Two situations were highlighted by the respondents with different views. The total 
loss received more rigorous views than the partial loss, as illustrated in Tables 1.1 and 1.2.  
Table 1.1: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 1  
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Sub-theme   In total loss, it is not allowed to incur the 
loss by the issuer.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S4, S7, S12, B2, B5  Transferring this risk to the issuer is 
invalid unless in circumstances of 
negligence to specify a sufficient 
insurance company.   
S3, C3, C4  
  
The issuer is allowed to voluntarily 
undertake the repair without any prior 
obligation.  
In sukuk, referring to the asset’s insurance to cover the loss is the usual action. 
However, the concern is that when the insurance company defaults on covering the entire 
obligation, who would bear the risk? Sharia banking officers and most of the scholars adopt 
the view that transferring this risk to the issuer leads to the lessee incurring the asset risk, 
which contradicts Sharia principles. However, academics and one scholar allow the issuer to 
voluntarily guarantee to repair the asset, but he is not permitted to pay the expected return 
while the assets are damaged. As stated by C3, guaranteeing the asset with its expected return 
is prohibited by ijma as it is an explicit riba, while the only permissible action is to 
compensate for the assets voluntarily.   
Table 1.2: Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 1  
Sub-theme   In partial loss, it is controversial to pay the exact rentals when 
the loss has occurred.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S5  With partial loss, the rental payment has to be minimized to 
prevent any risk borne by the lessee.   
B2, B5  In the dispute, courts have the authority to resolve the issue.   
S7, B4   It is permitted for the rental payment to be equal, more or less 
than the average rentals.  
S10  The assets can be substituted with equivalent.    
S4, S8, B8   The excess amount can be placed under an account to be paid to 
investors at the final purchase.  
Partial loss of the asset means a reduction in the rental payment that would negatively 
influence the distribution amount in sukuk. That decreasing the rent confirms a genuine 
relationship between the assets received support from a Sharia scholar. However, the concern 
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raised is how to deal with such a loss in accordance with Sharia rules. Two ways are 
suggested. One way suggested by only one scholar is to substitute the assets, and the more 
practical suggestion offered by a Sharia banking officer and a number of scholars is to retain 
the excess payment in an account until the issuer pays the nominal value plus all the cash in 
the account.  
II. Issues Related to the Guarantee of Maintenance  
Essential maintenance is a type of guarantee of the assets that has to be borne by the investors 
(lessor). Investors in the Zamzam sukuk have to pay annual fees for maintenance. In the SEC 
and Sadara sukuk, on the other hand, major maintenance and repair are transferred to the lessee 
through the service agent agreement. In the Sadara sukuk, the additional step is added that the 
cost of such maintenance will be reimbursed by the managing partner on behalf of the co-
lessors. Table 2 shows the responses of the interviewees concerning transferring this 
maintenance cost to the issuer.    
Table 2: Issues Related to the Guarantee of the Securitized Asset  
Research Question   
Q2: What is the ruling when the maintenance of sukuk assets is borne by the issuer?  
How can this influence the issuance?   
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   It is unlawful to transfer the maintenance costs to the originator 
who is the lessee.  
2   In practice, there are some lawful ways to transfer the 
maintenance.  
Concluding theme:   There is no doubt that the maintenance cost is incurred by the 
investors; however, the discussion raised is on finding some 
ways to transfer the cost to the issuer.  
It is illegal to transfer the major maintenance costs to the originator who is the lessee.  
However, the respondents attempted to provide some practical solutions, as illustrated in 
Table 2.2.   
Table 2.1: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 2  
Sub-theme   It is unlawful to transfer the maintenance costs to the 
originator.  
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Interviewees  Remarks   
S1, S5, S11, C3, C4  It is permitted for the issuer to only perform the 
maintenance, but all related expenses should be incurred by 
the investors.  
Maintaining the assets is a part of the investors’ ownership duties, while transferring 
the maintenance cost to the issuer may raise the issue of fictitious ownership. The issuer may 
perform the maintenance on behalf of the investors without incurring any expenses. This 
method was proposed by a number of scholars but does not seem to be practiced in the 
market.     
Table 2.2: Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 2  
Sub-theme   In practice, there are some lawful ways to transfer the 
maintenance.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S6, S8,C2  The maintenance cost can be transferred to the issuer through 
an agreed stipulation.   
S7, B2, B5, B6, B8  The maintenance cost can be transferred to the issuer through 
supplementary payments.  
B4, S4, S3  All the maintenance cost can be covered by the issuer through 
the final purchase as a purchase payment.    
Some scholars allow the transfer of maintenance costs through an agreed stipulation, 
because in contemporary times such costs become easier to accurately specify, meaning that 
no unidentified payments would be required. In addition, Sharia takes into account the 
prevalence of commercial customs which accept such a stipulation. However, a number of 
Sharia banking officers provided a more practical method of using the supplementary 
payment. To illustrate that, the supplementary payment is a further rental payment that 
covers the assets’ costs for the previous period. At each interval, for instance three months, 
the parties will renew their contract and adjust the supplementary payment to cover any prior 
expenses incurred by the investors. In this respect, a direct transfer of the expenses to the 
lessee would result in unknown payments, while adjusting the rental at every interval to 
cover certain prior expenses would mean a specified payment. The effect is to avoid any 
reduction, resulting from the maintenance costs, of the periodical amount distributed to the 
investors. While most Sharia boards accept such a justification, S5 objected to this practice 
221 | P a g e  
  
and considered it an unlawful way to evade the rules. Finally, some scholars working as 
Sharia banking officers suggested that paying for all the assets’ expenses should take place 
in the final purchase payment. This means that all the costs would not be incurred by the 
issuer as a lessee rather as a purchaser.   
III. Issues Related to the Guarantee of the Asset Insurance   
Sukuk assets usually involve commercial insurance. The SEC maintains 
comprehensive commercial insurance that covers damage to and the loss of its assets and 
Sadara also uses some commercial insurance. There were two main views on its 
permissibility as highlighted by the respondents and illustrated in Table 3.  
Table 3: Issues Related to the Guarantee of the Asset Insurance  
Research Question   
Q3: If sukuk involve non-Islamic insurance, how can this affect the issuance?  
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   Commercial insurance is totally allowed in all situations.    
2   Commercial insurance is prohibited; however, sukuk mostly 
involve reasons to justify commercial insurance.  
Concluding theme:   Although, most sukuk discussions don’t indicate the issue of 
commercial insurance, it is essential to elaborate on this matter 
as the prevalent fatwa prohibit dealing with it.    
In practice, as stated by B5, most prospectuses do one of the following: either 
mentioning that the insurance is co-operative (Islamic), or that it is only co-operative when 
possible, or mentioning the insurance without any specification. Table 3 shows the issue of 
including commercial insurance when structuring sukuk, as most issuances apply this. All of 
the responses led to acceptance of the current practice of commercial insurance; however, 
while one view totally accepted it without any justification, as shown in Table 3.1 while the 
others limited their acceptance to only when it is needed, as illustrated in Table 3.2.    
Table 3.1: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 3  
Sub-theme   Sukuk mostly involve reasons to justify commercial 
insurance.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
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S2  Non-Islamic insurance is permissible in all cases.  
Only one scholar endorsed the acceptance of all types of insurance, including 
commercial insurance. All types of insurance are permissible, as it represents compensation 
for the commitment. This means that, when structuring sukuk, commercial insurance would 
be accepted even when the Islamic version is available.    
Table 3.2: Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 3  
Sub-theme   Commercial insurance is prohibited; however, 
sukuk mostly involve reasons to justify 
commercial insurance.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S1, S3, S4, S6, S7, S8, S9, S10,  
S12, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, C2   
Non-Islamic insurance is forbidden unless 
sufficient Islamic insurance is not available.    
Most Sharia scholars and a number of Sharia banking officers believed in the 
prohibition of commercial insurance. However, they showed flexible views related to 
commercial insurance since the basis of its prohibition is gharar. Gharar, unlike riba, can 
be tolerated in some cases of an insistent need and when there is no doubt that when such a 
need is overcome the ban will be restored. Therefore, it is essential for the Sharia advisor to 
ensure that no sufficient Islamic insurance is available prior to accepting any issuance.   
In the sukuk market, mitigating risks through insurance is a critical function, while 
the available Islamic insurance institutions are not sufficient to cover the considerable risks 
involved in most issuances. Islamic insurance companies are relatively limited in the scope 
of their tolerance and also in their prevalence, as it is not available in several countries. In 
addition, securitized assets tend to be insured prior to the issuance, which means that any 
adjustment may become problematic. Adding to this, insurance is a subsidiary contract not 
directly intended, since the deal is principally designed for financial investment. Therefore, 
most Sharia boards do not examine in detail the type of insurance included.   
IV. Issues Related to the Guarantee from the Agency   
Table 4 shows the respondents’ views on adding the guarantee feature to the agency 
contract, whether the guarantee is for the principal or the assets. For instance, the agents in 
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the SEC and Sadara sukuk are responsible for paying the maintenance costs, which is an 
aspect of guaranteeing the asset.  
Table 4: Issues Related to the Guarantee from the Agency  
Research Question   
Q4: What is the ruling if the sukuk agent undertakes to pay any shortfall amount to the 
investors?   
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   Some issuances assign the agent as a third party.   
2   The agent typically, in most of issuances, is the issuer.  
Concluding theme:   In sukuk, guaranteeing has several aspects and one of the 
dominant ones is through agency.    
When the responses were studied, two different situations are highlighted with 
different views which are indicated in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.  
Table 4.1: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 4  
Sub-theme   Some issuances assign the agent as a third party.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S3, S8, B4, B5, C3  It is permissible to include a guarantee from a third 
party.   
If the agent differs from the issuer, then a number of Sharia banking officers, scholars 
and academics would accept such a guarantee.   
Table 4.2 Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 4  
Sub-theme   The agent typically, in most of issuances, is the issuer.  
Interviewees  Remarks  
S1, S5, S6, S8, S10, S12,  
B4, B7, B8, C1, C2, C3  
It is not allowed for the agent to incur any guarantee 
feature.  
S9  The issuer can be a grantor under a separate contract 
from the contract of ijara.  
Most of the scholars and a number of Sharia banking officers and academics believed 
that it is not permissible for the agent as an issuer to provide a guarantee or pledge for the 
investors, unless such a stipulation is restricted to cases of negligence, misconduct or breach 
of the contract. This is because the agent acts to service the asset, while the guarantee is 
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related to the owners. Despite this it is not permissible for the issuer to provide any guarantee 
feature; and a view presented by one scholar accepts guarantees under a separate independent 
contract as an agency. The result is that the issuer will have two characters; one as a lessee 
and the other as a grantor in the capacity of agent.  
V. Issues Related to the Guarantee of the Principal  
Guaranteeing the principal is a key controversial subject in this field. The Zamzam 
sukuk structure did not involve any guarantee aspect to the principal while in SEC and Sadara 
sukuk, according to the purchase undertakings, the originator is obligated to purchase sukuk 
from the investors at the nominal price. In particular, the ijara sukuk structure has two 
contradictory views, each with a support from Sharia international institutions, as noted in 
Table 5.  
Table 5: Issues Related to the Guarantee of the Principal   
Research Question   
Q5: What is the ruling if sukuk explicitly provide the guarantee of the principal by the 
issuer?  
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   Other than ijara sukuk, the situation is permissible.  
2   Guaranteeing the principal in ijara sukuk is controversial.  
Concluding theme:   No guarantee for the principal is one of the key aspects that 
sukuk are based on.   
Examining the respondent’s views shows two circumstances raised which are 
presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 which highlight some flexibility on structuring ijara sukuk.   
Table 5.1: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 5  
Sub-theme   Other than for ijara sukuk, the issue is agreeable.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S1, S3, S5, S6, S10, S12,  
B5, B7, C3  
The issuer of those sukuk cannot bear any guarantee  
of the principal.   
A group of Sharia banking officers, scholars and academics support the view that 
guaranteeing the investors’ principal at maturity is not permissible according to Sharia 
principles. This point is a particularly critical issue that results from imitating bonds.   
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Table 5.2: Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 5  
Sub-theme   Guaranteeing the principal in ijara sukuk is controversial.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S11  The purchase based on the nominal value shows a 
resemblance to bonds.   
S10, B2, B5, B6, B7,  
B8, C2   
It is permitted to return the principal of ijara sukuk based on 
the purchase undertaking.   
S5, S6, S7, B4   It is permissible provided that the lessee is not the agent, 
mudharib and partner. Also, in the case of asset loss, no 
guarantee can be provided.   
Only one scholar decided that the purchase undertaking at par value was unlawful, 
since this would result in an explicit guarantee of the capital, a point that leaves no doubt as 
to its prohibition. S11 stated that this view is endorsed by the IIFA while the AAOIFI 
supports permissibility. Also, the view of permissibility receives support from a group of 
scholars, Sharia banking officers and an academic. However, it is important to note that 
guaranteeing the principal is not permissible even under ijara sukuk. However, the structure 
of the ijara can lead to recovery of the initial payment through the purchase undertaking 
according to the nominal value, meaning that if the asset is destroyed there would not be any 
guarantee. This is attributed to the permissibility of the lease to own structure with any 
agreed payments that may equal the principal. In addition, it is important to highlight that 
permissibility is based on the basis of the undertaking, and not on the basis of obligation. 
The contract of the pledge is binding on the issuer side since he provides the promise.   
VI. Issues Related to the Guarantee of the Periodical Distribution  
In the market, sukuk-holders are paid a guaranteed periodic return. For instance, if 
Sadara, prior to the completion date, fails to pay the advance rental payments, the 
payments will be guaranteed by Aramco and Dow. However, Table 6 shows the two main 
views highlighted in responses concerning this issue.  
Table 6: Issues Related to the Guarantee of the Periodical Distribution  
Research Question   
Q6: What is the ruling if sukuk explicitly provide the guarantee of return from the 
issuer?  
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Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   Guaranteeing the distribution amounts other than the rental 
payment.  
2   When the periodic distribution amount is rental payments.  
Concluding theme:   Guaranteeing the periodic distribution amount is one of the 
controversial issues.   
The views of the respondents almost achieved consensus on banning such a 
guarantee in other than the ijara sukuk structure, as shown in Table 6.1, while for ijara sukuk 
the views become more flexible on this issue, as illustrated in Table 6.2.  
Table 6.1 Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 6  
Sub-theme   Guaranteeing the distribution amounts other than the rental 
payment.  
Interview No.1   Remarks   
S1, B4, B6, B7, B8   It is not accepted to guarantee such a distribution by the issuer.   
C3   Guaranteeing the distribution amounts is worse than 
guaranteeing the principal.  
Specifying the distribution amounts has to be based on the expected revenues without 
any guarantee. All responders agree on this matter; however, C3 asserts that this specific 
guarantee is the worst aspect of sukuk structures. This is because this feature shows an 
evident resemblance to riba. Typically, a liquidity facility can assess in maintaining the 
distribution amounts to mitigate the risk arising from not providing any guarantee aspect. In 
this regard, it is important to highlight the differences between guarantee and credit 
enhancement to the payments. Credit enhancements are permissible to mitigate the risk while 
the guarantee is an obligation upon the issuer to avoid the risk.  
Table 6.2: Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 6  
Sub-theme   When the periodic distribution amount is rental payments.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S5  It is permitted as long as the assets are not destroyed.   
S8, B6, B7, B8, C4  Paying the rental by the issuer is a strict obligation and any 
shortage or delay is not accepted in Sharia.  
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  The interviewees, including scholars, Sharia banking officers and an academic, agree 
on the permissibility of paying a determined rental payment to the investors. However, it is 
important to note that the amount paid is not a guarantee for the sukuk return, but rather it is 
an obligation on the rental payment under the ijara basis. Thus, if total loss occurs to the 
asset, no payment would be distributed to investors. Partial loss will receive the same views 
as in Table 1.2.   
10.2.2 Issues Related to Ownership  
Actual ownership of assets by investors in sukuk is a controversial issue when it 
comes to the bankruptcy. While courts have broadened the scope of ownership beyond actual 
possession, the topic is still problematic among scholars. This issue is analysed to identify 
the views on sukuk ownership from the Sharia perspective.   
 I. Issues Related to the Ownership of Restricted Assets  
No actual possession offered to sukuk-holders can be proved inferentially through 
restricted access to assets. The Zamzam sukuk investors physically possess a share of the 
future project with some agreed limitations on behaviours towards the real ownership of the 
residential units, while the SEC and Sadara sukuk investors own only the interests, rights, 
benefits in, to and under the assets and thus each sukuk shows only a beneficial ownership 
of the assets. The limited ownership of the owned asset creates a dispute as shown in Table 
7.  
Table 7: Issues Related to the Ownership on Limited Possession  
Research Question   
Q7: In the case of insolvency, what is the ruling if investors do not have recourse to 
their assets?   
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   It is permitted to sell assets with some restrictions.   
2   Applying any restriction upon the owner’s behaviour involves 
some critical issues.    
Concluding theme:   The discussion on this issue is attributed to a wider problem 
related to restrictions upon the owner.    
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Most of the issuances provide a wider statement that the investors do not have any 
recourse to the securitized asset except through the purchase undertaking. Thus, investors 
are obligated to only re-sell the assets back to the originator, but if the originator was 
bankrupted, can investors sell them to other parties? According to the restricted ownership 
in the SEC and Sadara sukuk, there is a possible resource to the underlying assets other than 
selling them to the bankrupted originator. The views of respondents on the issue are 
presented in Tables 7.1 and 7.2.   
Table 7.1: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 7  
Sub-theme   It is permitted to sell assets with some restrictions.   
Interviewees  Remarks   
S3, B1  No direct possession of the assets is an analogy to the case of equity.   
B6  Such a restriction is analogous to the land plan by the authority.   
A couple of Sharia banking officers and only one scholar supported the view that 
accepts the limitation of commercial behaviours upon the owners. This is because, in equity 
investment, investors have a shared ownership in the company but without any liability to 
sell the company. In addition, if an authority specifies the land as a health facility, it would 
not be permissible for the owner to use it for other than that specification. This is similar to 
the sukuk, as it is specified to be sold under the purchase undertaken, and it would not be 
permissible to violate this agreement.    
Table 7.2: Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 7  
Sub-theme   Applying any restriction upon the owner’s behaviour involve 
some critical issues    
Interviewees  Remarks   
S5, S8, B4, C3  The manner of the restriction in sukuk confirms the fictitious 
ownership of the asset.   
S10, S11, C5  Such a restriction can be justified individually; however, with all 
other sukuk justifications would result in impermissible actions.  
S1, B7, B8   It is not permissible to prevent investors from selling their assets 
if the issuer is bankrupted, and at least to be treated as pledged 
assets.  
B3   Legally, the stipulation is invalid and the owner will have recourse 
to their assets.   
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The majority of interviewees, that including scholars, Sharia banking officers, and 
academics, do not accept the type of ownership provided in the sukuk market. The ownership 
involves an authority over the assets while the securitized assets do not provide any authority 
to the investors. By preventing investors from having access to their assets, this means that 
the mortgage contract has more control on assets than the investors’ ownership. In their case, 
if the issuer became bankrupt, he would be obligated to pay the purchase amount as 
compensation. At the final stage, bondholders and sukuk-holders are treated equally without 
taking into account the ownership involved, as it was only a fictitious. In fact, the aim is to 
achieve the status of bonds and all other transactions are not intended. This point is evident 
in the prospectuses that describe the sukuk as unsecured obligations that have no actual link 
to the asset. In principle, Sharia would accept such transactions if these are intended; 
however, the reality confirms that they are only to evade the rules.   
II. Issues Related to Ownership and Legal Possession  
Holding SEC sukuk or Sadara sukuk does not enable their investors to any physical 
possession, as there is no legal registration offered to them. Table 8 shows the respondents’ 
views on the issue of legal possession from the Sharia perspective.  
Table 8: Issues Related to Ownership and Legal Possession  
Research Question   
Q8: According to qabd (taking into possession), sukuk have to include the registration 
of the asset, which is absent in most of the issuances. What is your view of these sukuk? 
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   There is constructive possession that has the same effect as 
physical possession.  
2   The absence of legal registration is a controversial matter.  
Concluding theme:   Sharia possession and legal possession are associated with 
different considerations in the sukuk applications.   
The respondents agreed that the practices show constructive possession, and not 
physical possession; however, they differed in views of the forms of this possession as 
highlighted in Table 8.1.  
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Table 8.1: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 8  
Sub-theme   There is constructive possession that has the same effect as 
physical possession.   
Interviewees  Remarks   
S5, S7, B5   Constructive possession is achieved through the SPV  
S1, S3, S4, B4, B6  Possession is achieved through the official documents.  
The respondents believed that there is constructive possession in the sukuk issuances. 
This is because various features in the sukuk confirm the possession of the asset from a Sharia 
perspective, with some differences on the feature that confirm the possession.  
Table 8.2: Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 8  
Sub-theme   The absence of legal registration is a controversial matter.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
B3, B8   Legal registration in not essential from the Sharia perspective, 
rather merely constructive possession is sufficient.   
S11, S12, C5   The absence of legal registration raises the issue of fictitious 
ownerships particularly in the case of the insolvency.  
Sharia banking officers do not believe that the legal registration of the securitized 
assets is important. This is because, in Sharia, the main point is the ability to utilize from the 
asset, even if the physical possession is absent. In sukuk, investors receive their distribution 
amounts as a result of owning the assets. However, without legal transfer, investors will not 
be able to utilize the asset if the issuer becomes bankrupt. Concern was raised by a number 
of scholars about this issue, as even if legal registration is not a Sharia requirement this may 
result in investors being prevented from using their assets, which is a Sharia matter.   
III. Issues Related to the Ownership and the Incentive Fee  
Based on their ownership, all returns generated from the securitized assets belong to 
the investors. Transferring some of the profits to the originator as incentive fees may indicate 
non-genuine ownership. For example, the SEC sukuk prospectus mentions that any payment 
of the residual amount (if any) belongs to the SEC as an incentive payment.  
Table 9 shows the responses of interviewees on this issue.     
Table 9: Issues Related to the Ownership on the Incentive Fee  
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Research Question   
Q9: What is the ruling if the excess of the asset’s profit is retained by the issuer as 
incentive fees? What is the Sharia justification for withholding all of the profits from 
investors?  
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   The incentive fee is permitted.  
2   The incentive fee, in fact, is a means to imitate conventional 
bonds.   
Concluding theme:   Most issuances involve the incentive fee in order to maintain 
the exact distribution amounts to the investors.   
In general, the respondents agreed with the permissibility of the incentive fee; 
however, some highlighted a concern about imitating bonds by such a lawful means, as 
indicated in Tables 9.1 and 9.2.    
Table 9.1: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 9  
Sub-theme   The incentive fee is permitted.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S1, S3, S6, S7, S10, 
B3, B4, B5, B7  
Investors have the right to waive some of their profits.  
The Sharia banking officers and the majority of scholars support the permissibility 
of the incentive fee which is similar to the views of Sharia boards. The investors are the 
owners of the profits generated from the asset, and thus they are free to deal with them 
according to their desire to motivate the issuer to improve the performance levels and more 
efficiently serve the assets.  
Table 9.2 Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 9  
Sub-theme   The incentive fee, in fact, is a means to imitate conventional 
bonds.   
Interviewees  Remarks   
S11, S12, C3  The incentive fee is a lawful means to achieve an unlawful 
structure.  
A couple of scholars and an academic highlighted the purpose of the incentive fee as 
being to maintain the returns according to the interest indicators as in the case of 
conventional bonds. In fact, in Sharia, the rule concerning a single action is that it can be 
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permitted even while there may be concern about compound actions which may be 
prohibited due to the final unlawful structure.  
10.2.3 Issues Related to the Structure  
 The complexity in structuring sukuk creates various requirements. However, the following 
discussion highlights some of the prospectus requirements that have been omitted in the 
cases in order to identify the impact of Sharia on the issuances.  
 I. Issues Related to the Structure when not Specifying the Cost  
Identifying the cost and expenses is crucial for preventing any future disputes. 
However, the following tables highlight some issues founded in the case studies when such 
clarification is missing. For example, in the Zamzam sukuk the maintenance cost is 
transferred to the investors without any specification of the average amount. In Tables 9.1 
and 9.2, the responses of interviewees show the impact of such neglected elements on the 
entire sukuk issuance.  
Table 10: Issues Related to the Structure on Not Specifying the Maintenance Costs  
Research Question   
Q10: What is the ruling if the sukuk transfer the periodical maintenance costs to the 
investors without specifying any indication of the costs?  
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   There is no prohibited gharar in such a case.    
2   The structure may raise the issue of gharar.   
Concluding theme:   In certain sukuk the periodical maintenance costs is held by the 
investors as lessees.   
There is no doubt that the lessee bears the cost of periodical maintenance; however, 
the concern raised is when the lessor acts on the lessee’s behalf without specifying the costs, 
the views on this are clarified in Tables 10.1 and 10.2.  
Table 10.1: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 10  
Sub-theme   There is no prohibited gharar in such a case.   
Interviewees  Remarks   
S10  There is only a minor gharar that has no effect.   
S1, S5   There is no need for the costs to be based upon indicators.   
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S11  Such a case is permissible and any dispute which arises will be 
dealt with in the courts.  
Most scholars agreed that there is no prohibited gharar when there is no indication 
of the periodical maintenance cost. The expenses for periodical maintenance should be open 
to cover any incidental costs. No indications are required and no considerable ghara may 
occur. This is because the average expenses related to periodical maintenance are recognized 
by the urf, and thus only minor gharar exists.     
Table 10.2: Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 10  
Sub-theme   The structure may raise the issue of gharar.   
Interviewees  Remarks   
S6, S8, B4, B6, B8,  
C1   
The costs have to be based upon any clear indicator; otherwise 
a considerable gharar and possible dispute may occur.  
Sharia banking officers and a couple of scholars raised the issue of gharar in the case 
of no specification of the periodical maintenance cost. Without any such basis, this may 
allow the possibility of fraud concerning the actual expenses. Examples of indications that 
can be provided are receipts, documents or relevant reports.   
II. Issues Related to the Structure when Not Specifying Agency Costs  
In the prospectuses of the sukuk cases studied, there are some agency contracts that 
do not specify fees. The views of the respondents on this issue are presented below.  
Table 11: Issues Related to the Structure when Not Specifying Agency Costs  
Research Question   
Q11: What is your opinion on not specifying the fees for the agent, how can this 
influence the total issuance?  
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   There is no Sharia concern about specifying the fees in agency 
contracts.  
2   In the market, such a practice is not accepted.  
Concluding theme:   Most sukuk prospectuses include a wakala contract as a key 
element to efficiently serve the securitized asset.  
When the responses were examined, two types of answers were found. The first is 
based on theory, as highlighted in Table 11.1, relating to general rulings according to Sharia. 
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The second type is based on the practice according to the prevailing law, as indicated in 
Table 11.2.  
Table 11.1 Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 11  
Sub-theme   There is no Sharia concern about specifying the fees in 
agency contracts.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S1, S5, S8, B2, S12, S6  Wakala originally is a contract to donate with no 
compulsory fees.  
B7, S10  Wakala becomes a compulsory obligation when fees are 
specified.    
The majority of scholars along with a couple of Sharia banking officers agreed that 
wakala has two patterns; one with a fee and the other without. However, adding the payment 
will transform it into a compulsory obligation where no party has the right to withdraw from 
the contract.   
Table 11.2 Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 11  
Sub-theme   In the market, such a practice is not accepted.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
B4, B5, C4  For regulation purposes, the agency fee has to be specified.  
B8  The specification may not appear in the prospectus but rather in 
the non-public documents.   
S3, S7, B2, B4, B6 Most practices include a minor fee.  
  Most Sharia banking officers attempted to provide more practical answers, as they 
mentioned that all issued sukuk have specified fees either in the prospectus or in other 
documents. Due to there being no direct link with the structure, the fee is usually determined 
in the documents attached. This is because prospectuses provide only a summary of the 
agreement, not all of the details. In practice, even if the parties agreed to work without fees, 
they would have to specify any amount to satisfy the regulator. Even with a minor fee, 
regulations would aim to determine the agency in a compulsory contract to prevent any 
future dispute. Some cases provided only 10 riyals for the agent, and the agent would accept 
such a fee since he would benefit from the total cash received. Although some sukuk 
transactions may be considered as fictitious, the agency relationship truly exists and involves 
genuine obligations.  
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III. Issues Related to the Structure when not Separating Transactions  
Having two separate transactions is significant to avoid any potential doubt about 
validity of the issuance. However, the SEC sold beneficial ownership of the power 
generation assets to investors with the obligation of selling them back to the originator. Table 
10 demonstrates the respondents' views on combining two transactions from a Sharia point 
of view.      
Table 12: Issue Related to the Structure when Not Separating Transactions  
Research Question   
Q12: What is the view in executing a number of contracts in sukuk structure?  
 
Focused Coding  Sub-theme/Remarks    
1   There is a concern related to multiple contracts.   
2   No Sharia concern with combining the contracts.  
Concluding theme:   Sukuk  structures  essentially  involve  a  number 
transactions.  
of 
Table 12 indicates the issue of combining multiple contracts according to the 
principles of Sharia. When the responses were examined, two contradicting views became 
evident. The first view, highlighted in Table 12.2, relates to being more suspicious about 
such sukuk structures.   
Table 12: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 12  
Sub-theme   There is a concern related to multiple contracts.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S5  It tends to lead to prohibited activities.  
C2  Sukuk may be included under the hadith of prohibiting two sales in 
one.  
The minority, including one scholar and an academic, raised a concern about the 
multiple contracts in sukuk. Certain combinations of contracts, which do exist in sukuk, raise 
some concerns. According to the AAOIFI Standard 25, Clause no.4, clear rules are set for 
combining contracts that must not lead to riba or to any prohibited activities (AAOIFI, 
2008). In sukuk, however, some existing practices are designed to sidestep Sharia law. For 
instance, it is required in the ijara contract that the costs of maintenance, major repairs, and 
insurance are borne by the lessor; however, the issuer combines this with other contracts 
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aiming to avoid these rules. Most of the respondents limit the hadith of prohibiting two sales 
in one to inah sales. Sukuk in current practice can be included, as inah sale exists and 
therefore the sukuk will not be excluded from the prohibition in the hadith.  
Table 12: Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 12  
Sub-theme   There is no Sharia concern about the 
combination of contracts.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S3, S1, S8, S9, B2, B4, B5, B6, B8, 
C4   
Sukuk  involve  separate  independent 
contracts.  
It should be noted that this view has been adopted by most of the Sharia boards, 
Sharia banking officers and scholars to open the way for more innovative structures and 
creative financial instruments. Although a number of transactions deal with, certain assets, 
sukuk are systems where all of the contracts are separate, independent and have various 
purposes. Each contract must satisfy all of the specific Sharia requirements to ensure its 
individual validity. Also, these combined contracts are complementary in the service of the 
main contract. For example, ijara sukuk usually involve a wakala contract in order to transfer 
the obligations concerning the assets to the most informed party with the more adequate 
skills. In this regard, sukuk type is determined according to the contract that generates the 
distribution amount. In addition, sukuk involve ijara, wakala and musharaka contracts; 
however, they do not target the specific assets. When targeting the same asset, as in leasing 
the ijara asset followed by a purchase, the subsequent purchase agreement was only a pledge, 
and not a binding contract. In finance, a contract which creates obligations for both parties 
differs from a binding promise where the obligation is only on the provider’s side. In Sharia, 
not all combinations of contracts are prohibited, but only those where the combination leads 
to unlawful activities.  
10.2.4 Issues Related to Regulation  
Certain rules and guidelines are compulsory in governing any sukuk investment, 
while the issues below concern recommendations for improving regulation and mitigating 
systemic risks. The following discussion shows these issues from a Sharia perspective, 
aiming to highlight the interviewees, attitudes towards such supervision.  
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I. Issues Related to the Regulation on Sukuk Prospectus  
The prospectus embodies the current regulatory framework for sukuk issuances. 
Some issuances neglect certain essential points, for example, the Zamzam sukuk did not 
explain rights and obligations of all participants and, more importantly, did not clarify the 
substantial levels of risk involved. When these elements are not disclosed, different attitudes 
were found during the interviews, as shown in Table 13.   
Table 13.1: Issues Related to Regulation and the sukuk Prospectus  
Research Question   
Q13: What is the ruling if a sukuk investment prospectus/contract does not explain the 
rights and obligations of all participants?  
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   This absence will not influence the issuance.    
2   The absence would raise sharia concerns about jahala 
(ignorance).  
Concluding theme:   In sukuk, it is important to highlight the relationship between 
disclosure and Sharia.  
Table 13.1.1:  Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 13  
Sub-theme   This absence will not influence the issuance.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S1, S3, B2, B4,   The main concern is the legality of the contract, and then any 
dispute will be dealt with in court.   
S10  In Sharia, total disclosure is not required.  
The majority of Sharia scholars agreed that only the essential obligations are required 
to be disclosed; however, not all of the rights and obligations need to be disclosed.  
Table 13.1.2: Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 13  
Sub-theme   The absence would raise Sharia concerns about jahala.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S8, B3, B6, B7   It is important to disclose all relevant issue to avoid any future 
dispute.  
S10, B5, B7   It depends on the subject ignored, as it may influence the 
issuance.  
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The majority of Sharia banking officers maintained that, in practice, some 
requirements are legally essential irrespective of the Sharia rules. However, if the issuance 
ignores what is required by Sharia, this would negatively influence the issuance. In principle, 
Sharia rules that, in any contract, knowledge of the subject matter is necessary to avoid future 
dispute and thus in sukuk all relevant information that may lead to a dispute has to be 
disclosed. Respondent S7 clarified that the absence of information in the contract will be 
checked according to the general Sharia rules and then against commercial customs, and if 
the disclosure is, accordingly, required and the contract omits the information but with no 
later dispute appearing among the parties, this will not nullify the contract. This is because 
gharar and jahala are prohibited in the possible dispute; if whereas, disputes do not arise, 
no nullifying risk will arise.   
Table 13.2: Issues Related to Regulation and the Sukuk Prospectus  
Research Question   
Q14: What is your opinion if an issuance of sukuk involves a substantial amount of 
risks that have not been disclosed to the investors?  
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   It is significant to disclose all potential risks.  
2   It is not required to disclose all relevant risks.  
Concluding theme:   In sukuk, it is important for the relationship between disclosure 
and Sharia to be highlighted.  
It is important to note there is no doubt that Sharia encourages the disclosure among 
the parties. However, the concern is to what extent an absence of disclosure will influence 
the issuance, as shown in Tables 13.2.1 and 13.2.2  
Table 13.2.1: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 14  
Sub-theme   It is significant to disclose all possible risks.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S10, B4, C1  If all risks are not disclosed, this may be considered to be deception 
and cheating.   
In fact, this matter is related to governance issues; however, from a Sharia 
perspective, it is considered to be unlawful action. This strict view is supported by a minority 
of interviewees; only one scholar, Sharia banking officer and academic. It is prohibited to 
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conceal the risks; however, they believe such a practice cannot make the entire contract 
invalid.   
Table 13.2.2: Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 14  
Sub-theme   It is not required to disclose all relevant risks.  
Interview No.1   Remarks   
S5, S9, B5   No Sharia impact on not disclosing the risks.  
S6, S7, S11, B8  There is no need for the issuer to disclose all possible risks, as 
this is the investors’ task.   
Although it is compulsory in Saudi law to disclose all possible risks, this is not a 
Sharia requirement. The majority of scholars agree that not disclosing all of the involved 
risks has no impact on the issuance from a Sharia perspective, as long as all other Sharia 
requirements are fulfilled. In Sharia, the only requirement is to disclose the risks that are 
considered most important according to prevailing commercial customs.   
II. Issues Related to Regulation Implementing AAOIFI Standards  
The current diversity in the market of sukuk, as shown in the earlier cases studied, is 
attributed to the lack of standardization and the absence of official Sharia regulation. Table 
14 shows the interviewees’ views on regulating the market with AAOIFI standards, aiming 
to answer to what extent the current standards are suitable for the contemporary market from 
the points of view of practitioners and researchers.     
Table 14: Issues Related to Regulation Implementing AAOIFI Standards  
Research Question   
Q15: What is your opinion about making the AAOIFI standards obligatory in the sukuk 
market?   
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   It is a recommended procedure to officially apply AAOIFI 
standards in the market.  
2   It is not the optimal choice to make the AAOIFI standards 
obligatory.   
Concluding theme:   The sukuk market essentially requires more regulation and one 
of the methods is to use the AAOIFI standards.    
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It is common in the literature to recommend applying the AAOIFI standards 
officially. Tables 14.1 and 14.2 show the opinions on this regard among the different 
respondents.   
Table 14.1: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 15  
Sub-theme   It is a recommended procedure to officially apply AAOIFI 
standards in the market.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S4, S5, S6, S8, S10, S11, 
S12, B4, B6, C4.  
This procedure is necessary in the current sukuk market.  
S7, B8   The procedure is recommended and then any 
contradictions in the standards would have to be 
considered according to the evidence.   
As there is no regulation related to Sharia requirements, the practices in the market 
are very diverse. On the other hand, the AAOIFI is an international institution that has 
received global acceptance and has involved scholars from most Sharia boards in the 
industry. Therefore, most of the responders, including the majority of Sharia scholars, 
recommend the application of the AAOIFI standards in sukuk markets. Following the 
AAOIFI standards would be an intermediate stage with general rules that need to be followed 
by a Sharia board in assessing the details of an issuance from a Sharia perspective. However, 
if any violation is found in a sukuk structure according to the AAOIFI standards, their Sharia 
basis has to be clarified. By such a practice, ijtihad will remain open in the industry to 
provide more creative instruments and sukuk activities would remain under control.     
Table 14.2: Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 15  
Sub-theme   It is not the optimal choice to make the AAOIFI standards 
obligatory.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S1 , C1, C3  Current AAOIFI standards are not sufficient to regulate sukuk 
market.   
C5  AAOIFI standards are not applicable in the current market.   
S9, B7   No standards should be made compulsory.   
In fact, the AAOIFI standards only offer general guidance, and are not suitable to be 
regulations. In addition, there is a considerable gap between these standards and real practice. 
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Since 2008, significant developments have occurred in the market without any change to the 
standards. However, some interviewees disagree with the idea of making any standards 
obligatory, as the Sharia board may adopt different Sharia views according to differences in 
customs, circumstances, time and place.     
III. Issues Related to Regulation and Sharia Board Approval  
To what extent receiving Sharia board approval is essential, as the Zamzam sukuk 
were issued without such approval. Table 15 shows the interviewees’ attitudes towards non-
approved issuances.  
Table 15: Issues Related to Regulation and Sharia Board Approval  
Research Question   
Q16: What is your opinion on considering Sharia board approval as a requirement for 
issuing sukuk? What about an issuance with no such approval or approved from only 
one scholar?  
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   It is acceptable to issue sukuk without Sharia board approval.   
2   It is necessary to involve a Sharia board   
Concluding theme:   Involving a Sharia board which cannot have less than three 
members is an AAOIFI requirement.   
Issuing sukuk without a Sharia board needs clarification from experts in the field, as 
shown in Tables 15.1 and 15.2.   
Table 15.1: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 16  
Sub-theme   It is acceptable to issue sukuk without Sharia board approval.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S1, S6   Sharia board is not essential as long as the purpose from the Sharia 
board will be achieved in other methods.   
Only a couple of the scholars would accept sukuk without Sharia board approval. 
This is because its importance is related to the nature of the structure rather than appointing 
a Sharia board. Undoubtedly, it is recommended to appoint a Sharia board but most 
significant point is actual compliance with Islamic rules.   
Table 15.2: Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 16  
242 | P a g e  
  
Sub-theme   It is necessary to involve a Sharia board  
Interview No.1   Remarks   
S4, S5, S11, S12,  
B3, B7, C1, C3   
It is a compulsory process in any issuance to involve a board 
and not only a single scholar.   
S10   A Sharia board is essential and accepting one scholar approval 
in a repeated structure.   
S8, B2, B4   The board is required, as the critical issue is to check the 
documents and not only the structure.   
The majority of the respondent among scholars, Sharia banking officers and 
academics asserted that it is compulsory to involve a Sharia board in order to prevent any 
breach of Sharia rules. Not involving a Sharia board means that the investment is not Islamic, 
since there is no proof of its Sharia compliance. This is because sukuk issues are usually not 
related to the structure, but only to the details in the documents.   
IV. Issues Related to the Regulation on Contradicting Ijma’  
While there is no controversy about ijma’, Table 16 illustrates the interviewees 
opinions on sukuk contradicting ijma’.  
Table 16: Issues Related to the Regulation on Contradicting Ijma’  
Research Question   
Q17: What is the ruling if an issuance of sukuk contradicts a consensus opinion?  
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   Sukuk contradicting ijma seem not to exist.  
2   The investment becomes prohibited.  
Concluding theme:   Contradicting ijma’ is critical and there cannot be any doubt 
that it is forbidden.   
When sukuk contradicts a consensus ruling, two main views were expressed, which 
are highlighted in Tables 16.1 and 16.2.    
Table 16.1: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 17  
Sub-theme   Sukuk contradicting ijma seem not to exist.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S7, S10, B4, B8   Ijma’ issues are limited and sukuk issuances seem not to involve 
any violation of ijma’.  
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A number of scholars and Sharia banking officers believed that the practice of sukuk 
does not contradict the ijma cases. This is because ijma’ cases are limited to a number of 
specific situations that do include any of sukuk issues.   
Table 16.2: Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 17  
Sub-theme   The investment becomes prohibited.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S5, B3, B7, C1, C4  The sukuk issuance becomes totally forbidden.  
S1, B6  It depends on the type of violation. As long as the issuance can 
be modified according to ijma’, the issuance can be accepted.   
Some believed that the entire issuance becomes prohibited, while others would aim 
to modify the issuance according to ijma’ in order to maintain validity.   
10.2.5 Issues Related to the Current Sukuk Industry  
Although sukuk have emerged as an innovative instrument to fill a gap in the capital 
market, current practices show critical faults. The following section identifies the 
assessments of academics and practitioners concerning the current market.   
I. Issues Related to the Importance of the current Sukuk 
The respondents were asked if current sukuk market practices show actual innovation 
in the global market. Table 17 shows the respondents’ assessments of to what extent the 
sukuk market fills gaps in the market.    
Table 17: Issues Related to the Importance of Current Sukuk  
Research Question   
Q18: Is there a need for sukuk for the development of the economy in general and 
Islamic finance in particular?  
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   The sukuk market positively enhances Islamic finance.   
2   There are some negative features in the sukuk market.  
Concluding theme:   The effect of sukuk at the macroeconomic level is significant 
when assessing current practice.   
The respondents’ assessments on the sukuk market are shown in Tables 17.1 and 
17.2.   
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Table 17.1: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 18  
Sub-theme   The sukuk market positively enhances Islamic finance.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S1, C3  The importance of sukuk to the Islamic finance is comparable to 
that of bonds to Western finance.  
B4, B8  Imitating bonds is a positive method as long as Sharia rules are 
fulfilled  
S6, S8, S10, S11, 
B7  
Sukuk provide Islamic finance with an alternative method to 
increase liquidity.    
Several scholars and Sharia banking officers endorse the positive effect of sukuk in 
Islamic finance. In Islamic finance, there is a marked need to provide a financial instrument 
as a substitute for bonds. Imitating bonds can be a positive method to design the instrument 
of sukuk as an acceptable substitute. Sukuk have become the best instrument to provide 
Islamic finance with better liquidity. In addition, sukuk facilitate infrastructure growth, 
industrial project development and public service evolution. It is important to note that these 
points do not relate to the quality of Sharia compliance.   
Table 17.2: Focused Coding No. 2 for Research Question 18  
Sub-theme   There are some negative features in the sukuk market.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S5, C1, C5   Sukuk in the industry are not sufficient in their Sharia quality.  
B4  Sukuk involve considerable weaknesses that negatively influence 
Islamic finance.   
S10  Only minor value is added by sukuk to the global economy.  
Sukuk are immature as instruments and have been treated in the global market as 
bonds. This is because most practices are based upon debt rather than the actual sharing. The 
actual practices involved contradict Sharia rules. It is important to note that respondent S5 
highlighted that benefits involving finance, such as enhanced liquidity, do not mean that 
sukuk are permitted under Sharia since it is mentioned in the Quran that ‘when they ask you 
about wine and gambling. Say, ‘In them is great sin and [yet, some] benefit for people. But 
their sin is greater than their benefit’. Even if the sukuk market improves the Islamic finance, 
it still uses unlawful means that require a higher compliance level.   
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II. Issues Related to Assessing the Current Sukuk Market  
Saudi Arabia's sukuk market is relatively conservative compared to the Malaysian 
market; however, the responses of interviewees highlight several issues and challenges 
concerning practice, as shown in Table 18.  
Table 18: Issue Related to Assessing the Current Sukuk Market  
Research Question   
Q19: What are your criticisms of Saudi sukuk market?   
Focused Coding   Sub-theme/Remarks   
1   Criticisms at the market level.  
2   Criticisms related to the issuances.  
Concluding theme:   Sukuk are immature instruments that have been subject to a 
number of important criticisms.  
The Saudi sukuk market has been the target of some criticism concerning both the 
market and issuances, as shown in Tables 18.1 and 18.2.  
Table 18.1: Focused Coding No. 1 for Research Question 19  
Sub-theme   Criticisms at the market level.  
Interviewees  Remarks   
S1  The illiquidity of the secondary market is a result of an inactive 
primary market.  
S1, S10  The Sukuk market targets only institutions and not individuals.  
S4, B4  More regulation at this level is essential.  
The Saudi sukuk market remains modest and comparatively inactive. Its scope is also 
restricted to institutional investors. More severe is the absence of specific regulation of the 
market. No clear conditions and standards exist, resulting in chaos evident in this field.  At 
the Sharia level, an authoritative body is recommended to review and control practice.  
Table 18.2: Focused Coding No.2 for Research Question 19  
Sub-theme   Criticisms related to the issuances.  
Interview No.1   Remarks   
S5, S10  It is considered as a fixed income instrument.  
S10, B7, B8   More Sharia supervision until maturity.  
S3, S6  Lack of Sharia compliance.  
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A number of scholars criticized the fact that most structures focus on fixed income 
rather than on actually sharing profit, resulting in critical violations of Sharia rules. For this 
reason, it is important to ensure continuous Sharia-compliance through an independent 
Sharia supervisory board, as asserted by a couple of Sharia banking officers.   
10.3 Summary  
The current dispute on sukuk issues mainly reflects the earlier jurisprudential 
arguments. However, earlier disputes had wide ramifications for the relevant issues whereas 
current disputes have become more focused and are easier to identify. There is no doubt that 
the AAOIFI has a role in harmonizing current scholars’ views through the meetings and 
discussions prior to the publishing of standards. The AAOIFI has adopted some standards 
which require specific procedures in order to be applicable in the market.  
In this regard, some recent practices were found to satisfy the Sharia standards and the 
financial requirements. In general, Sharia scholars showed some flexibility during the 
interview on a number of Sharia issues, while Sharia banking officers tended to be more 
practical. The responses of Sharia banking officers appeared to link the AAOIFI standards 
and the current market since they provided practical suggestions to satisfy requirements of 
the standards.  
To summarize the practical findings; a way out to reduce rental payments as a cause 
of partial loss is that the assets can be substituted with an equivalent. Another lawful 
approach is to maintain the excess amount of the rental in an account to be paid to investors 
at final purchase.  Another issue related to total loss can be solved by assigning the issuer to 
nominate the insurance company. In the event that of the company being unable to cover the 
total loss, the issuer would then be responsible for covering any shortfall due to misconduct 
in the decision, and furthermore the maintenance cost can be lawfully transferred through an 
agreed stipulation. In addition, the costs can be added in the next leasing interval under a 
supplementary payment. Also, it may be possible to cover all maintenance costs in the final 
purchase.  
Moreover, for guaranteeing the principal, the return and the assets of the issuance are 
critical. The principal can be lawfully repaid on the basis of lease-to-own. The final purchase 
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can be equivalent to the nominal value taking into account that the contract pledge is only 
binding on the provider, and not on both sides, otherwise it becomes impermissible. In 
addition, the periodical distribution amount can be strictly guaranteed by the issuer as 
obligated rentals. It is a strict obligation that the issuer as a lessee pays the rent. However, 
making the issuer a grantor in the capacity of the lessee for the asset is illegal, while some 
agree that the issuer can become a guarantor with a separate contract from the contract of 
ijara.   
It is agreed that the current Saudi sukuk market requires further improvements and 
developments to the current regulations. However, making the AAOIFI standard a part of 
the mandatory regulatory requirements in the market is a controversial idea. While 
proponents strongly agree that such regulation could be used to ban the current unlawful 
activities, others consider it as a negative approach that would lead to closing ijtihad.    
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Chapter 11: Summary of the Findings and 
Conclusion 
 
11.1 Introduction 
          The study shows that sukuk issuance in Islamic finance is comparable to the asset 
securitization in Western finance. Asset securitization has been described as ‘alchemy’, since 
it generates value in the conventional market that did not exist earlier. In this respect, the 
research highlights the considerable value generated by sukuk that enables the study to 
describe sukuk as ‘alchemy’ in the Islamic financial market. The comparability between these 
instruments raises question related to the differences in their characteristics and level of 
exposure to risk. A common claim in the literature on sukuk risks is that they are very similar 
to the risks in bond investments. The questions that the study aimed to answer were ‘What 
are the differences between the risks in bonds and in asset-backed sukuk?’ and ‘To what 
extent are the current practices of sukuk different from the theoretical literature?’ To 
accomplish the aims, the research first concentrated on the main differences found in risk 
exposure that distinguish sukuk investments from investing in conventional system. This 
research examined the differences between SBS and conventional bonds and found various 
fundamental variations, proving that these two types of securities provide different solutions 
in the market. These theoretical assertions were then examined in the applications in three 
specific case studies.   
11.2 Summary of the Results  
The summarization includes three categories that reflect the research questions; issues 
related to risks, issues related to agency problems and issues related to Sharia compliance. 
11.2.1 Issues Related to Risks  
Ramasamy et al. (2011) in their study shows that Islamic sukuk have lower exposure 
to risks. Their empirical analysis confirms that sukuk are moderately risky when compared 
to the bonds market. Their research indicated that the popularity of sukuk and the lower yield 
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support their less risky nature. By contrast, Wicaksono (2015) believes that sukuk and bonds 
are exposed to the same level of risk since they have the same reaction to the market’s 
sentiments. Although, Wicaksono (2015) study agrees that sukuk and conventional bonds 
have fundamental differences in their structures, the study concluded that they have the same 
level of risks. On the other hand, this study adopts that there is a higher exposure to the 
financial risks in sukuk cases than in bonds structure. Sukuk investors are highly exposed to 
risks related to the Sharia risk, legal risk and liquidity risk. More important is the credit risk 
in sukuk cases is more exposed than in bond investments. 
The credit risk that refers to the risks related to the principal and distribution 
payments, and sukuk are more exposed to these risks than bonds since any loss in the assets 
has to influence both the distribution amounts and the purchase undertaking. According to 
the AAOIFI, the return and the principal for sukuk cannot be guaranteed by the originator 
except if the loss occurs due to misuse or negligence. This increases the investors’ exposure 
to such risk. Bonds are less exposed to financial risks since there is no link to the assets but 
rather to the originator’s creditworthiness and thus the return and the principal are guaranteed 
by the originator. In practice, however, the SEC and Sadara sukuk show no actual 
relationship to the assets and the structure provides different levels of guarantee for both 
obligations, resulting in a great reliance on the originator’s creditworthiness rather than the 
circumstances of the assets. These sukuk involve a purchase undertaking at the assets’ par 
value with insurance for the assets. However, if the insurer fails to cover the loss, two 
different practices are found: one with compulsory coverage of any shortfall in the assets’ 
insurance by the originator, as applied in the SEC sukuk and which aims for the same 
exposure as appears with bonds. The other practice, as seen in the Sadara sukuk, provides 
voluntary coverage of the loss by the originator, so that investors retain a higher exposure to 
such a risk. The second practice satisfies the Sharia framework as provided in the literature, 
since there should be enough exposure to capital loss risk compared to the risk available in 
bonds. It is the investors’ obligation to cover any shortages in insurance related to the assets. 
With regards to distribution, both cases show that, if the originator fails to generate rental 
payments, investors will face a loss without any guarantee for the distribution. This is a 
positive step towards a more harmonious instrument according to the spirit of Sharia, but it 
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involves an additional risk that does not exist in bond investments. This means the sukuk 
provide different levels of exposure to credit risk than exists in bond investment.   
Although the cases considered show higher exposure to credit risk than in bonds with 
no guarantee of a return, they do not offer legal ownership to the investors which means that 
there is no recourse to any of the underlying assets in the case of default on the part of the 
originator. However, SBS investors incur higher credit risk with the advantage of their 
recourse to the assets. A defect in practice is that only some of the Sharia requirements and 
features of SCS are applied rather than being totally in conformity with SBS. As the current 
practices diverge from the paradigmatic version, these sukuk lose the distinctive features and 
tend to be less attractive than conventional bonds. This is attributed to the considerable risks 
involved without a compensating return. The return issue appears greater in Saudi sukuk 
market because the market featured with lower return compared to others. Saudi sukuk cases 
do not compensate effectively with higher financial risks. For instance, Sadara sukuk were 
priced at 95 basic points above the six-month Saudi interbank offered rate, making a profit 
rate of just under 2%. There is no doubt that Sadara sukuk have more sophisticated structures 
than those of bonds. A number of transactions are involved in these sukuk, including selling, 
purchasing, leasing and agency contracts that require a great deal of documentation. The 
result is that Sadara sukuk investors are exposed to higher risks since there is no guarantee 
of a return, as seen also in SEC sukuk, and in turn the uniqueness of having recourse to the 
underlying assets is loss. The outcome is that a number of Saudi applications have high 
degree of risks along with the loss of sukuk uniqueness. 
         The research furthermore discussed market risks related to changes in the assets’ value, 
interest rates and currency risks. Risk associated with assets value does not confront bonds 
investors, while sukuk investors bear these risks as a result of being owners of the underlying 
assets. However, this exposure is limited by the purchase undertaking at par value, meaning 
that no loss will be incurred if the asset’s value changes in the market. Through this 
procedure, this risk has been transferred to the originator rather than being borne by 
investors, aiming to reduce the degree of association between the investors and their assets 
and being more compatible with bond structures. Moreover, interest rate risk affects the 
value of bonds directly while, as appropriate Sharia-based instruments sukuk are less 
251 | P a g e  
  
exposed to such changes in the market. This is because their returns depend on the actual 
revenues from the assets and are calculated based on real incomes from the assets in the pool, 
resulting in the avoidance or significant reduction of this risk. This was only applied in the 
Zamzam sukuk, as the return was linked to the real estate market, resulting in lower exposure 
to interest rate risk. On the other hand, the periodical distributions of the Sadara sukuk were 
semi-annual with an expected return of 6 month SAIBOR plus 95 basis points per annum. 
As in conventional debt, this direct link between returns and SAIBOR increase the exposure 
to reinvestment risk due to the fluctuation of interest rates in the market.   
         Both sukuk and bondholders are similarly exposed to currency exchange risks since 
any unfavourable changes in the exchange rates leads to possible loss. In practice, the foreign 
exchange risk is mostly unavoidable in international issuances due to unanticipated currency 
fluctuations, while this type of exposure is not present with local issuances. The study 
furthermore looked at the liquidity risk that is related partly to the inactive secondary sukuk 
market. Sukuk-holders are highly exposed to these risks due to the Sharia restrictions on 
trading debt, while bonds are more active and better standardized. The nature of sukuk means 
that some Sharia limitations operate in their trading; however, actual practice adds another 
dimension to the illiquidity of sukuk. The limited issuances in the primary market and then 
the exercise of ‘buy and hold’ leads to a higher exposure to the liquidity risks. These risks 
were given attention in the prospectuses in the case studied. For instance, for Sadara sukuk 
it was indicated that their investment cannot be traded quickly enough to prevent any 
predicted loss due to the lack of an efficient Saudi secondary market, which may result in 
the inability to sell the sukuk at a reasonable time and reasonable price. As this is the case, it 
is difficult or impossible to remove liquidity risk from any sukuk investment.   
In addition, the research discussed the operational risks, which refer to the risks 
related to negative event affecting the assets. This is an additional risk incurred by sukuk 
investors and does not exist in bond investment. Sukuk are exposed to this risk due to the 
real ownership of the assets and the degree of this exposure depends on the nature of the 
assets. For instance, this risk in the Sadara sukuk was significant during construction as the 
assets were as yet unavailable. Nevertheless, in the cases the risk of partial loss was mainly 
transferred to the originators. Originators incur any expenses related to partial damage to the 
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assets using different procedures. Moreover, the originator bears the insurance and 
maintenance costs and the partial loss of assets results in weakening the link between the 
investors and their invested assets. This means that there is no direct influence on the 
distributions to the investors due to misuse of the assets. However, this does not comply with 
sukuk from a Sharia perspective as the investors have to show a higher level of exposure to 
asset liabilities.  
Finally, the research studied the legal risks in sukuk investment. Sukuk investors are 
more exposed to this risk than investors in bonds. One of the problems facing the sukuk market 
is the absence of a proper legislative basis. Thus, in sukuk attempts are made to use English law 
to cover such a shortage, resulting in the possibly of conflict between English law and Sharia 
rules. For instance, the certificates and transaction documents for the SEC sukuk are 
governed by English law. As, English law in some cases contradicts Sharia rules, this means 
that there may be legal inconsistency in sukuk investments. This could explain the reason for 
the SEC prospectus starting that the issuance may be contrary to Sharia law in some of their 
possible future stages of the sukuk. Thus, the court may consider the relationships involved 
SEC sukuk as creditor and borrower rather than lessee and lessor, according to some of the 
clauses in the prospectus, which represents an obvious departure from Sharia law.  
Also, when applying Saudi Arabian law, there is a risk that the interpretation of the 
Sharia compliance may vary among different Saudi courts. For example, the Sadara sukuk, 
which apply Saudi law, may face the risk that courts in Saudi Arabia may decide that the 
musharaka agreement is invalid and consider the investors’ interest in the musharaka as a 
debt claim in the leased assets. Although the Sadara sukuk have received a pronouncement 
confirming compatibility with Sharia, such a statement cannot be binding on a judicial 
committee. Both cases show higher exposure to legal risks resulting from the lack of a 
standardized legal framework for sukuk investment.    
          Sharia risks involve the possibility of the sukuk issuance contradicting Sharia rules. 
Bonds show no exposure to this risk because no relationship exists between bonds and Sharia 
principles. However, if sukuk adhere to AAOIFI standards this would limit such an exposure. 
This is because AAOIFI standards show better harmonization with Sharia requirements, 
which in turn leads to a better management of this risk. This means that the possibility of 
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changes in the approval of the issuance, for example receiving disapproval from another 
scholar or to be judicially treated as a non-Islamic instrument, are less expected with sukuk 
meeting AAOIFI standards.  
Although the three cases considered have been reviewed and approved by reliable 
scholars, they show a different level of contradictions with AAOIFI requirements. The 
aggregate percentage compliance of the SEC was only 11.5%, Sadara sukuk was 81.7% and 
Zamzam sukuk achieved 90%. The great dissimilarity in the results is because Sharia 
supervisory boards do not limit their fatwa to the AAOIFI point of view. This increases the 
exposure to the risk of changes in approval, being disapproved by another scholar or for the 
sukuk to be judicially treated as a non-Islamic instrument. This particular risk is mentioned 
in the prospectuses of the case studies along with the legal consequences of being 
unenforceable due to being not Islamic. While most aspects of Sharia risk can be reduced by 
a strict adherence to Sharia financial law with great transparency on the basis of fatwa, the 
actual practices show less compliance and a lack of transparency. Sharia boards limit their 
fatwa to the overall compliance or non-compliance of the structure without giving details 
and evidence that provide investors with sufficient confidence related to Sharia compliance 
especially in controversial Sharia matters. For instance, the approval of the three cases 
appears in official documentation without any evidence, reasoning or explanation of the view 
given. However, the best financial practice necessitates greater transparency in order to 
protect the reputation of the sukuk and to maintain investor confidence, especially given their 
current distance from AAOIFI standards. 
As, sukuk cases have a higher exposure to the financial risks, investors are presumed 
to have the advantage of the recourse to their sukuk assets. However, the case studies only 
provide beneficial ownership without any recourse to the assets. In SBS, there are 
considerable risks in the investment; however, with a recourse to the assets. In this respect, 
most sukuk investors believe that they have received such an advantage. Lukonga (2015) 
examined a number of defaulting sukuk and found that the majority of their investors were 
not aware that there was no recourse to the underlying assets and that, subsequently, no sale 
of the underlying assets could be made in the event of default. This indicates that the 
practices have fault in their structure that could arise in the case of insolvency. Zaheer and 
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Wijnbergen (2013) found that the experience of default episodes indicates clearly that the 
advantages of sukuk can only be succeeded in accessing a broader investor base if their sukuk 
structure strictly complies with the rules prescribed by Sharia. The strict following of Sharia 
rules would have minimized the incidence of defaults. These rules need sukuk to be asset-
backed and free of gharar, gambling and interest.  
Another important point is that sukuk are typically designed to incur higher exposure 
to risks, while the case studies have shifted a number of these risks to the originator. To make 
the practices a true investment sukuk, investors have to incur additional risks in order to 
achieve the status of SBS. These additional risks are mainly related to the underlying assets 
in order to make a true investment sukuk according to the spirit of Sharia. However, the 
Sadara investors incurred higher risks related to both credit risks and asset risks than the SEC 
investors. This is, as discussed, because of the feature of no guarantee for the assets in the 
case of total loss. Thus, the Sadara sukuk can be considered as a step forward toward a true 
investment sukuk.  
11.2.2 Issues Related to Agency Problems   
The thesis also examined some of the agency costs embedded in asset-backed sukuk 
investments and tried to identify the principal/agent conflicts that appear in different 
applications of sukuk investment. The study found that the sukuk structure involves a number 
of critical agency conflicts. Sukuk are embedded with a variety of different agency 
relationships depending on the positions taken by the originator, such as being as a manager, 
a lessee, an issuer, a servicer, and a contractor, leading to higher exposure to agency 
problems. Aljifri & Khandelwal (2013) concludes in their study that Islamic financial 
activities have less agency problems than their conventional counterparts. On the contrary, 
this research pointed out that the higher level of the responsibility undertaken by the 
originator in sukuk issuance confirms the greater exposure to the agency issues. This research 
examined the agency conflicts that arise according to the type of assets concerned. 
Originators have an incentive to use risky assets when structuring asset-backed sukuk in 
order to exclude them from their books and to transfer the excessive risk to the investors. 
However, the case studies show that the securitized assets have not been entirely transferred 
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to the investors and, in fact, assets remain in the originator’s book. Despite Sharia concerns 
about ownership, this practice has minimized the agency conflicts that may arise.   
The study also found that there is an agency conflict related to the value of the 
underlying assets. As investors look for sukuk that reflect the value of the underlying assets, 
originators have an incentive to overstate their value to receive more cash. This issue is 
critical, as sukuk assets are sold at the market price, and also in the case the insolvency 
investors, have recourse to their assets to compensate for the loss. In addition, the practices 
show another dimension to this issue caused by the substitution undertakings. The 
securitized assets may change over the life time of the sukuk and investors may have no 
official access to monitor their invested assets, creating a circumstance of moral hazard. 
Here, the research found no evidence in the prospectuses of the SEC and Sadara sukuk related 
to the value of the underlying assets except what was mentioned by the Sadara Sharia board. 
The board asked for a neutral third party estimation to validate the actual relationship 
between the cash received and the value of the invested assets. This specific action helps to 
reduce the adverse selection in favour of Sadara. Moreover, the SEC and Sadara sukuk 
involved procedures that eliminating this conflict, as both cases applied the purchase 
undertaking. The originator as a manager/agent undertakes to purchase the underlying assets 
at their nominal value. This agreement manages the agency conflicts since the repurchase 
agreement shows a dimension of sharing between the originator and investors of the 
securitized asset that would reduce the agency costs. More importantly, this device allows 
the conflict that arises as a consequence of the originator being the lessee to be managed. 
The lessee may misuse the leased asset since the investors as owners cannot perform 
adequate monitoring. However, the purchase undertaking at par value would lead the 
originator’s performance to act in favour of the assets.   
          Also, the cases show that the purchase undertaking solves the agency conflicts caused 
by the originator being the servicer. In these cases, there was no access for the investors to 
ensure that the servicer’s actions are in favour of the assets. However, as the originator is the 
final owner of the assets, investors can become less concerned about the servicers’ 
performance. The undertaking device has reduced incentive asymmetries in various ways. 
In fact, the Sadara sukuk use a further device to manage these conflicts by using the concept 
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of co-ownership. Under the musharaka agreement, the originator and the investors become 
co-owners of the securitized assets which will increase the investors’ confidence that the 
originator, as co-owner, will maintain a high quality of service, management and 
performance.  
          Moreover, the research found that the musharaka agreement and purchase undertaking 
in the Sadara sukuk have minimized the agency costs due to the originator being the 
contractor. In this respect, the value of the assets is influenced by the contractor’s efforts, 
actions, inherent talent and other factors that are unobserved along with the information 
asymmetry concerning assets however, causing a possible moral hazard. Therefore, Sadara 
applied the hedging processes of the musharaka agreement and a purchase undertaking 
which reduce the asymmetry of incentive. Investors seek well constructed assets to raise the 
value of their investment, and also Sadara, as a partner and final purchaser, has the same 
incentive towards the leased assets, resulting in a situation where the contractor has sufficient 
motivation to perform well. In fact, both hedging methods ensure that the contractor has a 
compelling incentive to perform well and the investors can become more confident that they 
are investing in reliable future assets.  
          The study additionally examines the agency costs caused by the originator misusing 
the surplus. The originator as manager may misuse the surplus and spend it unwisely rather 
than maintaining it in the receivables account to meet any forthcoming obligations. Hence, 
the greater the access that the originator has to the earnings generated from the underlying 
assets, the more likely the investors are to suffer from agency costs. The practices of ijara 
sukuk show a hedging procedure to reduce this moral hazard. Ijara sukuk cases precisely 
determine the earnings as a rental payment and thus the cash flow generated from the assets 
becomes more definite and specified, resulting in a better management of the agency costs. 
Both cases have committed future cash intake to investors, aiming to reduce the agency costs 
and also to protect future cash flows from mismanagement. The research also discusses the 
adverse selection problem that may arise between the originator and Sharia-sensitive 
investors. Each case receives a fatwa that shows the compatibility of the issuance with Sharia 
in order to eliminate the originator’s incentive to structure a non-compatible issuance. This 
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fatwa enables investors to become more confident as they have no access to accurately 
evaluate the extent of the issuance being harmonious with Sharia rules.   
           All of the hedging programmes applied limited the agency costs and made the 
structure more effective in reducing agency risks. These mechanisms have reduced the 
degree of moral hazard and adverse selection generated by the quality and extent of 
information asymmetries. Despite sukuk originators typically having better status concerning 
information on the assets being utilized, the practices show effective programmes to reduce 
the possible risks and mitigate the ‘lemon’ problem. However, the hedging programmes 
made investors less concerned about the asset’s performance and more interested in coupon 
payments. Also, they became less interested in how the assets were serviced and managed 
and how the proceeds were spent as a result of the incentives and risks in the relationships 
between the originator and investors becoming less asymmetric.  
In studying the literature of Islamic finance, other theories may arise such as 
stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory is one of the predominant theories that is used to 
understand various types of relationships in business and provide a means to explain business 
challenges. This theory is broader than the agency theory view as it understands the concept 
of capital to involve all stakeholders rather than just shareholders parties and it is often used 
to outline the interests of shareholders, employees, customers, the public and vendors 
(Mohamed & Faouzi, 2014). The theory is considered appropriate to support the 
implementation in Islamic finance to enhance better Sharia compliance activities (Zamil, 
2014). It is proper to Islamic finance since it can help to support and develop the Islamic 
sharing economy, pirticulary risk sharing and PLS concept. Islam adopts a stakeholder 
approach which considers claims from all stakeholders as equally valid and acknowledges 
that the owners of businesses or financers have the right to earn profits. This approach 
supports equity based financing that depends on PLS as it is significant to share risks 
between the financiers and the owners (Belal, et al., 2015). The notion of shared risk makes 
the stakeholder link to value creation more explicit. As a result, the financial risks would not 
be shifted rather shared between equal parties. Each stakeholder would obtain profits, rights 
and bear risks, in accordance with their proportionate stake (Aribi & Arun, 2012). 
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11.2.3 Issues Related to Sharia Compliance   
The thesis aims to precisely identify the compliance of the three cases with AAOIFI 
standards. The following table shows the aggregate percentage compliance of the SEC, 
Sadara and Zamzam sukuk.  
Table 11-1 The Aggregate Percentage Compliance of SEC, Sadara and Zamzam Sukuk 
Sukuk Issuance SEC sukuk Sadara sukuk Zamzam sukuk 
The aggregate 
percentage compliance 11.5% 81.7% 90% 
 
The following table shows that the aggregate percentage compliance of SEC sukuk 
was only 11.5%, Sadara sukuk was 81.7% and Zamzam sukuk achieved 90%. Notably, the 
lowest score of the compliance is recorded for SEC sukuk while the highest is achieved by 
Zamzam sukuk. Sadara sukuk also achieve a high score but slightly lower than Zamzam case. 
Sadara and Zamzam sukuk involves higher exposure to the financial risks than in SEC sukuk. 
SEC sukuk explicitly provide a full of guarantee in the case of total loss assets that is not 
provided in Sadara and Zamzam sukuk. This is because, based on earlier discussion, being 
more compatible with Sharia involves naturally higher exposure to the financial risks. The 
total results show that the Saudi sukuk market is considerably vary on their Sharia 
compliance. This would confirm that AAOIFI standards are not officially adopted in the 
market. A case has achieved 11.5% while the other 90% which can indicate the chaos exists 
among Saudi applications related to their Sharia compatibility. These varied results are an 
outcome of not specifying rules for sukuk in the country. There is no single piece of 
legislation precisely regulating the implementation of sukuk including rules surrounding 
Sharia compliance.  
SEC sukuk use a plain vanilla ijara structure; whereas, Sadara and Zamzam apply a 
more sophisticated and efficient structure. In the market of sukuk, simple and direct ijara 
structure means lower compatibly with Sharia and higher similarity to the bonds. On the 
other hand, Zaheer & Wijnbergen (2013) found that strict adherence to Sharia rules would 
considerably simplify structuring sukuk. They support their opinion by stating that Sharia 
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compliance involves a clear allocation of property rights. In fact, this study adopts the 
opposite view that structuring complex sukuk is one of the feature to develop a better 
compliance issuance. Both Sadara and Zamzam sukuk have involved a number of efficient, 
complex and unprecedented features in order to avoid a number of Sharia issues and thus to 
achieve better Sharia compatibility. Sadara sukuk have achieved its successful complicated 
structure by the involvement of a range of various Islamic scholars and financial experts. It 
is important for both Sadara and Zamzam sukuk to be compatible with Sharia as they mainly 
target Muslim investors whether local or international. Muslim investors pay more attention 
to the the religious values while foreign investors in general have less concer with this regrd.  
Meanwhile, developing a better Sharia compliance structure according to AAOIFI 
does not mean a better social and moral consequences. Zamzam sukuk achieved the highest 
score in terms of the compatibility with AAOIFI standards; on the other hand, the project 
confronts a plenty of issues related to the social and moral implications. One of the main 
issues is the damage to the environment and the historicity of the holiest place in the Muslim 
world and the focal point of the prayer. Zamzam towers were built to provide up-market 
luxurious residence for high-net-worth pilgrimages. The project undermines equal 
opportunity in the holy place, diminishes its historicity and spirituality, and harms its 
environmental nature (Asutay, 2012).  Despite, their high result, Zamzam Towers can be 
considered as an example of social failure. This confirms that Sharia compliancy in the form 
of AAOIFI standards do not endogenise social consequences in their construct.  
The research asks about the critical Sharia issues that face asset-backed sukuk. In 
conclusion, the analysis found that the key requirements are mostly related to guarantees, 
ownership, the principal, rent and maintenance. The AAOIFI bans the issuer as a manager 
from offering any guarantee for the assets. However, the interview data show differentiation 
between the total loss and partial loss. In total loss, some allowed to voluntarily take the repair 
without any compulsory statement in the contract. This procedure was applied in the Sadara 
sukuk as the issuer may voluntarily cover any shortage in the insurance of the assets. However, 
the SEC has been obligated to cover the shortfall in the asset insurance. This difference resulted 
in the Sadara sukuk becoming more harmonious with Sharia. However, partial loss was 
treated with a more relaxed attitude towards the issuer’s guarantee. The interviews highlight 
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two possible ways to cover the loss by the issuer. The first is the substitution of the assets, 
and the second is maintaining the excessive rental under an account in order for investors to 
receive it at the final purchase. There is no clear clarification in the cases related to this issue; 
however, the SEC sukuk involve a substitution undertaking in order to substitute the assets 
if necessary. Moreover, the AAOIFI framework requires true ownership of the securitized 
assets when structuring asset-backed sukuk. However, the cases show that investors received 
the right of return with considerable restrictions on commercial behaviours with respect to 
the assets. The interviews highlighted other views in the market to accept or restrict the 
owner’s commercial behaviours. Their views are supported by analogical reasoning based on 
the case of equity since investors, in both situations, have no direct possession of the assets.  
Also, the research shows the AAOIFI acceptance for the lessee, in sukuk ijara, to 
undertake to purchase the assets at their par value, provided that the issuer is not a partner, 
mudharib, or investment agent. The interviews show another view that the purchase 
undertaking at nominal value is unlawful as it would result in an explicit guarantee of the 
principal, a point about which there is no doubt concerning its prohibition. However, it is 
important to note that the scenario of ijara sukuk involves the permissibility of purchasing 
at nominal value, which is different from guaranteeing the principal. The structure of ijara 
can lead to recovery of the initial payment through the purchase undertaking at par value, 
meaning that if the asset is destroyed there would be no guarantee. However, in these cases, the 
purchase undertaking does not satisfy AAOIFI standards, since these standards set a number 
of conditions to permit the undertaking and neither practice complies with the requirements. 
More importantly, the final purchase is attributed to a one-party undertaking, as the contract of 
the pledge is binding on the issuer’s side since he provides the promise. However, providing a 
two-party undertaking is illegal, and would turn the contract into an obligation rather than a 
pledge. In fact, the Sadara structure was more harmonious with Sharia as it provides a one-
party undertaking while the SEC provides a two-party undertaking.   
           Moreover, the study discusses the rental issue, as the AAOIFI assert that the rental 
has to be paid to the lessor as a strict obligation, and any shortage or delay is not acceptable. 
However, it is important to note that the amount paid is not a guarantee for sukuk returns, but 
rather it is an obligation on the rental payment under the ijara basis. The cases also show an 
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effective commitment from the issuer to pay the rental and, more importantly, without any 
guarantee of return. The SEC and Sadara, regardless of advance rental, do not guarantee the 
rent in cases where their activities do not generate any liquidity. For instance, if total loss 
occurs to the asset, no rental payment would be distributed to the investors.  
In addition, the study highlights that the AAOIFI emphasizes that the responsibility 
for maintenance and insurance fall under the lessor’s liabilities as the owner of the asset. In 
this respect, the interviews show some practical solutions to overcome this issue. The 
maintenance costs can be transferred to the issuer through an agreed stipulation, through 
supplementary payments, or it can be covered by the issuer through the final purchase as a 
purchase payment. In fact, the SEC sukuk transferred the maintenance costs to the issuer as 
an agent through an agreed stipulation, while Sadara covered them through supplementary 
payments. The point of transferring these costs is that the property’s ownership will be 
devolved finally to the issuer.  
The study highlighted some practical solutions in order to achieve a high level of 
Sharia-compliant sukuk along with a consideration of minimizing the financing costs and 
maximizing the profits of both parties. Significance is derived from maintaining a 
commitment to Sharia requirements as well as enhancing the investment allocation to satisfy 
both spiritual and financial criteria. However, the research concluded that the most critical 
Sharia issue that remain unsolved is related to ownership. Sukuk investors must have 
complete ownership of the underlying assets throughout the tenure with evidence from 
proper book entries and relevant documents. This is to give reasonable assurance to the 
sukuk-holders that they will be able to recover a main part of their investment if the originator 
defaults. Any legal ownership involves authority over the assets; however, the securitized 
assets do not provide any authority for the investors. For instance, the state of Bahrain tested 
ijara sukuk in 2001, and although it was hugely successful, the major defect was ownership. 
These sukuk are no more than the buying of earnings and returns from shares, which is not 
legal from the Sharia perspective (Usmani, 2008). Also, the Saudi cases studied prevented 
investors from having access to their assets, which results in something like a mortgage 
contract towards the assets rather than ownership. This is because, if the issuer is bankrupted, 
there is no access to the assets but rather the issuer has to pay the purchase amount as 
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compensation. At the final stage, bondholders and sukuk-holders are treated equally without 
taking into account the ownership involved, since it is merely fictitious. In fact, this point is 
evident in the prospectus of Saudi cases, as it describes sukuk as unsecured obligations 
whose holders have no actual ownership of the assets. However, to achieve a true sukuk 
investment, Saudi applications have to move away from the design of unsecured structures 
towards secured, asset-backed sukuk.  
11.3 Concluding Remarks  
        The research is bounded to investigate three main cases applied in Saudi Arabia.  This 
is because Saudi Arabia is the second largest Islamic finance economy internationally with 
total assets of $ 270 billion. Also, it has the largest Islamic banking market with assets worth 
$ 217 billion and also it is home to a number of dedicated Islamic Banks (Zehri & Mbarek, 
2016). In the Kingdom, the essential system which should be followed is the Islamic finance 
system, because it is classified as an Islamic country. Therefore, this market should show 
better interaction with Sharia principles and standards.  
The discussion on Saudi applications adopted agency theory since it provides 
unprecedented attention on information system, outcomes uncertainty and risk. Agency 
theory's explanatory power, particularly with regard to relationship dynamics, provides 
robust basis for recognizing the behaviour surrounding contractual relationships (Fayezi, et 
al., 2012). This theory is significant for establishing effective management control devices 
and also has a broad ability to capture different control mechanisms applied in specific 
structure. Despite, the significance and relevance between this theory and sukuk issuances 
as they structured with one party (the principal) delegates authority in terms of control and 
decision, this area has not received attention among academic literature.  
Moreover, the Sharia dissuasion adopted AAOIFI standards since AAOIFI 
formulates specific standards for sukuk market. AAOIFI governance standards provide 
detailed guidance on Sharia supervision and compliance performs. More important is that 
these standards have received a wide acceptance as they are officially adopted by a number 
of central banks to increase the investor’s confidence. In addition, some countries have been 
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made them as a part of mandatory regulatory requirement in jurisdictions while others have 
used them voluntarily as basis of internal guidelines by leading Islamic financial institutions.  
Indeed, there are some areas that need further explanation and clarification 
particularly in term of theoretical framework of the agency theory. In this research, the 
discussion on agency was limited to asset-backed sukuk. This study has examined these 
sukuk focusing on their agency relationship and analysing the issues that may arise and 
studying their effective management control devices. The investigation can also be carried 
on other types of sukuk that based on debt, services and equity in order to generate further 
evaluation on different sukuk structures. Equally important that the research needs to be 
further extended by studying the the relation between sukuk and other related theory such 
as stakeholder theory. It is important to discuss stakeholder theory from a broader point of 
view to explore the implications of the risk-sharing notion within stakeholder oriented 
theory and to highlight the foundation, significance and relevance of this theory in Islamic 
economic system and supports that a stakeholder theory has strong roots in the economic 
system in Islam. 
The findings of this research, however, are based on the selection of sukuk cases 
found in Saudi Arabia. It has achieved a determine score to identify each case position in 
terms of Sharia principles. Given the expansion in the global market for sukuk there is a 
need to examine sukuk issuances from Sharia perspective to ensure they maintain their 
essential requirement. The same method can be applied to evaluate other main cases 
available in the market to measure their Sharia compliance level since sukuk are issued 
without showing in detail their Sharia issues.  
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Appendix I: English version of the Interview 
questions 
 
Interview Questions: 
Thank you for agreeing to answer some questions about Islamic finance particularly 
sukuk market. The questions aim to find answers on a determined issue found in some 
cases of sukuk.  
1. What is the ruling when the maintenance of sukuk assets is borne by the issuer? How 
can this influence the issuance?  
2. What is the ruling if sukuk explicitly provide the guarantee of return from the issuer? 
3. In the case of insolvency, what is the ruling if investors do not have recourse to their 
assets?  
4. In the case of the assets’ deterioration, what is the ruling if the issuer bears the loss 
instead of investors? How to justify the investors’ ownership from Sharia point of view? 
5. What is the view in executing a number of contracts in sukuk structure?  
6. What is the ruling if the sukuk transfer the periodical maintenance costs to the investors 
without specifying any indication of the costs?  
7. What is the ruling if the sukuk agent undertakes to pay any shortfall amount to the 
investors?  
8. What is your opinion on not specifying the fees for the agent, how can this influence the 
total issuance? 
9. If sukuk involve non-Islamic insurance, how can this affect the issuance? 
10. What is the ruling if the excess of the asset’s profit is retained by the issuer as incentive 
fees? What is the Sharia justification for withholding all of the profits from investors? 
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11. What is the ruling if sukuk explicitly provide the guarantee of the principal by the 
issuer? 
12. According to qabd (taking into possession), sukuk have to include the registration of 
the asset, which is absent in most of the issuances. What is your view of these sukuk?  
13. What is the ruling if a sukuk investment prospectus/contract does not explain the rights 
and obligations of all participants? 
14. What is your opinion if an issuance of sukuk involves a substantial amount of risks that 
have not been disclosed to the investors?  
15. What is your opinion on considering Sharia board approval as a requirement for issuing 
sukuk? What about an issuance with no such approval or approved from only one scholar? 
16. What is the ruling if an issuance of sukuk contradicts a consensus opinion? 
17. Is there a need for sukuk for the development of the economy in general and Islamic 
finance in particular?? 
18. What are your criticisms of Saudi sukuk market? 
19. What is your opinion about making the AAOIFI standards obligatory in the sukuk 
market? 
 
Thank you for your time and comments. 
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 أسـئلـة الـمقابــلـة:
أشكر لكم الموافقة على قبول الإجابة على هذه الأسئلة المتعلقة بمجال التمويل الإسلامي، وخصوصا موضوع 
 معاصرةالأثناء دراسة عدد من التطبيقات  ظهرتالصكوك الإسلامية. تركز هذه الأسئلة على عدد من القضايا التي 
 في سوق الصكوك، وهي كالتالي:
 ها تكليف المستأجر بالصيانة الأساسية للأصل؟حكم الصكوك التي يكون في ما .1
 للمستثمر؟حكم الصكوك التي يضمن فيها المصدر قدرا ثابتا من الربح  ما .2
 في حاله إفلاس الُمصدر للصكوك، هل يحق له أن يمنع المستثمرين من بيع أصولهم؟   .3
 إذا هلك الأصل كليا، وتحمل المصدر كامل الخسارة عن المستثمرين، فمالحكم برأي فضيلتكم؟ .4
حكم الصكوك التي تجمع عقدين معا، مثلا عقد البيع، مع عقد الإجارة؟ هل يدخل هذا ضمن النهي عن بيعتين  ما .5
 تقبل، مع إبرام عقد الإجارة)؟الآيوفي (لايجوز التمليك بإبرام عقد البيع مضافا إلى المس معيارفي بيعه؟ 
حكم الصكوك التي تلزم المستأجر بالصيانة التشغيلية، لكن التكلفة يحددها المؤجر في بداية كل عام، هل  ما. 6
 يعد هذا من الغرر؟
ما حكم تعيين وكيل عن المستثمرين في الصكوك، وهذا الوكيل يكون ضامن لرأس المال؟ فهل يجوز الجمع  .7
 والوكالة؟ الكفالةبين 
ما حكم تعيين وكيل عن المستثمرين في الصكوك، وهذا الوكيل لم تحدد له الأجرة؟ هل يعتبر هذا انتفاء لأحد  .8
 ؟بالأجرةشروط العقد، وهو العلم 
  حكم الصكوك التي يكون فيها تأمينا تجاريا غير إسلامي؟ ما. 9
ليه (بصفته وكيل) لا إلى المسثمرين، فمالحكم زاد من الأرباح، فهو يعود إ إذا اشترط المصدر بأن ما .11
 فضيلة الشيخ؟
 هل هذا الضمان يحول الصكوك إلى سندات؟ للصك؟حكم الصكوك التي يكون فيها ضمان للقيمة الاسمية  ما .11
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 حكم الصكوك التي لم يحصل فيها تقابض حقيقي للأصل؟ ما .21
 مالحكم إذا أخلت نشرة الإصدار بتوضيح كل الالتزامات والحقوق لجميع الأطراف؟ .31
حكم الصكوك التي يكون فيها قدر عال من الخطورة، ولم توضح هذه الخطورة في العقد، حيث تتعمد  ما .41
 بعض الجهات في مرحلة التسويق إبراز الأرباح وعدم ذكر أي نوع من المخاطر؟
حول الصكوك التي تصدر من غير الرجوع إلى هيئة شرعية، أو تعتمد على موافقة عالم  رأي فضيلتكم ما .51
 شرعي واحد لا على هيئة شرعية متعددة الأعضاء؟
 الأمة؟خالف أحد الأحكام التي أجمع عليها علماء  إذاهو حكم الإصدار  ما .61
 يل الإسلامي على وجه الخصوص؟هل هناك حاجة إلى الصكوك من أجل تطوير الاقتصاد عموما، والتمو .71
 ما رأي فضيلتكم حول سوق الصكوك الحالي، هل من انتقادات أو اقتراحات للتطوير؟ .81
ما رأي فضيلتكم حول إلزام ُمصدري الصكوك بالالتزام بالأحكام الصادرة من هيئة المراجعة والمحاسبة  91.
 ؟)الإسلامية (الآيوفي
 الثمين نصحكم ووقتكمأشكر لكم بذل 
  ,
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